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I am not sure that I am writing to the right person, if not 
possible you will be able to put this bit of information in the 
right place. 
I am writing concerning the New York (Brooklyn) Judicial 
system. Which has turned out to be one big joke, a waste of 
time and the tax payers money. 
I am a common laborer not professing to know law, but I do 
have common sense and understanding. I was summon to 
Supreme Court 11115/84 to serve as a possible Trial Juror. 
After walking about for four days, I was finally called and sent 
to court room 574 part II, 11121184. Presiding Judge Leone, 
defendant Mr. Rosada. There were a least sixty or seventy 
people sent to room 574 to pick a jury of twelve plus two 
alternates. The majority of the groups sent were Blacks. Mr. 
Rosado is being tried for Murder 11123/84. 
After telling us what the law expected of us as possible 
Jurors, which as the Judge stated was common sense and a 
promise from each of us to be fair and ·impartial then the 
selection began; it made no difference to the Judge the District 
Attorney or the defendants Lawyer that the majority of the 
prospective Jurors were Black. They manage to pick thirteen 
(13) whites and one black second alternate making sure of an 
all white Jury. 
We were also reminded that we if selected as a Juror, were 
not suppose to take Sympathy into the founding of a Verdict. 
But Mrs. Rosado was in the court room while the selection was 
being made she is about seven months pregnant. She was 
seated right a long with the prospective Jurors and if that isn't 
a sympathy pitch I've never seen one. Some of us do have 
common sense. 
And so I ask you Mrs. Holtzman if we Blacks don't have 
common sense and don't know how to be fair and impartial, 
why send these Summons to us? why are we subject to finds of 
250.00 if we dont appear and told it's our civic duty if we ask 
to be excused. Why bother to call us down to these courts and 
then over look us like a bunch of niave or better yet ignorant 
children. We could be on our jobs or in schools trying to help 
our selves instead of in court house Halls being Made fools of. 
I will not sign IT1Y name because I am a little person and will 
surely get the short end of the stick. I just thought it was time 
for some one to Know about the Judicial system and if there is 
anything that can·be done or anyone who wants to do it, the 
matter will be taken care of. A Copy of this letter will be sent 
to Eye Witness News. 
Thanking You 
• 
• reprinted i't 
.News at 102c, 
!S it, "ha[s] 
' b 110 ·e ster's Third 
~ry 913 <una-
m Drefchi'118ki 
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)lic:hael McCRAY, Petitioner-Appellee, 
v. 
)lobert ABRAMS, Respondent-Appellant. 
No. 1272, Docket 84-2026. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit. 
Argued May 22, 1984. 
Decided Dec. 4, 1984. 
Following affirmance of state court's 
denial of defendant's motion for a new 
trial, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 
N.E.2d 915, and denial of his petition for a 
writ of certiorari from the United States 
Supreme Court, defendant petitioned for a 
writ of habeas corpus. The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York, 576 F.Supp. 1244, Eugene H. 
Nickerson, J., conditionally granted the pe-
tition, and state appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Kearse, Circuit Judge, held that: 
(1) state is not permitted by Sixth Amend-
ment to restrict unreasonably the possibili-
ty that the petit jury will comprise a fair 
cross section of the community, and (2) black 
defendant, who identified several minority 
venirepersons who were excused despite 
having proffered no discernible reason to 
believe that they would not be unbiased 
jurors and one black who was excused de-
spite having an experience that one might 
think would make him identify more with a 
complaining witness than with a defendant, 
made a prima facie showing that prosecu-
tor exercised state's peremptory challenges 
to exclude black and Hispanic jurors on 
basis of their group affiliation and conse-
quently in violation of his Sixth Amend-
ment rights; however, a hearing should 
have been held to give state an opportunity 
to rebut the prima facie case. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded. 
Meskill, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting 
opinion. 
Rehearing in bane denied 2 Cir., 756 
F.2d 277. 
1. Constitutional Law e->221(4) 
Defendant could not mount a success-
ful equal protection challenge to prosecu-
tion's racially discriminatory use of its per-
emptory challenges solely on basis of pros-
ecution's acts in his case. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
2. Jury e->33(1) 
Defendant has no Sixth Amendment 
right to a petit jury of any particular com-
position. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
3. Jury e->33(1.1) 
State is not permitted by Sixth Amend-
ment to restrict unreasonably the possibili-
ty that the petit jury will comprise a fair 
cross section of the community. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
4. Jury e->33(5.1) 
A defendant may appropriately subject 
to scrutiny under the Sixth Amendment the 
prosecution's use of its peremptory chal-
lenges on the basis of its actions in his own 
particular case. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
5. Jury e->33(5.1) 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial 
by an impartial jury allows prosecution to 
exercise its peremptory challenges to ex-
cuse jurors to whom, on the basis of their 
personal history or behavior, some bias 
may be imputed; however, it forbids exer-
cise of such challenges to excuse jurors 
solely on basis of their racial affiliation. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
6. Jury e->33(1.1) 
In order to establish a prima facie vio-
lation of his right to the possibility of a fair 
cross section in the petit jury, a defendant 
must show that in his case the group al-
leged to be excluded is a cognizable group 
in the community, and there is a substan-
tial likelihood that the challenges leading to 
that exclusion have been made on the basis 
of the individual venireperson's group affil-
iation rather than because of any indication 
of a possible inability to decide the case on 
1114 750 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
the basis of the evidence presented. U.S. 
C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
7. Jury e=>33(1.1) 
If defendant established a prima facie 
violation of his right to possibility of a fair 
cross section in the petit jury, burden of 
proof shifts to state to rebut presumption 
of unconstitutional action by showing that 
permissible racially neutral selection crite-
ria and procedures have produced the mo-
nochromatic result; in order to rebut de-
fendant's showing, prosecutor need not 
show a reason rising to the level of cause. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
8. Jury e=>33(1.1) 
If court determines that prosecution's 
presentation is inadequate to rebut defend-
ant's proof of prima facie violation of his 
right to possibility of a fair cross section in 
the petit jury, court should declare a mis-
trial and a new jury should be selected 
from a new panel. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
6. 
9. Jury e=>33(5.1) 
Black defendant, who identified sever-
al minority venirepersons who were ex-
cused despite having proffered no discerni-
ble reason to believe that they would not be 
unbiased jurors and one black who was 
excused despite having an experience that 
one might think would make him identify 
more with a complaining witness than with 
a defendant, made a prima facie showing 
that prosecutor exercised state's perempto-
ry challenges to exclude black and Hispanic 
jurors on basis of their group affiliation 
and consequently in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment rights; however, a hearing 
should have been held to give state an 
opportunity to rebut the prima facie case. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Steven R. Shapiro, New York Civil Liber-
. ties Union, New York City, for petitioner-
appellee. 
I. Although McCray has not been incarcerated 
since his conviction, but rather has been al· 
lowed, upon posting a bond, to remain at liberty 
pending the conclusion of the proceedings chal· 
lenging his conviction, he is, by virtue .:>f the 
limitations placed upon his freedom, in "custo-
Barbara D. Underwood, Asst. Disl 
Brooklyn, N.Y. (Elizabeth Holtzman 
Atty., Kings County, Allan P. Root,' 
Kowalski, Asst. Dist. Attys., Broo 
N.Y., on the brief), for respondent-
lant. 
Before LUMBARD, MESKILL, 
KEARSE, Circuit Judges. 
KEARSE, Circuit Judge: 
Respondent New York State Atto 
General Robert Abrams (the "State") 
peals from a judgment of the United Statll 
District Court for the Eastern District 
New York, Eugene H. Nick't.,rson, Judgl. 
granting the petition of Michael McCray, a 
black defendant convicted in New Yo..t 
State Supreme Court of robbery, for a writ 
of habeas corpus on the ground that the 
prosecution's use of Eeremptory ch~llengel 
to excuse all black and Hispanic venirepel" 
sons from the jury that convicted McCraJ 
viol~rial and eqUII 
protectiOn provisiOns, respectively, of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. McCray v. Abrams, 57f 
F.Supp. 1244 (E.D.N.Y.1983). The distriet 
court ordered the State to release McCraJ 
unless it afforded him a new trial within 60 
days. 1 The court stayed its judgme 
pending this appeal. 
On appeal, the State agrees that a d»-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges 
would violate a defendant's fundamental 
rights. It contends, however, that the dis-
trict court (1) erred in ruling that McCray 
made out a prima facie case that the P~ 
cution so used its peremptory challenges JJl 
his case, and (2) if a prima facie case wal 
established, erred in not holding an evide~ 
tiary hearing giving the State an opportun!' 
ty to rebut the inference that it had ex~ 
cised its peremptory challenges for a con-
stitutionally forbidden purpose. 
dy" within the meaning of the federal ha~ 
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). 
93 Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 
S.Ct. 1571, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973); Jones v. fs"'; 
ningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, .'1 S.Ct. 373. 3 ' 
L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). 
I. BAI 
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We hold that the district court properly 
~ ----
concluded that McCray established a prima 
facrecaSe1natffie state's use of perempto-
rychailenges violated his SIXth mend-
ment right to trial by an impartial jury, and 
w~ t at ortion of the court's ruling. 
We are persuaded, however, that the court 
should have held a hearing to give t e 
Stat£::an .QPp~ty to rebut the _!)rima 
facie case, and we therefore vacate the 
judgffient and remand for further proceed-
ings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On November 15, 1978, Philip Roberts, a 
white art student, was assaulted and 
robbed at gunpoint in downtown Brooklyn 
by three black youths. Roberts returned 
to his college dormitory and notified his 
resident adviser and the police. The police 
did not respond immediately, but on De-
cember 1 and 5, they took Roberts on a 
tour of the area. The first expedition did 
not produce an identification, but during 
the second, Roberts identified McCray, who 
was standing on a street corner near his 
home, as one of the robbers. 
McCray was arrested and charged with 
robbery in the first and second degrees. 
The arrest was McCray's first. 
A. The State Court Proceedings 
McCray's first trial was before a jury 
composed of nine whites and three blacks. 
The trial ended in a hung ·ury, with nine 
jurors voting to convict and three voting to 
acquit. It appears that either two or three 
of the jurors who voted to acquit were 
black (see Part I.C. infra ). 
McCray was retried, with the same As-
sistant District Attorney ("ADA") as prose-
cutor. Under N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 270.-
25(2)(b) (McKinney 1982), each side was 
entitled to fifteen erempto challen es. 
After the exercise of eleven or twelve chal-
lenges by the State, McCray moved for a 
'----
mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor 
appearea- ro-oe s ·~ usmg the 
State-rs peremptorycFiallen es to exclude 
blacks an 1spamcs rom the jury. In 
support of this contention, McCray pointed 
out that "[t]here have been seven black 
people and one Hispanic ven[ire]man up to 
this point. [The prosecutor] has challenged 
each and every one of them. Of her eleven 
challenges, she has used eight to challenge 
blacks and Hispanics." (Transcript of 
hearing dated April 24, 1980, at 5.) 
McCray requested a hearing at which the 
prosecutor would be asked to testify as to 
why she excluded the venirepersons she 
did. Following argument by McCray's 
counsel, the court denied the request for a 
hearing and the motion for a mistrial. The 
record does not reflect that the prosecutor 
made any statement with regard to her use 
of challenges. 
In a later opinion explicating its denial of 
the motion, People v. McCray, 104 Misc.2d 
782, 429 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sup.Ct. Kings Coun-
ty 1980), the court stated that the prosecu-
tor had denied excusing jurors on the 
ground of race. /d. at 783, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 
159. The court stated that it had denied 
the motion for a mistrial because of the 
presumption that peremptory challenges 
are properly exercised and the administra-
tive burden that would be entailed in re-
viewing their exercise. The court furtherJ 
reasoned that excusing a juror of the same 
race as the defendant on the ground of 
perceived group affinity is "a time honored 
basis for the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges." /d. at 784, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 159. 
The case against McCray proceeded to 
trial before an all-white jury (see Part I.D. 
infra). The only evidence against him was 
the identification made by Roberts. The 
jury found McCray guilty, as charged, of 
first and second degree robbery. McCray 
was sentenced to concurrent prison terms 
of 2 to 6 years on the first degree robbery 
charge and 1112 to 4112 years on the second 
degree robbery charge. 
Prior to sentencing, McCray moved for a 
new trial, again attacking the State's use 
of its peremptory challenges. The court 
denied the motion. McCray pursued his 
contention on appeal without success. The 
Appellate Division affirmed without opin-
ion, 84 A.D.2d 769, 444 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d 
Dep't 1981). The New York Court of Ap-
1116 750 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
peals affirmed in a 4-3 decision, 57 N.Y.2d 
542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 N.E.2d 915 
(1982). The Court of Appeals majority, re-
lying on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), conclud-
ed that neither federal nor state constitu-
tional rights were implicated in the prose-
cutor's striking of all minority venireper-
sons, stating that "[t]he benefits of requir-
ing the prosecutor to justify the exercise of 
certain peremptory challenges are simply 
outweighed by the damage to a system of 
jury selection which best serves to guaran-
tee a fair and impartial jury." 57 N.Y.2d 
at 549, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 445, 443 N.E.2d at 
919. The three dissenters viewed Swain as 
not controlling in light of the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of an impartial jury from 
which no large, identifiable segment of the 
community has been systematically exclud-
ed. ld. at 552-53, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 447, 443 
N.E.2d at 921 (Meyer, J., dissenting); id. at 
556-57, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 449, 443 N.E.2d at 
923 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). 
B. The Denial of Certiorari 
McCray then sought a writ of certiorari 
from the United States Supreme Court. 
The Court denied the petition, 461 U.S. 
961, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 
(1983), but five Justices indicated their view 
thata discri~ecuto­
rial peremptones sfloulGnoto e considered 
beyo Marshall, 
joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from 
the denial of certiorari, on the ground that 
"Swain was decided before this Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment 
. . . and . . . . should be reconsidered in 
light of Sixth Amendment principles estab-
lished by our recent cases." Id. at 2441 
(opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting). 
I Three Justices, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, stated that they did not disagree with Justice Marshall's assessment of the 
importance of the issue. Rather, they vot-
ed ~eny certiorari on the ground that 
"further consideration of the substantive 
and procedural ramifications of the prob-
lem by other courts will enable us to deal 
with the issue more wisely at a later date." 
Id. at 2438 (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
McCray moved in the New York Court of 
Appeals for reargument in light of the 
opmwns accompanying the Supreme 
Court's denial of certiorari. The motion 
was denied without opinion, 60 N.Y.2d 587, 
467 N.Y.S.2d 1031, 454 N.E.2d 127 (1983). 
C. The Present Habeas Petition 
Having exhausted his state remedies, 
McCray filed the present petition for habe-
as corpus in the district court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), alleging that "[t]he 
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges 
to exclude all minority members (7 blacks, 
1 hispanic) drawn for the jury panel on the 
basis of race violates the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by an impartial jury and the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." (Petition for Writ of Habe-
as Corpus, filed October 3, 1983, 1111.) In 
support of the petition, the attorney who 
had represented McCray at his second trial 
sub~it stating, inter alia, 
that it was his recollection that the three 
jurors who had voted to acquit McCray at 
his first trial had been the three black 
jurors; that during jury selection at the 
second trial, conducted by the same ADA 
who conducted the first trial, he "noticed 
that [the prosecutor] was pre-emptorily 
[sic] challenging every single black and 
hispanic potential juror"; that the prosecu· 
tor peremptorily challenged seven blacks 
and one Hispanic, at least three of whom 
had not stated that they knew anyone who 
had committed a crime or knew anyone 
accused or suspected of committing a 
crime; and that one of the blacks peremp-
torily challenged stated that he had either 
a relative or a close friend who was a 
victim of a crime and who had been shot 
during the course of a robbery. 
In opposition to the petition, the State 
agreed that the Constitution should be con- .r.o... _ __, 
strued to prohibit the prosecutor from us-
ing peremptory challenges to exclude po-
tential jurors solely on the basis of race. 
and urged the court 
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basis of race, 
)tdb~ 6 ' cCRAY v. ABRAMS 1117 
~~ Clteu7!0F.ldttt3 (1984) 
and urged the  ibit such u e by L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 
&he defendant as well. The ~te a~ed Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 
that in the present case McCray had not (1978), Judge Nickerson set out the proce-
JD&(ie a prima facie showing that the prose- dure to be foll~se alleg-
eutor used peremptory challenges to ex- es t at th~tion is abusing its per-
elude jurors solely on the basis of race. It emptory challenges. If the prosecution's 
asserted that the prosecutor had not used peremptories have been used in such~way 
peremptory challenges to exclude every mi- as to establish-a rima facie case of racial ? Z 
DOrity member drawn for the jury panel, it discrimination, the presumption o proper 
being the recollection of both trial counsel use of the peremptory gives way and the 
t;bat one black juror had been selected to burden shifts to the prosecution to justify 
eerve as an alternate. It stated that de- its challenges on nonraciaJ grounds. Citing 
fense counsel had conceded that at least Wheeler, the court held that a prima facie 
some of the minority jurors challenged by case of improper challenges may be estab-
tbe prosecutor had made statements during lished when the venirepersons excluded are 
the voir dire that would lead the prosecutor members of a " 'cognizable group' discrimi-
to seek to excuse them. The State conced- nation against which is prohibited," and the 
ed that the prosecutor had exercised seven probable reason for their exclusion is their 
peremptory challenges against blacks and membership in the group rather than any 
one against a Hispanic, and stated that she 
had used either three or four against white predisposition regarding the specific case 
I I 
I 
venirepersons. Relying on the trial court's at bar. 576 F.Supp. at 1249. Once this j 
opinion, 104 Misc.2d at 783, 429 N.Y.S.2d at showing is made, the prosecution may re-
159, the State asserted that when the pros- but the prima facie case by demonstrating 
eeutor's use of peremptory challenges was that its peremptory challenges were moti-
questioned during the jury selection pro- vated by pe~ case-specific biases, ? /~ ? 
cess, the prosecutor had denied excusing rather than by group association. Its ex- } · 
jurors on the basis of race. The State did planati a level that ~ !-
not, prior to the district court's announce- would warrant a c~n- /J-.1-4-k.d~ c 
ment of its decision on McCray's petition, eluding~erred by · 
submit an affidavit from the ADA who had failing to inquire into the bases for the 
conducted McCray's trials. prosecution's use of peremptory cnallenges 
On December 19, 1983, in an opinion re-
ported at 576 F.Supp. 1244, Judge Nicker-
son ruled in favor of cCray. TheCourt 
ruled that judicial scrutiny of discriminato-
ry prosecutorial peremptory challenges 
was required by the Sixth Amendment. /d. 
at 1248. Further, relying on the opinions 
accompanying the Supreme Court's denial 
of McCray's petition __.-f.o4 ertiorari, the 
court concluded th~t'"Swain--V. Alabama is 
no lo~~d law·;· an[ that "[t]he equal 
protection clause should be construed to 
prohibit a prosecutor's exercise of peremp-
tory challenges to exclude blacks solely on 
the basis of race in any case." /d. at 1249. 
According considerable weight to state 
court developments in California and Mas-
sachusetts, see Commonwealth v. Soares, 
877 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 
against black and Hispanic venirepersons, 
the district court ruled that a new trial was 
constitutionally required. 
After the district court rendered its deci-
sion, the State moved to "amend the judg-
ment and to expand the record," contend-
ing that the court had overlooked vital cri-
teria for determining whether McCray had 
established a prima facie case, and that the 
State was entitled to a hearing on the mer-
its of McCray's contention. In support of 
this motion, the State submitted an affida-
vit from the former ADA who had conduct-
ed McCray's trials, describing her use of 
peremptory challenges and the proceedings 
on McCray's motion for a mistrial during 
the jury selection process. The affidavit 
stated that the prosecutor had not discrimi-
nated on the basis of race in selecting 
jurors for the trials of McCray; that she 
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had challenged a number of jurors as a State's racially discriminatory use of ita 
result of their or their family's negative peremptories, ~that even if he did make 
experiences with the criminal justice sys· he necessary prima facie shoWing, the 
tern because she believed those jurors we ~ ourr-shoul not -~ the writ 
biased against the prosecution; that she without holding a ean g a low the 
had unsuccessfully sought to have those State to presen rebutting evidence. 
jurors excused for cause before excusing Notwithstanding the State's doctrinal 
them peremptorily; and that the first alter- concessions, we must begin with a review 
nate juror was black and that she did not of the court's ruling that the Sixth and 
excuse him although she still had peremp- Fourteenth Amendments bar the prosecu-
tory challenges available. The prosecutor tor's discriminatory use of peremptory 
stated that the trial judge had convened a challenges, for the constitutional doctrine 
hearing on McCray's motion for a mistrial; informs the analysis of both whether a 
that the court asked her whether she had prima facie case has been established and 
discriminated on the basis of race in select· what proceedings should follow the estab-
ing the jury and that she had answered in lishment of such a case. Our review per-
the negative; that she asked for permission suades us that the court correctly ruled 
to explain, relying on notes she had kept, that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the 
the reasons for her peremptory challenges; prosecution's use of challenges to discrimi-
and that the judge refused her permission nate on the basis of race and that McCray 
to explain, stating that he was satisfied presented~dence iO esta ish a 
that she had not discriminated on the basis prima acie case of sue use. e agree 
of race in making her challenges. The with ~r, that the State 
prosecutor stated that after McCray's first should have been accorded an opportunity 
trial, she had interviewed those jurors at to rebut that showing. 
some length and that to the best of her 
recollection, of the three jurors who voted 
for acquittal two were black and one was 
white, and that, according to the jurors 
interviewed, the white juror who voted for 
acquittal was the "motivating force" be-
hind the remaining two votes for acquittal. 
Judge Nickerson treated the State's mo-
tion to amend judgment and expand the 
record as a motion for reargument of the 
petition and denied it without comment. 
This appeal followed. 
D. The Issues on This Appeal 
~
On this appeal, the State makes a rela· 
tively narrow challenge to the district 
court's decision. Its posi~ is that the 
court correctly held thafi.t:fle Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments bar the use of 
peremptory challenges to strike potential 
jurors on the basis of race. Further it 
states that the recollections of both trial 
counsel agree that the jury that convicted 
~Cray consisted of twelve white jurors. 
l.7 ~ ue State arg)!es ~l_y t~ McCray _b.iled 
to establish a prima facie case of the 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND Swain 
v. Alabama. 
We begin with a review of {'SW(iin,v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.~13 
L.Ed.2d 759, which is the only United 
States Supreme Court decision thus far to 
address directly the constitutional validity 
of the use of peremptory jury challenges to 
discriminate on the basis of race. Al-
though much criticized, Swain has led most 
courts to reject all constitutional challenges 
to the prosecutor's alleged discriminatory 
use of peremptories. 
A. Swain v. Alabama 
Swain was a black defendant convicted 
by an all-white jury of the rape of a wh~te 
woman. In his case, the trial jury venu-e 
had included eight blacks, two of whom 
were exempt; the prosecution used its pel" 
emptory challenges to remove the other 
six. Swain also showed that in the county 
in which he was tried there had not since 
1950 "been a Negro o~ a petit jury in eith?" 
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e:riminal cases prosecutors ha[d] consistent- its full purpose,'" id. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at 
1y and systematically exercised their 835 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 
8
t;rikes to prevent any and all Negroes on U.S. 370, 378, 13 S.Ct. 136, 139, 36 L.Ed. 
petit jury venires from serving on the petit 1011 (1892)). 
jury itself." 380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 
837; see also id. at 231-32, 85 S.Ct. at 
841-42 (Goldberg, J., dissenting: "[P]eti-
tioner established by competent evidence 
.. . that no Negro within the memory of 
persons now living has ever served on any 
petit jury in any civil or criminal case tried 
in Talladega County, Alabama."). Invok-
ing a long line of cases beginning with 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 10 Otto 303, 
100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880), that had 
held that "a State's purposeful or deliber-
ate denial to Negroes on account of race of 
participation as jurors in the administration 
of justice violates the Equal Protection 
Clause," Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 
2Q3-{}4, 85 S.Ct. at 826-27 (citing Ex parte 
Virginia, 10 Otto 339, 100 U.S. 339, 25 
L.Ed. 676 (1880); Gibson v. Mississippi, 
162 U.S. 565, 16 S.Ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 
(1896)), Swain contended, inter alia, that 
the prosecution's use of its peremptory 
challenges constituted invidious discrimina-
tion in the selection of jurors, in violation 
of his rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Supreme Court disagreed. 
In Part II of its opinion, the Court dis-
cussed at some length the history and pur-
poses of the peremptory challenge. Trac-
ing such challenges back past The Ordi-
nance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 
(1305), the Court noted the persistent use 
of peremptories in American trials and the 
prevailing view that they are a necessary 
part of a trial by jury, for they allow the 
challenge of a person thought to be less 
than fair and impartial but for whom cause 
to strike cannot be shown, and permit the 
removal of a person who may have been 
offended by a probing voir dire. The Court 
stated that "[t]he essential nature of the 
peremptory challenge is that it is one exer-
cised without a reason stated, without in-
quiry and without being subject to the 
court's control," 380 U.S. at 220, 85 S.Ct. at 
836: and that " 'it is, as Blackstone says, an 
arbitrary and capricious right; and it must 
be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of 
Given the nature and the history of the 
peremptory challenge, the Court found 
~erit in the proposition that the system, 
"m and of itself, provides justification for 
striking any group of otherwise qualified 
jurors in any given case, whether they be 
Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those 
with blue eyes." 380 U.S. at 212, 85 S.Ct. 
at 831. The Court concluded that "we can-
not hold that the striking of Negroes in a 
particular case is a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws." ld. at 221, 85 S.Ct. at 
836. 
In the light of the purpose of the per-
emptory system and the function it 
serves in a pluralistic society in connec-
tion with the institution of jury trial, we 
cannot hold that the Constitution re-
quires an examination of the prosecu-
tor's reasons for the exercise of his chal-
lenges in any given case. The presump-
tion in any particular case must be that 
the prosecutor is using the State's chal-
lenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury 
to try the case before the court. The 
presumption is not overcome and the 
prosecutor therefore subJected to exam-
ination by allegations that in the case 
at hand all Negroes were removed from 
the Jury or that they were removed be-
cause they were Negroes. Any other 
result, we think, would establish a rule 
wholly at odds with the peremptory chal-
lenge system as we know it. 
ld. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837 (emphasis added). 
The Court went on to say, in Part III of 
its opinion, that a defendant could require 
judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's use of 
peremptory challenges if he could show 
that 
the prosecutor in a county, in case after 
case, whatever the circumstances, what-
ever the crime and whoever the defend-
ant or the victim may be, is responsible 
for the removal of Negroes who have 
been selected as qualified jurors by the 
jury commissioners and who have sur-
! I 
I 
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vived challenges for cause, with the re-
sult that no Negroes ever serve on petit 
juries . . . . If the State has not seen fit 
to leave a single Negro on any jury in a 
criminal case, the presumption protecting 
the prosecutor may well be overcome. 
Such proof might support a reasonable 
inference that Negroes are excluded 
from juries for reasons wholly unrelated 
to the outcome of the particular case on 
trial and that the peremptory system is 
being used to deny the Negro the same 
right and opportunity to participate in 
the administration of justice enjoyed by 
the white population. These ends the 
peremptory challenge is not designed to 
facilitate or justify. 
!d. at 223-24, 85 S.Ct. at 837-38. The 
Court found, however, that Swain had not 
met this standard of proof. 
B. Mission Impossible 
Not surprisingly, almost no other defend-
ants in the nearly tw<J decades - since the 
Swain decision nave met this standard of 
pro~er.- For example, in United 
States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961, 96 S.Ct. 
1745, 48 L.Ed.2d 206 (1976), the defendant 
showed that "[d]uring the year 1974 in the 
15 cited cases involving black defendants a 
total of 70 Negroes were potentially avail-
able as trial jurors and 57 of those were 
2. Equal protection challenges were likewise re-
jected in, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 
1207, 1213-17 (5th Cir.197l) (In trials held dur-
ing a certain week, the government peremptori-
ly challenged 10 out of 12 blacks in cases where 
the defendant was black, but only three out of 
12 blacks where the defendant was white.); 
State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10 (Mo.Ct.App.1975) 
(The prosecution peremptorily challenged sev-
enty-five percent of black venirepersons in thir-
ty-one criminal cases involving black defend-
ants.); see also United States v. Newman, 549 
F.2d 240 (2d Cir.1977) (rejecting statistical evi-
dence as not probative of extent to which blacks 
were peremptorily excused within division in 
which trial was held); United States v. Boyd, 610 
F.2d 521, 526 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1089, 100 S.Ct. 1052, 62 L.Ed.2d 777 (1980); 
United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799, 801 (5th 
Cir.1979); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 
1064, 1076 (5th Cir.1977) (of six blacks in origi-
nal venire, one excused for cause, other five 
excused peremptorily by government), cert. de-
stricken by the government through the 
use of its peremptory challenges." !d. at 
848. At Carter's first trial two of four 
blacks were peremptorily challenged by the 
government; at his second trial, all five 
blacks were so challenged. His equal pro-
tection argument was rejected. In United 
States v. Danzey, 476 F.Supp. 1065 (E.D.N. 
Y.1979), aff'd mem., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878, 101 S.Ct. 225, 66 
L.Ed.2d 101 (1980), four blacks were per-
emptorily challenged by the government, 
and one black was seated on the jury only 
after the prosecutor had exhausted his 
challenges. The prosecutor explained to 
the trial judge: " I make it a practice to 
attempt to exclude as best I can all jurors 
so that to [sic] exclude jurors of the same 
ethnic background as the defendant." !d. 
at 1066. Danzey's equal protection argu-
ment was rejected.z Not until State v. 
Brown, 371 So.2d 751 (La.1979), and State 
v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162 (La.1979), 
involving a prosecutor who admitted the 
practice of striking blacks and whose use 
of peremptory challenges had been re-
peatedly appealed by black defendants, did 
any court find the Swain burden satisfied. 
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent 
to the denial of McCray's petition for cer-
1 
tiorari, "[i]n the nearly two decades s~nce it 
was decided, Swain has been the subJect of / ' 
almost universal and often scathing criti- " 
nied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 743, 54 L.Ed.2d 767 
(1978); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 
42-43 (8th Cir.) (all three blacks peremptorily 
challenged by government), cert. denied. 426 
U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2631, 49 L.Ed.2d 377 (1976); 
United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 930 (8th 
Cir.1973) (all four blacks peremptorily chal· 
lenged by government), cert. denied, 414 u.s.) 
1137, 94 S.Ct. 882, 38 L.Ed.2d 762 (1974; 
Greene v. United States, 486 F.Supp. 199, 200 
(W.D.Mo.) (all five blacks peremptorily c~ 
lenged by government), alf'd, 626 F.2d 75 (8 
6 Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 87 ' 
101 S.Ct. 220, 66 L.Ed.2d 98 (1980); Rogers ~· 
State, 257 Ark. 144, 515 S.W.2d 79 (1974) (all sax 
blacks peremptorily challenged by state),~ 
denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1656, 44 L.3d· 14 
87 (1975). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R- . 
(1977) (Swain standard not found satisfied; 
any case from any jurisdiction); J . Van ~9~ 
Jury Selection Procedures 154--60 & nn. 
(1977). 
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. m" McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. C18 0 
g61 963, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 2440, 77 L.Ed.2d 
tS2Z (1983) (opinion of Marshall, J., dissent-
ing; footnote, citing numerous _writings, 
rnitted). See, e.g., Comment, Swam v. Ala-
:.ma: A Constitutional Blueprint for the 
perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 
Va.L.Rev. 1157 (1966); Note, Limiting the 
peremptory Challenge: Representation 
of (}roups on Petit Juries, 86 Yale L.J . 
1715, 1723 & n. 36 (1977); Winick, Prosecu-
torial Peremptory Challenge Practice in 
Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and 
0 Constitutional Analysis, 81 Mich.L.Rev. 
1 1o-11 (1982). Many of these commenta-
ries have been critical, in our view rightly, 
of the nearly impossible task set for the 
defendant in Part III of the Swain opinion, 
ie., to show that in all cases, in all circum-
stances, whoever the victim, whoever the 
defendant, blacks were excluded from ju-
ries without cause. 
We disagree as well with some of the 
( 
fundamental premises found in Part II of 
Swain. For example, the Court's state-
ment that there was no violation of equal 
protection because blacks and whites "are 
alike subject to being challenged without 
cause," 380 U.S. at 221, 85 S.Ct. at 836, 
ignores practice. In most communities a 
majority of those eligible for jury duty are 
white; and as a practical matter, the prose-
does not peremptorily excuse whites 
because they are whites. Thus, al-
· "~~"'~..._ the implication in Part III of 
is that "the Negro [should have) 
f} L.._ the same right and opportunity to partici-
pate in the administration of justice en-
joyed by the white population," id. at 224, 
85 S.Ct. at 838, we think the assumption of 
Part II that that right is not violated sim-
ply because both blacks and whites are 
"subject to" being peremptorily excluded is 
fanciful. 
More importantly, Swain's basic premise 
furthers the erosion of that right. The 
Swain Court found it permissible for a 
3. Compare Ross with Ham v. South Carolina, 
409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973), 
in which the Court had held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause required the granting of the defend-
ant's request for voir dire questions exploring 
prosecutor to eliminate all blacks in any 
given case simply because they are blacks, 
because the "presumption . . . must be that 
the prosecutor is using the State's chal-
lenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury 
.. .. " /d. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837. The 
implication of this presumption, however, is 
that in any given case before the court, 
whites can be fair and impartial, whereas 
blacks, simply because they are blacks, 
cannot. The application of this premise as 
Swain suggests to "any given" case-as 
for example, where a black defendant is 
accused of a homicidal attack on a white 
person, e.g., Ri@!:!!o v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 
96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976), or 
where there may be less of a racial under-
current, as where a black defendant is ac-
cused of receiving stolen property, e.g., 
People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 
N.Y.S.2d 739 (2d Dep't 1981), appeal with-
drawn, 55 N.Y.2d 879 (1982), or even 
where a white defendant is charged with 
an offense against a white victim, e.g., Pe-
ters v. Kijj, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 
L.Ed.2d 83 (1972)--results in the conclusion 
that in each case only white jurors will be 
sufficiently fair and impartial to adjudicate 
the controversy. Yet, it is fallacious to j 
assume that all persons sharing an attri-
bute of skin color, or of gender or ethnic 
origin, etc., will ipso facto be partial to 
others sharing that attribute. Thus, in 
jury selection contexts other than those 
involving peremptory challenges, the Court 
has rejected the notion that a particular 
racial or ethnic group will make determina-
tions solely on the basis of their group 
affiliation. In Ristaino v. Ross, for exam-
ple, the Court ru~t)he mere fact 
that the victim of the crimes alleged was a 
white man and the defendants were Ne-
groes" did not give the defendant a consti- \ 
tutional right even to cause a voir dire 
question relating specifically to racial prej-
udice to be asked in addition to the usual 
questions as to general bias.3 424 U.S. at 
racial prejudice because the black defendant 
was charged with possession of marijuana, was 
a civil rights activist, and contended that he had 
been framed because of his civil rights activi-
ties. 
~ ... !. 
l 
1 I ,. ' ,.,.-. ;.; 
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597, 96 S.Ct. at 1021. And in Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499, 97""S:Cl1272, 
1282, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), the Court re-
jected any presumption that a given ethnic 
group will not discriminate against mem-
bers of their own group. • 
According to Swain, however, there is no 
type of case in which blacks qua blacks 
may not be summarily eliminated on the 
presumption that the prosecutor is merely 
seeking a "fair and impartial jury." The 
premise of Swain and the rarity of whole-
sale challenges to white venirepersons thus 
serve only to limit artificially the opportuni-
ty of blacks for participation in our system 
of justice, and to perpetuate an invidious 
proposition of racial inferiority that has 
been outlawed in virtually every area of 
public affairs-in employment, in educa-
tion, in housing, in property rights. How 
unfortunate that the invidious proposition 
has been allowed to flourish in the adminis-
tration of justice. 
C. State Court Developments 
In light of the near impossibility experi-
enced by defendants in attempting to meet 
the requirements set by Swain, a small 
number of state courts have fashioned 
standards based on their state constitutions 
to guarantee to the defendant a trial before 
a jury that has not had cognizable groups 
eliminated by the discriminatory acts of the 
prosecutor. In most instances, the state 
court was influenced by the fact that at the 
time Swain was decided, the Supreme 
Court had not yet ruled that the guarantee 
of the Sixth Amendment of trial by an 
impartial jury was binding on the states 
through incorporation into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The first such case was People v. Wheel-
er, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 
P.2d 748 (1978). In Wheeler, the prosecu-
tor had peremptorily challenged every 
black person called from the venire, with-
out any effort to challenge them for cause 
and with little or no questioning that could 
have disclosed any biases. The California 
Supreme Court ruled that the use of per-
emptory challenges to remove prospective 
black jurors on the sole ground of "group 
association" violated the defendant's right 
to a jury drawn from a representative cross 
section of the community, as guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 16 of the California Con-
stitution ("Trial by jury is an inviolate right 
and shall be secured to all .. .. "). The 
court stated that while the constitutional 
provision did not grant the defendant a 
right to a jury that mirrored the demo-
graphic composition of the population, it 
did entitle him to "a petit jury that is as 
near an approximation of the ideal cross-
section of the community as the process of 
a random draw permits." 148 Cal.Rptr. at 
904, 583 P.2d at 762. 
The Wheeler court stated that the de-
fendant could establish a prima facie case 
by showing that the persons excluded were 
members of a cognizable group within the 
meaning of the representative cross-section 
rule, and that there was a strong likelihood 
that these prospective jurors were chal-
lenged not as a result of any specific bias 
but only because of their group association. 
Upon such a showing by the defendant, the 
burden shifts to the prosecution to justify 
its use of the peremptory challenge on spe-
cific bias grounds reasonably relevant to 
the case at hand. The prosecution's rea-
sons need not rise to the level needed to 
sustain a challenge for cause. !d., at 
906-07, 583 P.2d at 764-65. 
Wheeler was followed shortly by Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 
N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 
S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979), in which 
the prosecution had peremptorily chal-
lenged twelve of the thirteen black jurors 
drawn from the panel. Following the lead 
of the California Supreme Court in Wheel-
er, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that Article 12 of the Declara· 
tion of Rights of the Massachusetts Consti-
tution, which guarantees the right to trial 
by jury of one's peers, protected the de-
fendant against the prosecution's use of its 
challenges on racially discriminatorY 
grounds. 
In State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 
P.2d 716 (Ct.App.1980), the Court of Ap-
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Is of New Mexico rejected a claim by a 
:endant that his constitutional rights had 
been violated when the prosecution used a 
peremptory challenge to excuse the one 
black member of the venire, holding that 
the defendant had not made out a prima 
facie case of discrimination. The court 
went on to state, however, that "improper, 
systematic exclusion by use of peremptory 
challenges can be shown . . . under the 
Jfheeler-Soares rationale and supported by 
Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico 
Constitution, where the absolute number of 
challenges in the one case raises the infer-
ence of systematic acts by the prosecutor." 
612 P.2d at 718. 
In New York, two courts ruled that the 
New York Constitution forbade the prose-
cutor's discriminatory use of his perempto-
ry challenges. In People v. Kagan, 101 
Misc.2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup.Ct.N.Y. 
County 1979), in which the defendants were 
Jewish, the trial court ruled that the prose-
cutor was forbidden to use his perempto-
ries to challenge Jews simply because they 
were Jews. The court found, however, 
that the defendants had not established a 
prima facie case of such use. In People v. 
Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 
(1981), in which the defendant was black, 
the Appellate Division, after "extensive 
and thoughtful analysis," People v. 
McCray, 57 N.Y.2d at 552 n. 1, 457 N.Y. 
S.2d at 446 n. 1 (Meyer, J., dissenting), 
ruled that the prosecution's use of all of its 
peremptory challenges to excuse all black 
venirepersons violated the New York Con-
stitution. The appellate court quashed the 
results of the jury selection procedures and 
ordered a new tria1.4 Both Kagan and 
Thompson appear to have been overruled 
sub silentio by the New York Court of 
4. The standard of appellate review suggested by 
the court in People v. Thompson differed some-
what from that suggested by the Wheeler and 
Soares courts. The Thompson court indicated 
that even if a significant number of black jurors 
had been peremptorily challenged, the trial 
court need not inquire into the prosecutor's 
reasons for those challenges if the trial court's 
own observations of the jury selection process 
indicated that the peremptories were properly 
exercised. 79 A.D.2d at 11~11. 435 N.Y.S.2d at 
Appeals's ruling in People v. McCray. See 
also People v. Payne, 106 Ill.App.3d 1034, 
62 Ill.Dec. 744, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982), 
rev'd, 99 Ill.2d 135, 75 Ill.Dec. 643, 457 
N .E.2d 1202 (1983). 
Most recently, in State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 
481 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court 
"[b ]elieving that it is time in Florida to hold 
that jurors should be selected on the basis 
of their individual characteristics and that 
they should not be subject to being rejected 
solely because of the color of their skin," id. 
at 482, held that Article I, section 16 of the 
Florida Constitution prohibits both the 
state and the defense from using perempto-
ry challenges in any given case to exclude 
prospective jurors solely because of their 
race, id. at 486-487. The court ruled that 
the test set out in Swain is no longer to be 
used by Florida courts when confronted 
with an allegation of discriminatory use of 
peremptories. 
D. Applicability of Swain's Equal Pro-
tection Analysis to the Present Case 
[1] In light of (a) the criticisms of 
Swain, (b) the developments in Sixth 
Amendment doctrine since the decision of 
Swain, (c) the state court developments 
curtailing the use of peremptory challenges 
on a discriminatory basis, and (d) the inti-
mations in the opinions joined by five Jus-
tices in connection with the denial of 
McCray's petition for certiorari that the 
time is drawing near for a reconsideration 
of Swain, both McCray and the State urge 
us to rule that Swain is no longer good 
law. While the assaults on Swain are not 
without considerable force, we are con-
strained to note that, on the question of the 
vulnerability of the prosecution's use of 
peremptory challenges to attack under the 
755. The court concluded that since the reasons 
underlying the use of peremptory challenges 
may "not [be] as readily apparent to those who 
were not in the position of the Judge who at-
tended the voir dire," the exclusion of a signifi -
cant number of black jurors would be "insuffi-
cient, in and of itself, to warrant reversal of a 
trial court's determination not to make inquiry" 
into the use of the challenges. /d. at 111, 435 
N.Y.S.2d at 755; accord State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 
481 at 485-486 (Fla.1984). 
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Equal Protection Clause, Swain is clear, 
direct, and unequivocal. It states that a 
defendant may not mount a successful 
equal protection challenge to the prosecu-
tion's racially discriminatory use of its per-
emptory challenges solely on the basis of 
the prosecution's acts in a single case. 
Since McCray's contentions rest solely on 
the State's use of its peremptories in his 
own case, he does not meet the require-
ments set by Swain. We therefore decline 
to rest our decision in this case on equal 
protection principles. 
We are not, however, required to read 
Swain as setting the standards for all oth-
er provisions of the Constitution. It is true 
that at the end of Part II of the Swain 
opinion, the Court stated that in light of 
the importance of the peremptory chal-
lenge system it could not hold that "the 
Constitution" required an examination into 
the prosecution's reasons for the exercise 
of such challenges. 380 U.S. at 222, 85 
S.Ct. at 837. And we note that at least one 
commentator has taken these words literal-
ly, inferring that Swain has held the per-
emptory challenge "immune . . . from fed-
eral constitutional inquiry of any sort." 
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 Harv. 
L.Rev. 70, 194 (1983). We think it inappro-
priate and improvident to consider this ref-
erence out of the context of the opinion as 
a whole. All of the Court's constitutional 
analysis focused on the Equal Protection 
Clause. We do not believe the single gen-
eral reference was intended to remove this 
focus. 
Nor do we view United States v. New-
man, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir.1977), the only 
prior opinion of this Court addressing the 
prosecution's peremptory use of its chal-
lenges on a racial basis, as dispositive of 
Sixth Amendment issues. Newman was 
argued and decided on the basis of district-
wide statistical data submitted in support 
of a due process theory. The Court disa-
greed with the use of district-wide data, 
noting that the community of which a jury 
is to represent a fair cross section is the 
division in which the defendant is tried, not 
the entire district. The Court held that 
Swain was the governing authority and 
that the statistical analysis was flawed, 
and concluded that the "due process claims 
made by the defendants in this case have 
no support in law nor do the facts alleged 
have support in the evidence." /d. at 250. 
We see no evidence in the Newman opinion 
that the parties presented any substantial 
argument that the government's racially 
discriminatory use of its peremptories in a 
given case might violate the Sixth Amend-
ment. 
Accordingly, we tum now to the Sixth 
Amendment. 
III. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury .... " In Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 
L.Ed.2d 497 (1968), decided three years af-
ter Swain, the Supreme Court ruled that 
this provision is applicable to the states: 
Because we believe that trial by jury in 
criminal cases is fundamental to the 
American scheme of justice, we hold that 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a 
right of jury trial in all criminal cases 
which-were they to be tried in a federal 
court-would come within the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee. 
/d. at 149, 88 S.Ct. at 1447 (footnote omit-
ted). Many cases construing the scope of 
the states' responsibilities in light of the 
Sixth Amendment's guarantee were to fol-
low. 
A. The Development of Sixth Amend· 
ment Doctrine As Applicable to tM 
States 
In a long sequence of cases, the Supreme 
Court has faced such questions as whether 
the Sixth Amendment permitted the exclu-
sion of blacks women and conscientioua 
objectors frorr: jury pa,nels; whether jurr 
verdicts of guilty could be less than unaru; 
mous; and whether juries could consist 0 
groups smaller than the traditional twelve. 
The answers to these questions have var-
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;ed but the touchstone of each analysis has 
~n whether the practice in question de-
prived the defendant of the possibility of a 
jurY that represented a cross section of the 
community. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 
s.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), the Court 
considered whether the Sixth Amendment 
required that all juries consist of twelve 
persons, rather than six as permitted by 
Florida law for noncapital offenses. Not-
ing that Duncan v. Louisiana had describ-
ed the rationale for a right to a jury trial as 
providing "an inestimable safeguard 
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecu-
tor and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge," 391 U.S. at 156, 88 S.Ct. 
at 1451, the Williams Court stated that 
the essential feature of a jury obviously 
lies in the interposition between the ac-
cused and his accuser of the common-
sense judgment of a group of laymen, 
and in the community participation and 
shared responsibility that results from 
that group's determination of guilt or 
innocence. 
399 U.S. at 100, 90 S.Ct. at 1906. The 
Court concluded that the twelve-person re-
quirement was not of constitutional dimen-
sion and that a six-person jury was of 
sufficient size to comprise a cross section 
of the community. The Court stated that 
the number of persons on the jury should 
"be large enough to promote group deliber-
ation, free from outside attempts at intimi-
dation, and to provide a fair possibility for 
obtaining a representative cross-section of 
the community." /d. 
In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 98 
S.Ct. 1029, 55 L.Ed.2d 234 (1978), the Court 
ruled that a jury of five was too small. Six 
Justices observed that so limited a number 
probably could not adequately include a 
cross section of the community. See id. at 
239, 242, 98 S.Ct. at 1038, 1040 (opinion of 
Blackmun, J., expressing "substantial 
doubt about the ability of juries truly to 
represent the community as membership 
decreases below six"); id. at 245, 98 S.Ct. 
at 1042 (opinion of White, J.: "a jury of 
fewer than six persons would fail to repre-
750 F.2d-26 
sent the sense of the community and hence 
not satisfy the fair cross-section require-
ment of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments .... "); id. at 246, 98 S.Ct. at 1042 
(opinion of Brennan, J.). 
In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 
S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), the Court 
ruled that the Sixth Amendment did not 
prohibit the states from allowing conviction 
by verdicts of 11-1 or 10-2 rather than 
requiring unanimity. Four Justices ob-
served that 
" . . . the essential feature of a jury obvi-
ously lies in the interposition between 
the accused and his accuser of the com-
monsense judgment of a group of lay-
men ... . " Williams v. Florida, supra, 
[399 U.S.] at 100 [90 S.Ct. at 1906]. A 
requirement of unanimity, however, does 
not materially contribute to the exercise 
of this commonsense judgment. As we 
said in Williams, a jury will come to 
such a judgment as long as it consists of 
a group of laymen representative of a 
cross section of the community who have 
the duty and the opportunity to deliber-
ate, free from outside attempts at intimi-
dation, on the question of a defendant's 
guilt. 
406 U.S. at 410-11, 92 S.Ct. at 1633 (opinion 
of White, J.). Similarly a fifth Justice stat-
ed that "the Court has held that criminal 
defendants are entitled, as a matter of due 
process, to a jury drawn from a representa-
tive cross section of the community. This 
is an essential element of a fair and impar-
tial jury trial." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 
U.S. 356, 378, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 1642, 32 
L.Ed.2d 152 (1972) (opinion of Powell, J., 
concurring in the judgment in Apodaca v. 
Oregon). 
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 
88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), which 
· may have been decided on the basis of due 
process, rather than Sixth Amendment, 
principles (see Part III.B. infra ), the Court 
considered a challenge to an Illinois statute 
that permitted the state to challenge for 
cause potential jurors who were opposed to 
capital punishment. Under the Illinois sys-
tem, the jury not only decided guilt, but, if 
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it found the defendant guilty, it determined 
whether his sentence should be imprison-
ment or death. The Court reversed With-
erspoon's conviction on the ground that it 
was 
self-evident that, in its role as arbiter of 
the punishment to be imposed, this jury 
fell woefully short of that impartiality to 
which the petitioner was entitled under 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
/d. at 518, 88 S.Ct. at 1775. The Court 
concluded that "in a nation less than half 
of whose people believe in the death penal-
ty, a jury composed exclusively of [persons 
who believe in that penalty] cannot speak 
for the community." /d. at 519-20, 88 
S.Ct. at 1776 (footnote omitted). 
In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 
S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), the Court 
considered a statute that provided that no 
woman was to be selected for jury service 
unless she had filed with the clerk of the 
court a written declaration of her desire to 
serve. The result was that in the parish in 
which the petitioner was tried, although 
53% of those eligible for jury service were 
women, no more than 10% of the venireper-
sons were women. The Court concluded 
that the provision violated the Sixth 
Amendment since it operated to exclude 
women from jury service and thus unduly 
restricted the possibility of a defendant's 
having a petit jury that represented a fair 
cross section of the community: 
We accept the fair-cross-section re-
quirement as fundamental to the jury 
trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment and are convinced that the require-
ment has solid foundation. The purpose 
of a jury is to guard against the exercise 
of arbitrary power-to make available 
the commonsense judgment of the com-
munity as a hedge against the overzea-
lous or mistaken prosecutor and in pref-
erence to the professional or perhaps ov-
erconditioned or biased response of a 
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S., 
at 155-156 [88 S.Ct. , at 1450-1451]. This 
prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the 
jury pool is made up of only special seg-
ments of the populace or if large, distinc-
tive groups are excluded from the pool. 
Community participation in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law, moreover, is 
not only consistent with our democratic 
heritage but is also critical to public con-
fidence in the fairness of the criminal 
justice system. Restricting jury service 
to only special groups or excluding iden-
tifiable segments playing major roles in 
the community cannot be squared with 
the constitutional concept of jury trial. 
419 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 697-698. The 
Taylor Court concluded that "[i]f the fair-
cross-section rule is to govern the selection 
of juries, as we have concluded it must, 
women cannot be systematically excluded 
from jury panels from which petit juries 
are drawn." 419 U.S. at 533, 95 S.Ct. at 
699. 
The Court cautioned that it did not mean 
to imply that petit juries actually chosen 
must mirror the community or reflect the 
various distinctive groups in the popula-
tion. Its holding was not that the defend-
ant was guaranteed a jury of a particular 
composition, but rather that he was entitled 
to a venire from which distinctive groups 
had not been systematically excluded. 419 
U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 701. 
In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 
S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Court 
struck down a statute that exempted wom-
en from jury duty upon their request for 
exemption. The Court held that "such sys-
tematic exclusion of women that results in 
jury venires averaging less than 15% fe-
male violates the Constitution's fair-cross-
section requirement." /d. at 360, 99 S.Ct. 
at 666. 
The Court's acknowledgement of the 
cross-section ideal in state trials is also 
reflected in many of its earlier rulings in 
federal cases. In Glasser v. United 
States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 
680 (1942), the Court analyzed the nature 
of the right to a jury trial in the context of 
the Sixth Amendment's strictures on the 
federal government and concluded that it 
would be impermissible to limit venireworn· 
en to those who were members of specifiC 
civic organizations: 
[T]he proper functi' 
tern, and, indeed, ' 
requires that the j 
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not the organ of 
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[T]he proper functioning of the jury sys- economic, social, religious, racial, politi· 
tern, and, indeed, our democracy itself, cal and geographical groups of the com· 
requires that the jury be a "body truly munity; frequently such representation 
representative of the community," and would be impossible. But it does mean 
not the organ of any special group or that prospective jurors shall be selected 
class. If that requirement is observed, by court officials without systematic and 
the officials charged with choosing feder· intentional exclusion of any of these 
al jurors may exercise some discretion to groups. 
the end that competent jurors may be /d. at 220, 66 S.Ct. at 985 (citations omit· 
called. But they must not allow the de· ted). 
sire for competent jurors to lead them More recently, in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 
493, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972), in 
which the Court remanded, on due process 
grounds, for a hearing on the allegations of 
a white defendant that blacks had been 
· into selections which do not comport with 
the concept of the jury as a cross-section 
of the community. Tendencies, no mat· 
ter how slight, toward the selection of 
jurors by any method other than a pro-
cess which will insure a trial by a repre· 
sentative group are undermining pro-
cesses weakening the institution of jury 
trial, and should be sturdily resisted. 
315 U.S. at 86, 62 S.Ct. at 472. 
Similarly, in Ballard v. United States, 
329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 
(1946), the Court exercised its supervisory 
power to bar the exclusion of women from 
jury service in the federal courts, observing 
as follows: 
The truth is that the two sexes are not 
fungible; a community made up exclu· 
sively of one is different from a commu-
nity composed of both; the subtle inter-
play of influence one on the other is 
among the imponderables. To insulate 
the courtroom from either may not in a 
given case make an iota of difference. 
Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if 
either sex is excluded. 
/d. at 193-94, 67 S.Ct. at 264 (footnote 
omitted). And in Thiel v. Southern Pacific 
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 
1181 (1946), a civil case, the Court held 
improper the routine exclusion from the 
jury venire of all persons who worked for a 
daily wage: 
The American tradition of trial by jury, 
considered in connection with either crim-
inal or civil proceedings, necessarily con-
templates an impartial jury drawn from a 
cross-section of the community. This 
does not mean, of course, that every jury 
must contain representatives of all the 
systematically excluded from the grand 
jury that indicted him and the petit jury 
that convicted him, three Justices elaborat-
ed as follows : 
When any large and identifiable segment 
of the community is excluded from jury 
service, the effect is to remove from the 
jury room qualities of human nature and 
varieties of human experience, the range 
of which is unknown and perhaps un-
knowable. It i$ not necessary to assume 
that the excluded group will consistently 
vote as a class in order to conclude, as 
we do, that its exclusion deprives the 
jury of a perspective on human events 
that may have unsuspected importance in 
any case that may be presented. 
/d. at 503-04, 92 S.Ct. at 2169 (opinion of 
Marshall, J.; footnote omitted). Even the 
three Justices who dissented from the judg-
ment of the Peters Court 
completely agree[ d] that juries should 
not be deprived of the insights of the 
various segments of the community, for 
the "common-sense judgment of a jury," 
referred to in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145, 156 [88 S.Ct. 1444, 1451, 20 
L.Ed.2d 491] (1968), is surely enriched 
when all voices can be heard. 
407 U.S. at 510-11, 92 S.Ct. at 2172 (Burg-
er, C.J., dissenting). 
Finally, we note that in none of these 
cases did the Supreme Court require the 
defendant to make a showing that the jury 
that resulted from the challenged practices 
was in fact a biased jury. If the Court 
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found that the defendant had made a show-
ing that the cross-section requirement had 
been violated, it concluded that he was 
entitled to relief or further proceedings 
simply on the basis of the violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right. See, e.g., Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538-39, 95 S.Ct. 
at 701-02 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
B. / The Import of the Sixth Amendment 
for the Final Phase of the Jury Selec-
l tion Process 
The jury selection process obviously does 
not end with the assembling of th~ venire, 
and it is the final phase of the process, the 
actual selection of the petit jury, with 
whic~ Although, 
as discussed in Part II above, a few courts 
and commentators have concluded that per-
emptory challenges exercised at this stage 
may properly be subjected to the cross-sec-
tion requirement,5 a far larger body of case 
authority h~velOQ.ea iriS~ort Of the 
proposition that the cross-ie"ction fequire-
ment o t e 1xth Amendment does not 
extena~e ana tfius haS no 
applicabiliTy to the prosecution's exercise 
of its peremptory challenges.6 The latter 
rulings are said to be mandated by the fact 
that most of the Supreme Court decisions 
invalidating the exclusion of cognizable 
groups in the jury selection process have 
focused on the selection of the venire rath-
er than the selection of th~tit jury, and 
by the Court's statement in Taylor v. Loui-
siana, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 701, that 
there is no requirement that the petit jury 
5. See Gngsby v. Mabry, 569 F.Supp. 1273, 1285-
86 (E.D.Ark.), stay granted, 583 F.Supp. 629 
(E.D.Ark.1983); State v. Neil, 457 So.2d at 486; 
People v. Wheeler, 148 Cai.Rptr. at 903-D4, 583 
P.2d at 761-62; Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 
N.E.2d at 513; State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716; 
Winick, supra, 81 Mich.L.Rev. at 62-66; Note, 
supra, 86 Yale L.J. at 1731-32. 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679 
(7th Cir.1984); United States v. Thompson, 730 
F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Chil-
dress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1319-20 (8th Cir.1983) (en 
bane), cert. denied,- U.S. -. 104 S.Ct. 744, 
79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984); Weathersby v. Morris, 
708 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 
- U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 719, 79 L.Ed.2d 181 
actually reflect a cross section of the com-
munity. 
[2] We agree entirely with the proposi-
tion that the defendant has no right to a 
petit jury of any particular composition . .......... ..__ ..... 
The random drawing of petit jurors from 
the venire is by its very nature inconsistent 
with any guarantee of a particular result-
ing composition. But we disagree with the 
conclusion of those courts at have rea-
soned that the lac of such a guarantee 
means men ment has no 
implications or pro ess o se ectmg the 
petit jury frOmlFie venire. We think such 
a ~usionistlei'ied by the Supreme 
Court's repeated emphasis on the cross-sec-
tion requirement of the Sixth Amendment 
and the fundamental value judgments un-
derlying that requirement. 
[3] We begin by analyzing the goal of 
the guarantee that the venire itself repre-
sent a fair cross section of the community. 
The venire qua venire is a body that, as-
suredly, gives service to the community by 
standing ready to serve on a petit jury if 
called upon to do so; but it is a group that 
takes no action and makes no decisions. 
No defendant has ever been tried before a 
venire; the venire is not the body that 
deliberates in the jury room; no defendant 
has ever been found guilty by a venire. If 
there is a Sixth Amendment requirement 
that the venire represent a fair cross sec-
tion of the community, it must logically be 
because it is important that the defendant 
have the chance that the petit jury will be 
similarly constituted. The necessary impli-
(1984 ); People v. Williams, 97 Ill.2d 252, 73 
III.Dec. 360, 372-73, 454 N.E.2d 220, 232-33 
(1983), cert. denied,- U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2364, 
80 L.Ed.2d 836 (1984); People v. McCray, 57 
N.Y.2d at 545, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 442-43, 443 
N.E.2d at 916-17. See also Gilliard v. Mississip· 
pi,- U.S. - , 104 S.Ct. 40, 40-44, 78 L.Ed.2d 
179 (1983) (Marshall , 1., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari (collecting cases)); State v. Neil, 
457 So.2d at 484 n. 3 (collecting cases); Saltz· 
burg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the 
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Represen· 
cation, 41 Md.L.Rev. 337, 360 (1982); Note, The 
Defendant 's Right to Object to Prosecuton·at Mis· 
use of the Peremptory Challenge, 92 Harv.L.Rev. 
1770, 1780 ( 1979). 
cation is that the Sixt 
antees the defendant 
guarantees not that th 
en into actuality, but 
undistorted chance th: 
agree that the Sixth l 
require any action to e 
sentative character of 
over to the petit jury; 
ment simply prohibits 
ic elimination of the · 
carry-{)ver. 
Our conclusion tha 
ment guarantees the 
bility of a cross-sectio 
ported by, for exampl' 
435 U.S. 223, 98 S.Ct. 
in which there was n< 
venire was improper. 
the calling of only fivE 
valid venire to form 
inconsistent with the 
part because so smal 
reasonably low possil 
cross section of the c 
was not permitted tA 
venire in a way that ~ 
ty that a fair cross se 
We find even cle 
proposition that the 
jury from a proper 
constitutional scrutir 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 5 
L.Ed.2d 776, which ft 
challenge stage of tl 
was no implication tl 
to the death penalt; 
the venire; the venir 
ed. The statute tha 
one that permitted 
for cause any veni1 
the death penalty, 
such persons as a 1 
phase of the jury se 
erspoon is thus irre 
tion that the challer 
tion is not subject · 
ny. If the only cor. 
were that there be 
the venire, with no 
lowed, the challeng 
spoon would have ' 
of the com. 
with the proposi-
has no right to a 
composition. 
petit jurors from 
ture inconsistent 
particular result-
disagree with the 
that have rea-
a guarantee 
ment has no 
of selecting the 










a petit jury if 
is a group that 
no decisions. 
tried before a 




t logically be 
the defendant 
jury will be 
I:!Cf!SI':l~MT imp)i· 
Ill.2d 252, 73 
220, 232-33 
104 S.Ct. 2364, 





State v. Neil, 
cases); Saltz-
and the 
J-kS~s~~ ~ McCRAYv. ABRAMS ~-~ ~ p,'t t29 
Clteu750F.ld1113 (1984) ~'--'<./ 
cation is that the Sixth Amendment guar-
antees the defendant that possibility. It 
guarantees not that the possibility will rip-
en into actuality, but only the fair and 
undistorted chance that it will. We thus 
agree that the Sixth Amendment does not 
re~l @§En! ure ~pre-
sen tJve character o ttie venire be carrted 
over to t~ry; we . m the Amend-
rnenfSimply prohiliits the state's s stemat-
ic el ma o t e possi i tty o sue a 
carry-over. 
~conclusion that the Sixth Amend-
[ 
rnent guarantees the defendant the ' 'possi-
bi~ of a cross-sectional J:!etit j~ry is sup-
ported by, for example, ll!:!!!w v. Georgia, 
435 U.S. 223, 98 S.Ct. 1029, 55 L.Ed.2d 234, 
in which there was no suggestion that the 
venire was improper. The Court held that 
the calling of only five persons from even a 
valid venire to form the petit jury was 
inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment, in 
part because so small a group had an un-
reasonably low possibility of comprising a 
cross section of the community. The state 
was not permitted to deal with the valid 
venire in a way that so limited the possibili-
ty that a fair cross section might be drawn. 
We find even clearer support for the 
proposition that the process of selecting a 
jury from a proper venire is subject to 
constitutional scrutiny in WithersEoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 
L.Ed.2d 776, which focused squarely on the 
challenge stage of the proceedings. There 
was no implication that those who objected 
to the death penalty were excluded from 
the venire; the venire was validly constitut-
ed. The statute that was invalidated was 
one that permitted the state to challenge 
for cause any venireperson who opposed 
the death penalty, and thus to eliminate 
such persons as a group in the very last 
phase of the jury selection process. With-
erspoon is thus irreconcilable with the no-
tion that the challenge stage of jury selec-
tion is not subject to constitutional scruti-
ny. If the only constitutional requirement 
were that there be a fair cross section on 
the venire, with no concern for what fol-
lowed, the challenges for cause in Wither-
spoon would have escaped review. 
We note that it is not entirely clear 
whether Witherspoon was decided on Sixth 
Amendment grounds or on due process 
grounds. The Witherspoon trial had oc-
curred years before the Court's decision in 
Duncan v. Louisiana made the Sixth 
Amendment's jury trial requirements appli-
cable to the states; and in DeStefano v. 
Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 
L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968), announced two weeks 
after Witherspoon, the Court ruled that 
Duncan was not to be applied retroactive-
ly. Nonetheless, the Witherspoon Court 
stated that "this jury fell woefully short of 
that impartiality to which the petitioner 
was entitled under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments." 391 U.S. at 518, 88 
S.Ct. at 1775 (emphasis added). In any 
event, even if Witherspoon was decided 
under general principles of due process 
rather than under the Sixth Amendment, it 
would defy reason to believe that the incor-
poration of the Sixth Amendment into the 
Fourteenth lessened the amount of scruti-
ny to be given to the final phase of the 
state jury selection process. 
I~ su~ the conclusion we draw from the 
Supreme Court cases is tha,t whatever the 
nature of the state statute or ractice may 
be (e.g., granting exemptions rom jury ser-
vice as in Duren, or adjus ng the size of 
the petit jury as in Bal w, or defining 
"cause" to cha1lenge as i Witherspoon, or 
departing from the tra · ional requirement 
of unanimity as in AP, daca ), and whatev-
er the stage of the s ection process that is 
subjected to that tatute or practice (e.g., 
selection of th venire as in Taylor, or 
selection of t e petit jury as in Wither- (-
spoon, or the erations of the petit jury as ~ 
in Apodaca), the state is not _Eermitted by U4A- -
the Sixth Amendment to restrict unreason-~ 
a_!ilir the possibility that the etit ·u will 1 _ . 1 . 
com~air cross section of the commu-~ I~
nity. 
__::_--
C. Peremptory Challenges and the Prop-
er Scope of the Courts Focus 
We turn next to the questions of whether 
and on what basis peremptory challenges, 
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as contrasted with challenges for cause, 
may be subjected to scrutiny under the 
Sixth Amendment. As noted above, some 
believe that Swain immunized peremptory 
challenges from all constitutional scrutiny, 
and indeed, it appears that Swain's exten-
sive review of the history of the perempto-
ry challenge system and its conclusions as 
to the importance of that system in Ameri-
can jury trials have created a myth that 
peremptory challenges are sacrosanct. We 
believe the proper view is that they are not. 
First, as the review in Swain makes 
lear, the peremptory challenge is not root-
d i~tion; 1t ~com-
1 1 .u~on law and it is now a creature of rule 
vJ.~- g' a~ute. But it is not provided for in 
~ ~ the Constitution of the United States, nor 
~ in any state constitution that we know of. 
It ~n~ ~; it may be an 
~ inva uable right in certain circumstances; 
/J ~. r but it is not a i ht of constitutional di en-
~ sion. As a matter of soun jurisprudence, 
therefore, when a defendant has made a 
prima facie showing that the prosecution's 
use of its peremptories conflicts with a 
fundamental right that is protected by the 
Sixth Amendment, it is the inscrutability of 
the peremptory challenge that must yield, 
not the constitutional right. 
Nor does Swain stand for the proposi-
tion that the peremptory challenge is be-
yond scrutiny even under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Part III of the Swain opinion, 
although dictum, set forth the circumstanc-
es that a defendant would have to show in 
order to subject the prosecution's use of 
peremptories to inquiry by the court. Al-
though the standards set by Swain have 
proven to be practically impossible to meet, 
they were nevertheless enunciated. Plain-
ly, therefore, even the Swain Court did not 
believe that peremptory challenges are im-
mune from remedial judicial action should 
the defendant make a prima facie showing 
that they conflict with a constitutional 
right. 
Finally, we see no meaningful distinction, 
for Sixth Amendment purposes, between a 
stat e's exclusion of Identifiable _groups 
from the p~itjury by means of a statute 
or practice, as in Witherspoon, and the 
exclusion of such groups by means of the 
systematic action of the prosecutor, who is 
an agent of the state. The latter is equally 
state action and should be equally subject 
to scrutiny. Indeed, one of the rationales 
for according any right to a jury trial is 
that it provides "a hedge against the over-
zealous or mistaken prosecutor." Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 
698; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 
156, 88 S.Ct. at 1451. Plainly the hedge is 
blighted if the prosecutor is allowed arbi-
trarily to remove entire segments of the 
panel and thereby destroy any possibility 
that the jury may represent a fair cross 
section of the community. 
[ 4] For purposes of determining what a 
defendant must show in order to establish 
a prima facie case of a prosecutor's use of 
peremptory challenges in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment, we think the principal 
difference between Sw~ protec-
tion analysis and proper analysis under the ...____ 
Sixth Amendment lies in the appropriate 
scope -ot the court's focus . The Sixth 
Amendment provides that the right of the 
accused to trial by an impartial jury shall 
exist in "all c~lrniDarprosecUtions." (Em-
phasis added.) Thus, that Amendment pro-
tects each defendant who is to stand trial, 
not simply the last in a sequence of defend-
ants to suffer the deprivation of an impar-
tial jury. Accordingly, we construe the 
Sixth Amendment's provision to re uire the 
court ec1 e each case on the basis of 
the acts or practices complained of i;"J.hat 
very-cage, and not to require the defendant 
to show, as Swain requires for an equal 
protection claim, that those acts or prac-
tices have had undesirable effects in case 
after case. We confess that we are not 
sure why the Equal Protection Clause 
should protect only the last of a number of 
defendants to be subjected to discrimina-
tion, but we are sure that it is not sound to 
extend that proposition to the interpreta-
tion of a constitutional provision that is 
expressly directed to "all" criminal prose-
cutions. 
Accordingly, 
ant may appro1 
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Accordingly, we conclude that a defend- systematically eliminated because of their~ 
ant may appropriately subject to scrutiny group affiliation. -
under the Sixth Amendment the prosecu- Accordingly, w~ude that the Sixth -----
tion's use of its peremptory challenges on Amendment's guarantee of trial by an im-
the basis of its actions in his own particular partial jury allows the ,ErosecJ!.~ion to exer-
case. cise its ' i>erem tory challenges to excuse ,....._..., 
D. Impermissible Exclusions Under the ju[Qrs.JQ whom, on the bas1s of their ,per-
Sixth Amendment so~or~. some bias may 
be imputed; but it forbids the exercise of 
[5] In addition to the Sixth Amend- such chalk nges to excuse jurors solely o 
ment's conception of the ideal jury as one the basis of their ra~iation. - Th.-. 
that represents a cross section of the com- ""-
munity, several princi les provide guidance ~  
for determmm wliet er an ale ation of IV. PROCEDURES UNDER THE L _ .... ,../.._. ~ ~ ,. 
the systematic peremptory exclusion of SIXTH AMENDMENT ~ ~~ 
blacks and Hispanics rom t e petit jury In setting forth the factors that a de- - !{,,._,_.....~ 
states ~ ~ under the mendment. fendant must show in order to establish a Z:..~ "' 
Firsr,t.liegoal of ju selection is to assure prima facie case that the prosecution has 
;,-
that each juror is ree f om bia By this used its peremptories in a way that violates 
we mean that he or she is 1 e y to be able the Sixth Amendment, we think it appropri-~ '' 
to decide the case solely on the basis of the ate to adapt the Supreme Court's test for 
evidence before the jury. Swain v. Ala- the establishment o a pr1ma fac1e case a 
bama, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at 835. Sixth Amen men VIO ation wit res ct to 
Further, the notions that all persons who th~r , as set ort in 0frJm v. Missou-~ 
share an attribute, such as the same skin ri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 
color, will ipso facto view matters in the 579. There the Court stated as follows: 
same way, and that minority groups are In order to establish a prima facie viola-
less able than whites to decide the case tion of the fair-cross-sectio~irement, ~ 
solely on the basis of the evidence, are both the defendant must sho ( that the 
fallacious and pernicious. "As early as group alleged to be exclu e is a "dis- 11-/.~ 
) 
1880, [the Supreme] Court recognized that tinctive" group in the community; (2) 
blacks as a class are no less qualified to sit that the representation of this group in 
on juries than whites · · · ·" Duren v. Mis- venires from which juries are selected is 
souri, 439 U.S. at 371 n.* , 99 S.Ct. at 672 not fair and reasonable in relation to the 
n. • (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Any notion number o uch ~rsons in the communi-
that white persons can be objective in view- ty; an (3 hat this underrepresentation 
ing a case on its merits and that blacks qua is due to ~~yste the 
blacks cannot, is particularly objectionable. grou ess . 
In a case where a black defendant has been 
charged with a crime that has aroused ra- /d. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668. 
cial passions, one may believe that whites 
qua whites are more likely than blacks qua 
blacks to convict; this, however, does not 
bespeak a greater objectivity so much as it 
does a greater propensity to convict. Obvi-
ously, the responsibility of the state and its 
prosecutor is not to secure a conviction at 
all costs; it is to see that justice is done, 
and the constitutional wisdom is that jus-
tice is best served by a jury that represents 
a cross section of the community, not one 
from which cognizable groups have been 
[6] It is evident that the second factor 
stated by the Duren Court, i.e., that the 
resulting group was in fact not representa-
tive of the community, is not applicable to 
the petit jury stage. The first and third 
factors, however, are plainly reteVant ana 
m~. We conclude that in oroer to 
establish a prima facie violation of his right 
to the possibility of a fair cross section in 
the petit jury, the defendant must show 
that in his case, (1) the group alleged to be 
excluded is a cognizable group in the com-
~
{_~~ 
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prima facie case, " ' "the burden of proof 
shifts to the State to rebut the presumption 
of unconstitutional action by showing that 
permissible racially neutral selection crite-
ria and procedures have produced the mo-
nochromatic result." ' " Castaneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280, 
51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) (quoting Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 
2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), which quoted 
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 
92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972)). 
[8] In order to rebut the defendant's 
showing, the prosecutor need not show a 
reason rising ~here 
are a~n which a party 
may believe, not unreas ably, that a pro-
spective juror may h e some slight bias 
that would not port a cha enge for 
cause but tha ould make excusing him or 
her desirab e. Such reasons, if they appear 
to begenuine, should be accepted by the 
court, which will bear the responsibility of 
assessing the genuineness of the prosecu-
tor's response and of being alert to reasons 
that are pretextual. See, e.g., People v. 
Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 75, 
672 P.2d 854, 858 (1983) (en bane) (reasons 
proffered by prosecutor for peremptorily 
excusing blacks were equall ap licab to 
whites not excused; eld, defendant's pri-
ma facie showing not rebutted). If the 
court determines that the prosecution's pre-
sentation is inadequate to rebut the defend-
ant's proof, the court should declare a mis-
trial and a new jury should be selected 
from a new panel. .--l Plainly these principles and procedures 
V,¥1.-. require a ~on of the way in which a -.' the peremptory challenge system works. 
I}_ 1-Vv The modificat.i~s re~ired, however, only 
~ n 1~e-cases in which a defendant makes ~;,_ _ a facie showing that the prosecutor 
has used those challenges in a way that is 
inconsistent with the guarantee of the 
Sixth Amendment. In any case in which 
such a showing is not made, the prosecu-
tion may exercise its peremptory chal-
lenges without any inquiry into their bases. 
And where the court does inquire, after a 
prima facie showing has been made, the 
pro cution need not show use for the 
excuse of t e urors m uestion but only 
genuine reasons other than roup affilia-
ti2!1 e would think t e num er of occa-
sions in which a defendant would be able to 
make out a prima facie case that the prose- £<'~...&~-.. 
cutor's use of peremptories was systemati-
cally excluding a cognizable group from 
the jury solely on the basis of the group's 
affiliation would be few; we would hope 
~r7-c.e4-~"­
the number would decrease. In any event, .e.t.':IJ"-6 
this limited requirement for modification of 
the traditional, but nonconstitutional, sys-
tem is a small price to pay for the vindica-
tion of a constitutional right. 
Nor do we think the necessary proce-
dures place an unreasonable burden on the 
court. The process of identifying discrimi-
natory conduct and pretextual explanations 
is performed daily in the course of litiga-
tion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and a host of other statutes. It 
should not be considered unduly burden-
some, in those cases where a prima facie 
showing has been made, to scrutinize the 
prosecutor's actions when a defendant's 
life or liberty may be at stake. 
Finally, we note that in states that have 
ruled that the prosecution's use of its per-
emptory challenges is subject to scrutiny 
under the state constitution, we have seen 
no indication in the reported. authorities or 
the commentaries that the implementation 
of such scrutiny as has been required has 
created an undue burden for the prosecu-
tion or the courts. In People v. Hall, the 
California Supreme Court declined an invi-
tation to overrule its five-year-old decision 
in Wheeler, stating that it had no empirical 
evidence that the Wheeler procedures had 
proven unworkable. 197 Cal.Rptr. at 76 & 
n. 11, 672 P.2d at 859 & n. 11. And in the 
present case, the State advises us that in 
the two years t 
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the two years between the decision of the 
New York Appellate Division in People v. 
Thompson, holding that the racially dis-
criminatory use of peremptories by the 
prosecutor was invalid under the New York 
Constitution, and the implicit overruling of 
that decision by the New York Court of 
Appeals in People v. McCray, the Thomp-
son rule did not create any practical prob-
lems whatever. 
V. APPLICATION OF SIXTH AMENDMENT 
.ANALYSIS TO THE PRESENT CASE 
Application of the foregoing principles to 
the present case poses two questions: first, 
whether McCray established a prima facie 
case; and second, whether the State is enti-
tled to a hearing at which it may present 
evidence to rebut that case. We answer 
both questions in the affirmative. 
A. McCray's Prima Facie Showing 
[9] The district court correctly ruled 
that McCray had made a prima facie show-
ing that the prosecutor exercised the 
State's peremptory challenges to exclude 
black and Hispanic jurors on the basis of 
their group affiliation. McCray's trial 
counsel objected during the voir dire and 
detailed the prosecutor's use of the State's 
challenges, which up to that point had elim-
inated all of the blacks and Hispanics 
drawn. He identified several minority ven-
irepersons who were excused despite hav-
ing proffered no discernible reason to be-
lieve that they would not be unbiased jur-
ors, and one black who was excused despite 
having had an experience that one might 
think would make him identify more with a 
complaining witness than with a defendant. 
McCray's showing was ample to shift to 
the State the burden of coming forward 
with some reason other than group affilia-
tion for the challenges. 
We are not persuaded to the contrary 
view by the State's argument that one 
black venireperson was eventually seated 
as a jury alternate. Questions of possible 
tokenism aside, see, e.g., Alexander v. Lou-
isiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 
L.Ed.2d 536 (1972); Cassell v. Texas, 339 
U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950), 
we note that the selection of that alternate 
did not occur until after McCray had chal-
lenged the prosecutor's use of eight of the 
State's eleven peremptories to rid the jury 
of all the blacks and Hispanics called to 
that point. McCray had established his 
prima facie case at the time of his first 
objection to the prosecutor's actions. The 
trial court should have inquired into the 
prosecutor's reasons for the use of the 
State's peremptories against the minority 
members of the venire and, in the absence 
of a response showing permissible reasons, 
a mistrial should have been ordered and the 
jury selection process begun afresh. 
The question that remains is whether the 
record that now exists warranted the dis-
trict court's conditional granting of the 
writ without further proceedings. 
B. The Need for a Hearing on the State's 
Proffer of Rebuttal 
The State advances two bases for its 
argument that even if McCray did make a 
prima facie showing that the prosecutor 
exercised the State's peremptories on the 
basis of race, the district court should not 
have granted the conditional writ of habeas 
corpus. First, it argues that the district 
court should have deferred to the trial 
court's "decision to credit" the prosecutor's 
denial that she had so used the State's 
peremptories. Alternatively, it contends 
that the district court itself should have 
held a hearing on the State's proffer of 
rebutting evidence. We reject the former 
contention but agree with the latter. 
The State's first contention is governed 
by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which requires the 
district court to defer to factual findings by 
the state court only if (1) they are evi-
denced by reliable written indicia, (2) the 
court's factfinding procedure was adequate 
to afford a full and fair hearing, and (3) the 
findings are fairly supported by the record. 
Here the district court was not required to 
accept the State's view that the state trial 
court made any finding that the prosecutor 
did not exercise the peremptory challenges 
impermissibly. The trial court made no 
1134 750 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
such finding in its written opinion. Nor is 
such a finding reflected in any transcript or 
in any other writing in the record. 
All that appears in the record is the trial 
court's statement in its written opinion, 
published nearly two months after the con-
duct of the voir dire, that the prosecutor 
denied having used the State's perempto-
ries discriminatorily. Even that statement, 
however, is not supported by the record. 
The transcript of the argument and collo-
quy that followed McCray's objection to the 
prosecutor's actions during the voir dire 
reveals no statement whatever from the 
prosecutor. Further, it clearly appears 
from the record that the trial court refused 
to conduct any sort of hearing. According-
ly, the district court was not required to 
infer that the state court had found no 
racially discriminatory use of the perempto-
ry challenges nor even to defer to the trial 
court's statement that the prosecutor had 
denied such use. 
While the failure of the trial court to 
inquire into the prosecutor's reasons for 
the peremptory exclusion of minority veni-
repersons might well suffice to cause a 
state appellate court to order a new trial 
without further proceedings, see, e.g. , Peo-
ple v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 435 N.Y. 
S.2d 739 (1981), there are circumstances 
here that suggest that the district court 
should have held a hearing to conduct an 
inquiry into those reasons. 
First, principles of federalism and comity 
suggest that a writ of habeas corpus not be 
granted freeing a state defendant or grant-
ing him a new trial without giving the state 
every opportunity to respond to the peti-
tioner's allegations. Thus, in Bermudez v. 
Reid, 733 F.2d 18 (2d Cir.1984), in which 
the state had repeatedly defaulted in its 
obligation to respond to the allegations of 
the petition, we reversed the district court's 
granting of the writ on the basis of those 
defaults. We ruled that the court was 
required to conduct a hearing into the alle-
gations to determine whether the petitioner 
could make some factual showing that his 
federal rights had been violated, and that, 
notwithstanding the earlier inexcusable de-
faults, the state should be given notice of 
the hearing in order that the court might 
consider the petition on the basis of the 
best available evidence. 
We see no basis here for departing from 
the principle established by Bermudez, es-
pecially since the State has not defaulted 
and has urged that it be allowed to present 
rebutting evidence. We realize that the 
State did not come forward with an affida-
vit by the ADA who conducted the McCray 
trials until after the district court had ren-
dered its decision conditionally granting the 
writ. But we see no indication that the 
State intended to default in any way, and it 
could well have been that the State be-
lieved there was no immediate urgency to 
come forward with a factual showing in 
light of the uncertainty that the federal 
constitutional contentions advanced by 
McCray, which had theretofore been reject-
ed by virtually every other court to con-
sider them, would be accepted, and the fact 
that McCray himself had requested, if 
those contentions were accepted, that a 
hearing be held. Further, we note that the 
ADA who tried McCray stated in her affi-
davit to the district court that she had 
offered to explain to the trial court her 
reasons for each challenge; that at that 
time she had notes relating to the voir dire; 
and that the trial court refused to permit 
her to present her reasons. While such a 
proffer by the ADA is nowhere reflected in 
the record, we do not know that it did not 
occur. 
We recognize that more than four years 
have elapsed since the conduct of the voir 
dire in question, and that the State's practi-
cal burden of rebutting the prima facie 
showing made by McCray has increased 
with the passage of time. Nonetheless, in 
all the circumstances of this case, we think 
it appropriate for the district court to con-
duct a hearing into the State's proffered 
rebuttal of the prima facie case established 
by McCray. 
C ONCLUSION 
We agree with the decision of the district 
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lished a prima facie case that the State cannot hold that the Constitution re-
violated his rights under the Sixth Amend- quires an examination of the prosecutor's 
rnent by exercising its peremptory chal- reasons for the exercise of his challenges 
lenges to exclude black and Hispanic pro- in any given case. The presumption in 
8pective jurors on the basis of their group any particular case must be that the 
affiliation. The order conditionally grant- prosecutor is using the State's challenges 
ing the writ is vacated and the matter is to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try 
remanded for further proceedings consist- the case before the court. The presump-
ent with this opinion. tion is not overcome and the prosecutor 
MESKILL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I respectfully dissent. 
Although the majority's effort to combat 
what it perceives to be a form of discrimi-
nation is well intentioned, the result 
reached is unworkable and contrary to the 
law of this and almost every other circuit. 
Until today's decision, federal appellate 
case law dealing with the racial makeup of 
juries was uniform; to establish a violation 
of the Constitution, the defendant had to 
prove a systematic exclusion of blacks 
from petit juries that extended over a num-
ber of cases. Absent such a showing, the 
objective existence or nonexistence of a 
"proper" reason for the prosecutor's use of 
a peremptory challenge was irrelevant be-
cause the "presumption in any particular 
case must be that the prosecutor is using 
the State's challenges to obtain a fair and 
impartial jury to try the case before the 
court." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 
222, 85 S.Ct. 824, 837, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) 
(emphasis added).1 
The majority recognizes that Swain is 
the starting point for any analysis of the 
alleged discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges. The teaching of Swain is 
clear. After reviewing the nature and pur-
pose of peremptory challenges and com-
menting on their importance in our system 
of justice, the Court stated: 
In the light of the purpose of the per-
emptory system and the function it 
serves in a pluralistic society in connec-
tion with the institution of jury trial, we 
I. The majority refers on several occasions to the 
state's concession that the use of race as a factor 
in making peremptory challenges violates the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, 
the majority recognized that the state's conces-
sion of a possible equal protection violation was 
therefore subjected to examination by al-
legations that in the case at hand all 
Negroes were removed from the jury or 
that they were removed because they 
were Negroes. Any other result, we 
think, would establish a rule wholly at 
odds with the peremptory challenge sys-
tem as we know it. 
380 U.S. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837 (emphasis 
added). 
While the majority finds Swain distaste-
ful, it concedes that for purposes of 
McCray's equal protection claim Swain is 
controlling. However, in an attempt to cir-
cumvent Swain, the majority finds that a 
string of Sixth Amendment cases opens the 
door Swain so clearly closed. The majori-
ty's approach is contrary to the law estab-
lished in a host of federal appellate court 
decisions, including the law of this Circuit. 
In United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 
240 (2d Cir.1977), decided after almost all 
of the Sixth Amendment cases on which 
the majority relies, we recognized the con-
tinued validity of Swain. Although New-
man involved a due process claim, the 
Court was cognizant of Sixth Amendment 
standards, stating that the case before it 
concerned the defendants' right to "a fair 
and impartial jury and one which repre-
sents a fair cross-section of the communi-
ty." 549 F.2d at 244. In rejecting the 
defendants' challenge of the prosecutor's 
use of peremptory challenges, the Court 
stated: 
erroneous. I agree with them on that point, but 
I also find the state's concession of a possible 
Sixth Amendment violation to be erroneous. 
Moreover, given the precedent in this area, I 
find the state's concession to be incomprehensi-
ble from a legal viewpoint. 
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Nor under the circumstances did the de-
fendants under any existing law have 
the right to inquire into and interrogate 
the prosecutor about his reasons for per-
emptorily challenging the four Black ve-
niremen in the jury pool. Swain v. Ala-
bama, supra, is the governing authority 
on this matter. 
549 F.2d at' 246 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, in United States v. Danzey, 
476 F.Supp. 1065 (E.D.N.Y.l979), a Sixth 
Amendment claim was brought under facts 
similar to those in the case before us. In-
deed, the prosecutor in Danzey admitted: 
"I make it a practice to attempt to exclude 
as best I can all jurors . . . of the same 
ethnic background as the defendant." !d. 
at 1066. In rejecting the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment claim, Judge Nickerson found 
Swain and Newman controlling. We af-
firmed without opinion, 620 F.2d 286 (2d 
Cir.l980), and in a concurrence in the denial 
of a petition for a rehearing en bane, four 
members of our Court stated that the "use 
of peremptory challenges based on a group 
bias assumption denies no cognizable le-
gal rights 'in any particular case.' " Unit-
ed States v. Danzey, 622 F.2d 1065, 1066 
(2d Cir.) (emphasis added, quoting Swain, 
380 U.S. at 221), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 878, 
101 S.Ct. 225, 66 L.Ed.2d 101 (1980). They 
went on to add "no relief is appropriate 
unless the offending pattern is sufficient-
ly general and pervasive to support a 
clear inference of motivation or intent to 
discriminate against a particular racial or 
ethnic group." 622 F.2d at 1066 (emphasis 
added, citing Newman, 549 F.2d at 249-50). 
The majority should not so lightly disre-
gard our prior decisions. 
Even if the Jaw of our Circuit were not 
clear, the overwhelming weight of authori-
ty from other circuits calls for a rejection 
of the majority's approach. At least five 
circuits have rejected the notion that the 
Supreme Court's later Sixth Amendment 
decisions, particularly Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 
(1975), have undercut Swain. United 
States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 681-82 (7th 
Cir.l984) (practical considerations support 
prevailing view that Swain is still control-
ling law); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 
1219 n. 14 (11th Cir.l983), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3546, 82 L.Ed.2d 849 
(1984) (Sixth Amendment analysis of Tay-
lor does not extend to petit juries); United 
States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 146-47 
(4th Cir.l983) (appellant made Sixth 
Amendment claim, Swain cited as control-
ling); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 
1313 (8th Cir.l983) (en bane), cert. denied, 
-U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1984) (Taylor's Sixth Amendment analysis 
does not overrule Swain ); Weathersby v. 
Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir.l983), 
cert. denied, - U.S. --, 104 S.Ct. 719, 
79 L.Ed.2d 181 (1984) (Taylor analysis does 
not extend to petit juries). Moreover, three 
other circuits have recently reaffirmed the 
validity of Swain, although it is unclear 
from their decisions whether Sixth Amend-
ment claims were advanced. United 
States v. Cane[, 708 F.2d 894, 898 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. --, 104 
S.Ct. 165, 78 L.Ed.2d 151 (1983) ("We de-
cline to change the rule that neither side 
need justify the use of peremptory chal-
lenges."); United States v. Jenkins, 701 
F.2d 850, 859-60 (lOth Cir.l983) (Swain 
called for rejection of appellant's claim 
which only challenged conduct at his trial); 
United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799, 
801 (5th Cir.l979) (defendant must show 
systematic exclusion of blacks from petit 
juries). 
The weight of authority against the ma-
jority's Swain /Sixth Amendment analysis 
exists for good reason: the Sixth Amend-
ment cases are not inconsistent with 
Swain. Like Swain, the Sixth Amendment 
decisions that involve exclusion of prospec-
tive jurors focus on systematic exclusion. 
See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) 
(state may not challenge for cause pote~­
tial jurors opposed to death penalty; possi-
bly due process rather than Sixth Amend-
ment grounds); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 533, 95 S.Ct. 692, 699, 42 L.Ed.2d 
690 (1975) ("women cannot be systematical-
ly excluded from jury panels from which 
petit juries are drawn"); Duren v. Missou-
ri, 439 u.s. 357, 360, 
L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) (the 
sion of women that res 
averaging Jess than 1 
the Constitution's fair-e 
ment"). 
Moreover, the Sixth .ft 
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ri 439 U.S. 357, 360, 99 S.Ct. 664, 666, 58 
L:Ed.2d 579 (1979) (the "systematic exclu-
sion of women that results in jury venires 
averaging Jess than 15'lo female violates 
the Constitution's fair-cross-section require-
ment"). 
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment cases do 
not show a retreat from Swain. For exam-
ple, in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 
s .Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), on which 
the majority relies, Justice White stated: 
All that the Constitution forbids, how-
ever, is systematic exclusion of identifia-
ble segments of the community from 
jury panels and from the juries ultimate-
ly drawn from those panels; a defendant 
may not, for example, challenge the 
makeup of a jury merely because no 
members of his race are on the jury, but 
must prove that his race has been sys-
tematically excluded. See Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-209 [85 S.Ct. 
824, 829-830, 13 L.Ed.2d 759] (1965) .... 
406 U.S. at 413, 92 S.Ct. at 1634 (plurality 
opinion; emphasis added). In addition, in 
Taylor, the Court made it clear that it 
imposed 
no requirement that petit juries actually 
chosen must mirror the community and 
reflect the various distinctive groups in 
the population. Defendants are not enti-
tled to a jury of any particular composi-
tion, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 
[67 S.Ct. 1613, 1625, 91 L.Ed. 2043] 
(1947); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S., at 
413 [92 S.Ct. at 1634] (plurality opinion); 
but the jury wheels, pools of names, 
panels, or venires from which juries are 
drawn must not systematically exclude 
distinctive groups in the community and 
thereby fail to be reasonably representa-
tive thereof. 
419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 702 (emphasis 
added). I therefore find the majority's 
2. The majority places great emphasis on the 
absence of a constitutional provision allowing 
peremptory challenges. While there is no con-
stitutional requirement for peremptory chal-
lenges, the challenge is designed to secure an 
impartial jury, which is the overriding Sixth 
Amendment objective. The Supreme Court has 
recognized its importance in holding the per-
analysis of the interaction between Swain 
and Sixth Amendment precedent unpersua-
sive. 
Even if we could decide this case in a 
vacuum, removed from the precedent 
against the majority's approach, there are 
a number of practical factors that militate 
against the majority's decision. First, the 
majority gives far too little weight to the 
peremptory challenge's long history as a 
tool used to ensure an impartial jury.2 An 
attorney who uses her challenges to ex-
clude from the jury members of the same 
race, religion, sex, occupation, class or eth-
nic background as her opponent's client is 
not invidiously discriminating against mem-
bers of that group. Rather, the attorney is 
trying to ensure that her client faces a jury 
that at least will be unbiased and at best 
will be receptive to her view of the case. 
We must remember that at the same time 
the defense counsel, who may well have 
more challenges, is engaged in the same 
process. The result of this adversarial sys-
tem should be an impartial jury. As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Swain, the 
nature of this system means that peremp-
tory challenges are often 
exercised on grounds normally thought 
irrelevant to legal proceedings or official 
action, namely, the race, religion, nation-
ality, occupation or affiliations of people 
summoned for jury duty. For the ques-
tion a prosecutor or defense counsel 
must decide is not whether a juror of a 
particular race or nationality is in fact 
partial, but whether one from a different 
group is less likely to be . . . . Hence 
veniremen are not always judged solely 
as individuals for the purpose of exercis-
ing peremptory challenges. Rather they 
are challenged in light of the limited 
knowledge counsel has of them, which 
emptory challenge to be "a necessary part of 
trial by jury," Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at 
835, and "essential in contemplation of law to 
the impartiality of the trial," Lewis, 146 U.S. at 
378, 13 S.Ct. at 139. Thus, I believe that the 
majority has unduly minimized the significance 
of the peremptory challenge. 
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may include their group affiliations, in 
the context of the case to be tried. 
380 U.S. at 220-21, 85 S.Ct. at 836 (foot-
notes omitted). 
Although the majority finds such group 
based assumptions "fallacious" and "perni-
cious," an attorney has not only a right but 
an obligation to challenge a prospective 
juror who may be biased, even if the basis 
of her belief is a broad generalization, 
which may not in fact be true. Thus, the 
actual issue in this case is not whether a 
prosecutor may systematically exclude 
members of some group from sitting on 
juries but whether a prosecutor may use 
peremptory challenges to exclude individu-
al members of a group because she be-
lieves that in that particular case they 
may be biased in favor of members of the 
defendant's group.3 A competent prosecu-
tor will only strike a member of the defend-
ant's group in situations where she believes 
the possibility of that individual having a 
group bias-even if very small-is greater 
than the possibility of some other prospec-
tive juror having a bias. Where the group 
based assumption against members of the 
defendant's group is outweighed by some 
other assumption, the prosecutor will turn 
to the other assumptions; for instance, if a 
black college student is being tried in a 
draft registration case, the prosecutor may 
prefer to challenge a white social worker 
rather than a black veteran. By banning 
the use of such assumptions, the majority 
has severely limited the effectiveness of 
the peremptory challenge. See also King 
3. At times in its opinion the majority attempts 
to cast the case before us as one involving 
systematic exclusion. Indeed, based on the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial 
jury in "all criminal cases," the majority states 
that a systematic exclusion may be established 
in an individual case. Majority Op. at 113~1131, 
1_132. I find it d_ifficult to accept its interpreta· 
lion of systematic. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 
U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the 
Court defined the term systematic in the follow-
ing passage: "(Petitioners'] undisputed demon· 
stration that a large discrepancy occurred not 
just occasionally, but in every weekly venire for 
a period of nearly a year manifestly indicates 
that the cause of the underrepresentation was 
systematic-that is, inherent in the particular 
v. County of Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 493, 
500-01 (E.D.N.Y.1984). 
In addition, the majority fails to confront 
the obvious implication of its ruling for 
defense attorneys . As the Seventh Circuit 
recently recognized, "[i]t would be hard to 
argue that only a defendant should be al-
lowed to challenge racially motivated per-
emptory challenges. . . . As it cannot be 
right to believe that racial discrimination is 
wrong only when it harms a criminal de-
fendant, and not when it harms the law 
abiding community represented by the 
prosecutor . . .. " Clark, 737 F.2d at 682. 
See also Florida v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 
(Fla.1984) (Alderman, J., dissenting); Com-
monwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-
90 n. 35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n. 35, cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 
L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 
Cal.3d 258, 282 n. 29, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 907 
n. 29, 583 P.2d 7 48, 765 n. 29 (1978). 
This very problem, and the negative im-
pact it will have for defendants, was fore-
seen in Newman. 
The right to peremptory challenges is 
of great importance, both to the Govern-
ment and to the defendants-but mostly 
to the defendants, because they are per-
sonally involved in the result of the trial 
and for this reason usually have more of 
the peremptory challenges than the 
Government. These challenges provide 
one of the most effective assurances that 
a party will have a fair and impartial 
jury . . . . Once, however, a plaintiff or 
prosecutor is required to submit to inter-
jury-selection process utilized." 439 U.S. at 366, 
99 S.Ct. at 669. Thus, to establish systematic 
exclusion, even in Sixth Amendment cases, the 
defendant must show case after case exclusion. 
If in the case before us the defendant could 
make this showing, Swain would outlaw the 
practice and there would be no need to look to 
the Sixth Amendment. However, such an ana!· 
ysis does not satisfy the majority because 1t 
finds a Swain violation too difficult to prove. 
Thus, it redefines systematic and develops an 
~i~r test. What the majority ignores in so. do-
mg IS that perhaps the reason Swain violaUOD5 
have not been proved in an "acceptable" nu111· 
ber of cases is that they do not exist in an 
acceptable number of cases. 
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rogation concerning his reasons for mak-
ing a peremptory challenge, it will proba-
bly not be long before defendants will be 
required to do likewise. This, in all likeli-
hood, would spell the end of peremptory 
challenges; and Blacks and other recog-
nizable minority groups would thereby 
suffer a major loss in the removal of one 
of the greatest safeguards the Jaw has 
provided for a fair trial. 
549 F.2d at 250 n. 8.4 
The majority also fails to confront the 
virtual limitlessness of its Sixth Amend-
ment analysis. To establish a prima facie 
case under the majority's standard, the de-
fendant need only show "(1) the group al-
leged to be excluded is a cognizable group 
in the community, and (2) there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that the challenges lead-
ing to this exclusion have been made on the 
basis of the individual venireperson's group 
affiliation rather than because of any indi-
cation of a possible inability to decide the 
case on the basis of the evidence present-
ed." Majority op. at 1131-32 (emphasis add-
ed). Thus, a group based assumption may 
not be used to exclude a member of any 
Sixth Amendment "cognizable" or "distinc-
tive group." "Distinctive groups" under 
the Sixth Amendment are those that "are 
sufficiently numerous and distinct" that if 
they are systematically excluded from jury 
venires, "the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-
section requirement cannot be satisfied." 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 
S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) (quot-
ing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531, 95 S.Ct. at 
4. The extension of the majority's restrictions to 
the defense will create problems. The prosecu-
tion will then have every right. for example, to 
contend that a black defendant may not use his 
peremptory challenges exclusively against 
whites. This not only doubles potential delay 
and requires all attorneys to keep records of 
who they are challenging and why, it may also 
mean that a minority defendant will have to 
challenge some minority prospective jurors per-
emptorily in order to rebut a charge of discrimi-
nation. Furthermore, the defense is often enti-
tled to more peremptory challenges than the 
prosecution is, see, e.g., Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(b). 
Consequently, in order to avoid an inference of 
discrimination the defense may be forced to 
challenge more minority prospective jurors than 
698). For example, in any given communi-
ty, people opposed to the death penalty 
may be a "distinctive group" and thus un-
der the majority's analysis they may not be 
peremptorily challenged.5 It also appears 
that men, women, old people, young people, 
laborers, professionals, Democrats, Repub-
licans, etc. are distinctive groups. There-
fore, no group based assumptions may be 
used to eliminate any member of these 
groups. Such a change is not simply "a 
modification of the way in which the per-
emptory challenge system works," Majori-
ty op. at 1132. It effectively eliminates the 
peremptory challenge for all but the most 
frivolous reasons (people who wear gray, 
smile, or wear contact lenses). 
I believe the result the majority reaches 
spells the end of the peremptory challenge 
as an effective jury selection tool. Again a 
return to Swain is appropriate. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Swain, the per-
emptory challenge is by definition "an arbi-
trary and capricious right; and it must be 
exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its 
full purpose." Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 
S.Ct. at 835 (quoting Lewis v. United 
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378, 13 S.Ct. 136, 139, 
36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892)). It added: "The es-
sential nature of the peremptory challenge 
is that it is one exercised without a reason 
stated, without inquiry and without being 
subject to the court's control." Swain, 380 
U.S. at 220, 85 S.Ct. at 836. The Court 
concluded by recognizing that once the 
prosecutor is required to explain her chal-
lenge, 
the prosecution would. This is even more "per-
nicious" than the result the majority condemns. 
5. Such a result is contrary to the holdings of at 
least two circuits which have considered this 
issue. Dobbert v. Strickland, 718 F.2d 1518, 
1524-25 (I Jth Cir.1983) (although under Wither-
spoon state may not challenge prospective jur-
ors opposed to death penalty for cause, state 
may peremptorily challenge those prospective 
jurors); Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067, 1070 
(5th Cir.1982) (Witherspoon inapplicable to situ-
ation where prospective juror was peremptorily 
challenged). Thus, to the extent that the majori-
ty relies on Witherspoon, Majority Op. at 1129, 
its result is again contrary to the law of 
other circuits. 
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[t]he challenge, pro tanto, would no 
longer be peremptory, each and every 
challenge being open to examination, ei-
ther at the time of the challenge or at a 
hearing afterwards. The prosecutor's 
judgment underlying each challenge 
would be subject to scrutiny for reason-
ableness and sincerity. And a great 
many uses of the challenge would be 
banned. 
380 U.S. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837. 
The continued validity of the Court's con-
cern in Swain was recently pointed out by 
the Seventh Circuit. In expressing its 
doubt that Swain has been undercut by the 
Sixth Amendment cases, that court recog-
nized the practical considerations that 
weigh against such an analysis. First 
among these was "[t]he potential for 
stretching out criminal trials that are al-
ready too long, by making the voir dire a 
Title VII proceeding in miniature." Clark, 
737 F.2d at 682. The court also observed 
that if the prosecutor is faced with having 
to defend his peremptory challenges, 
it is hard to see how the peremptory 
challenge . . . will survive. Whenever 
counsel alleged that his opponent had a 
racial or similar type of motivation in 
exerc1smg a peremptory challenge 
(whether he used that challenge to ex-
clude a white or a black-and it would 
have to be one or the other--or, extend-
ing the principle as one could hardly re-
sist doing, a man or a woman, a Jew or a 
gentile, etc.) the opponent would have to 
come forward with a reason for wanting 
to exclude the juror. In other words he 
would have to provide good cause, or 
something very close to it; and the per-
emptory challenge would collapse into 
the challenge for cause. 
/d. 
The majority, however, steadfastly as-
serts that it is not imposing a cause stan-
6. The majority believes that its prima facie test 
will be difficult to meet. I find its belief unwar· 
ranted. To establish a prima facie case in their 
case-by-case approach, the defendant will only 
have to show that members of the distinctive 
group were repeatedly challenged. Thu~. if a 
venire contains three members of a "cognizable 
dard. However, the line it is attempting to 
draw is at best gossamery. Moreover, any 
inquiry into the motivation of the prosecu-
tor entails a tremendous burden. As 
Judge Wexler recently explained: 
Even assuming the existence of a clear 
theoretical rule regarding what types of 
peremptory challenges are legal, enor-
mous difficulties would arise from any 
attempt to implement such a rule in prac-
tice. A great deal of time, effort and 
expense would be necessary to attempt 
to determine whether any given peremp-
tory challenge is legal. Any such deter-
mination would entail the extremely diffi-
cult task of assessing the internal mo-
tives of the attorneys. It might also 
require an inquiry by the Court into the 
ethnic or religious backgrounds of pro-
spective jurors, thereby promoting the 
very emphasis on such factors which the 
rule seeks to avoid.... Most important 
of all, attorneys, confronted with a rule 
completely or partially restricting their 
right to act with the internal motive of 
helping their clients when making per-
emptory challenges, will be under enor-
mous pressure to lie regarding their mo-
tives. Such a rule will foster hypocrisy 
and disresp€ct for our system of justice. 
Indeed, it is even possible that an attor-
ney may lie to himself in an effort to 
convince himself that his motives are le-
gal. 
King v. County of Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 
493, 501-{)2 (E.D.N.Y.1984) (holding Swain 
is still controlling law).6 
In sum, the majority reaches its conclu-
sion only by rejecting the overwhelming 
weight of authority and by minimizing the 
burdens that its result will place on the 
court and the litigants. Although it is of-
fended by any group based assumptions, it 
fails to recognize that in a particular case 
such assumptions are not illogical and may 
group" and all three are challenged or maybe 
two of three are challenged, a prima facie case 
appears to be established. I find it hard to 
believe that this result will occur in only a "few; 
cases. Moreover, the impact of the thr~at .0 
having to justify every challenge will be s•gn•fi· 
cant, see supra note 4. 
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"gh heavily with the attorney attempting 
we1 B . h w select a jury. y actmg on t ese as-
sumptions, the attorney is not invidiously 
discriminating against members of the 
group excluded, be they blacks, whites, 
n women, Catholics or Jews. Rather 
:: ~ttomey is using his best judgment and 
acting within an adversarial system de-
·gned to create an impartial and unbiased 
~ which is, after all, the overriding 
S~ Amendment goal. The majority's at-
tempt to fine tune this system, even though 
well intentioned, is bound to cause more 
harm than good. 
1 would vacate the order of the district 
court granting the petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus and remand with directions 
to dismiss the petition. 
UNITED STATES of America. Appellee, 
v. 
Pasquale PANZA, Seymour Ringle, 
Charles Fruscione, Gregory Cappello, 
Gregory Boutelle, Christopher Merlino, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Nos. 322, 320, 163, 213, 321 and 323, 
Dockets 84-1032 to 84-1035, 84-1064 
and 84-1065. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit. 
Argued Oct. 11, 1984. 
Decided Dec. 18, 1984. 
Defendants were convicted in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York, Henry Bramwell, J ., 
of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, 
and mail fraud in connection with scheme 
to defraud automobile insurance companies 
under state "assigned risk" plan, and they 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Mans-
field, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) defend-
ants were not entitled to bill of particulars; 
(2) defendants were not entitled to sever-
ance of trials; (3) evidence was sufficient 
as to guilty knowledge and intent; (4) cer-
tain documents seized by investigator while 
armed with warrant and lawfully on de-
fendant's premises to arrest him were 
properly seized under plain view doctrine; 
and (5) defendant's postarrest admission to 
coconspirator who visited his home was not 
made in violation of defendant's right to 
counsel. 
Affirmed. 
I. Indictment and Information e=>l21.2(9) 
Defendants charged with mail fraud in 
connection with scheme to defraud insurers 
were not entitled to bill of particulars, 
where elements of mail fraud scheme were 
described in detail in indictment, where 
each mail fraud count in indictment spelled 
out conduct of defendants in furtherance of 
scheme, where each defendant was fur-
nished by way of discovery insurance files 
mentioned in indictment and additional per-
tinent documents, and where prosecutor 
met with defense counsel shortly after fil-
ing of indictment to explain Government's 
contentions regarding basis of alleged 
frauds and offered to provide defendants 
with copies of all relevant documents. 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1341; Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rule 
7(c), 18 U.S.C.A. 
2. Indictment and Information e=>121.1(3) 
Whether to grant bill of particulars 
rests within sound discretion of district 
court. 
3. Criminal Law e=>622.5 
Defendant charged with mail fraud 
waived any right that he might have had to 
severance of his trial from that of other 
defendants charged with numerous of-
fenses in connection with mail fraud and 
racketeering scheme, where defendant 
failed to request severance before trial. 
Fed.Rules Cr.Proc.Rules 8, 12(b)(2, 5), (f), 





r~~-r ~~ ~ ~?A-~ 
/-& ~~~4ut~~ cc:/12) 
1-CP~~~~ 
w~ ~ c::::A- c /J 2- ~ ;z-a. ~ 
~-~~~J/ 'ffl<"?!Ld-~C~4..~ 
Ytf-1!/-z.~ , CJL ~ 7Z~-- Gri- .~
~1~ CL, i~ ~ /2_4.-L.-~~ ~ ~ 
~1- ~c~ v r-5l.A-r J ~~ 
Jh4 n.q, ~/;£ 2 (!! /ata>t ~ 
~~~-~~4~~~ 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ~ . 
~~2,-
Aprill2, 198 Confere ~~~ ~-;! 
List 2, Sheet ~ ~"~-
No. 84-6263 /J.-u-7 a-e ~ ~ ~ 
~~~ ,£ 1 ' a: Etr 
Batson (burglar) Cert to Ky. S.Ct. (per curiam) 
~,~~~tC4-7~ 
~; ~~ ~~--JJ~ ... 
~~ _ stat'!crimina:l I· ---~imely 
J~ L ~~~fot- ijb 
~~n ' •·~~ 
v. 
Kentucky 
· 1. SUMMARY: This 1s the case where a black Kentucky bur-
glary defendant claimed that the prosecution's use of peremptory 
challenges to excuse all black · ury venirepersons violated the 
Sixth Amendment. The previous pool memo noted that this was a 
certworthy issue in view of a circuit split, but recommended that 
case creating the circuit 
- 2 -
/ 
split, McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113 (CA2 1984) , cert petn 
filed March 4, 1984 (No. 84-1426). 
On closer examination, the petn in McCray is a terrible can-
didate for deciding the Sixth Amendment issue. The first ques-
tion presented in that petn reads as follows: 
1. Whether the sixth amendment right to . 
trial by jury, made applicable to the state 
through the fourteenth amendment in Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 u.s. 145 (1968), prohibits the 
use of the peremptory challenge in a criminal 
case, by prosecutors or defense counsel, to 
exclude prospective jurors solely on the 
basis of race. 
Despite urging this 
notes that the pet 
applies to this 
concedes 
the petn subsequently 
at the Sixth amendment 
On this petition for a writ ~ certiora-
ri, the state contends that the· court below 
CO£!~Ctl~ held that the sixth amendment pro-
hifiit]:tb~ate from using peremptory chal-
lenges to strike potential jurors on the 
basis of race, and correctly held that a pri-
ma facie showing requires an evidentiary 
hearing rather than the immediate grant of 
~
the writ. The state contends, however, that 
t~ese decisions, although correct, are worthy 
of this Court's review. 
McCray Petn at 7. Indeed, petr New York apparently made the same 
concession in the Second Circuit. See Abrams v. McCray, 750 
F.2d, at 1118. Needless to say, I doubt the Court will want to 
decide an important Sixth Amendment issue which has split the 
circuits in a case where both petr and resp ta~e the same posi-
tion on the merits. 
~
It remains to decide whether the Batson case is a good case 
to resolve the conflict. In that regard, I note only that the 
• 
• - 3 -
record in this case is clear of any procedural defaults -- the 
petr clearly made the Sixth Amendment argument at each stage of 
the state proceedings, and the state courts expressly rejected 
them. It is also clear that the peremptories in this case were 
used in a manner to exclude all blacks from the jury (there was 
one black alternate in this case). The only drawback to a grant 
in this case, and it may be a significant one, is that the Court 
cannot expect particularly able advocacy of the State's position, 
judging from the resp to the petn. 
This is a possible GRANT. 
March 27, 1985 Syverud opn in petn 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
April 12, 1985, Conference 





Cert to Ky. S.Ct. (per curiam) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr, a black defendant, claims that the pros-
ecution's use of peremptory challenges to excuse all four black 
jury venirepersons from the jury panel violates the Sixth Amend-
ment. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Petr was indicted and tried 
in Jefferson County Circuit Court in Kentucky on charges of sec-
- 2 -
ond degree burglary and receipt of stolen property. Mrs. Henri-
etta Spencer identified petr at trial as the person who she had 
seen enter her house and flee with purses containing jewelry. 
A jury venire was drawn for the trial that included four 
blacks; the prosecution and defense were each allowed six peremp-
tory challenges. The · prosecution used its peremptory challenges 
to excuse two white venire members and all four black venire mem-
bers. Petr's counsel thereupon objected on the grounds that the 
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges violated the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments. Petr requested that the all-white jury 
panel that had been selected be excused. The trial court over-
ruled the objection and the panel was sworn. [The transcript of 
the colloquy between the trial judge and counsel on this issue is 
included in the Petn at A-14-18.] Petr was convicted and sen-
tenced to 20 years in prison. 
Petr appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky. As in the trial court, petr argued that the prosecution's 
use of peremptory challenges viola ted the Sixth Amendment. [The 
relevant portion of petr's brief in the Ky. S.Ct. is contained in 
the petn at A-10-13] . Petr argued that Swain v. Alabama, 380 
u.s. 202 (1965}, while rejecting an equal protection challenge to 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, nevertheless did not 
reach or decide the issue of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Petr 
cited the opinions of this court accompanying the denial of a 
petn for certiorari in McCray v. New York, 103 s.ct. 2438 (1983} 
as indicating that five Justices may prefer a different rule than 
- 3 -
Swain in the context of Sixth Amendment challenges to the dis-
crimina tory use of peremptory challenges. Petr further argued 
that state courts in Massachusetts, California, and Florida have 
relied on their state constitutions and the Sixth Amendment in 
reversing convictions where the prosecution employed peremptory 
challenges to exclude -members of one race from a jury panel. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in a 
unanimous per curiam opinion. Petn at A-1. Petr's Sixth Amend-
ment challenge was rejected in a single paragraph: 
Appellant acknowledged that the United 
States Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 
u.s. 202 (1965), held that preemptory [sic] 
challenges against blacks, by themselves, do 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment equal-
protection clause. However, appellant urges 
this court to adopt the position of other 
states based upon the Sixth Amendment and 
their own state constitutions, that preemp-
tory [sic] challenges against minority groups 
can be unconstitutional if they were shown to 
be a pattern of challenges against jurors 
from a discrete group and a likelihood that 
the challenges were based solely upon group 
membership. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 
(Cal. 1978), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 
N.E.2d 499 {Mass. 1979). We have recently 
reaffirmed our reliance upon Swain in Common-
wealth v. McFerron, Ky., S.W.2d 
{1984), holding that an allegation of the 
lack of a fair cross-section jury which does 
not concern a systematic exclusion from the 
jury drum does not rise to constitutional 
proportions, and we decline to adopt another 
rule. 
Petn at A-5-6. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The concise petn primarily repeats the 
arguments made in JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissent from denial of cer-
tiorari in McCray v. New York, 103 S.Ct. 2438 {1983) and Justice 
Brennan's dissent from denial in Thompson v. United States, 105 
- 4 -
S.Ct. 443 (1984). As this Court recognized in Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), a fair trial requires a jury made up of 
a fair cross section of the community. This Sixth Amendment 
right was violated by the use of peremptory challenges to exclude 
all members of the panel who were of the same race as the defend-
ant. Swain is inapplicable, both because it does not involve the 
Sixth Amendment and because the burden it imposes on a defendant 
that of showing systematic exclusion in a pattern of conduct 
by prosecutors -- is insuperable. 
Admittedly, the opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUS-
TICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE POWELL in denying the petn in McCray v. 
New York, supra, called for the Supreme Court to hold off on this 
issue until a later date so that other courts could consider it. 
The STEVENS opinion also noted the lack of circuit split. In the 
two years since McCray, however, most states have, like Kentucky, 
simply refused to reconsider the issue and instead relied on 
Swain. Only New Mexico and Florida have joined the ranks of Mas-
sachusetts and California in adopting new rules. The other 
states have shown no interest in reconsidering Swain, so this 
Court should step in and do the job. 
In addition, a circuit conflict has developed since McCray. 
In McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (CA2 December 4, 1984), the 
CA2 affirmed a district court's determination that a defendant 
could challenge on sixth amendment grounds the use of peremptory 
challenges to excuse all the black and Hispanic members of the 
jury venire. The decision in McCray is in square conflict with 
the decisions of the CAB in United States v. Thompson, 730 F.2d 
- 5 -
82 (1984) and the CA4 in United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 
(1983). In light of the Circuit conflict, the issue is now ripe 
for decision by this court. 
The Kentucky Attorney General argues that Swain v. Alabama 
should be left intact and should govern this case. There is no 
judicial dissatisfaction with Swain other than the CA2's recent 
decision in McCray v. Abrams, and that is an "aberrance". Schol-
ars have criticised the rule, but "it is a matter of general 
knowledge that the analytical treatises of legal theorists are 
often at odds with the constitutional law announced by this 
court." While racial discrimination is to be deplored, a defend-
ant is not entitled by the Sixth Amendment to "a jury of any par-
ticular composition." Citing Taylor v. Louisiana, supra. 
4. DISCUSSION: The issue squarely presented in the petn is 
obviously one on which this Court will have to grant certiorari 
at some point in view of the CA2's recent decision in McCray, 750 
F. 2d 1113. The CA2 case arose on review of the habeas petn of 
the same defendant's whose Sixth Amendment claims this Court de-
clined to review on direct appeal in McCray v. New York, 103 
S.Ct. 2438 (1983). Judge Kearse's opinion for the panel in that 
case (her opinion was joined by Judge Lumbard) reviewed all the 
federal and state developments since Swain and concludes that the 
Sixth Amendment constrains the exercise of peremptory challenges 
to exclude jurors solely on the basis of their racial affili-
ation. Judge Kearse's opinion concluded that McCray made a prima 
facie case that jurors were excused solely because of their race, 
but remanded so that the State could be given an opportunity to 
• 
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present evidence rebutting that prima facie case. Judge Meskill 
dissented, arguing that the majority's rule was unworkable and 
would impose an insuperable burden on trial courts in the admin-
istration of peremptory challenges. 
While this Kentucky case presents a certworthy issue in view 
of the circuit split; it would be more sensible to resolve the 
issue in the McCray case itself rather than in this case. The 
Kentucky Supreme Court opinion is nowhere near as thorough as 
either the majority or the dissent in the CA2. A cert petn was 
filed by the New York Attorney General in McCray on March 4, 
1985, but the petn has not yet been circulated to the conference. 
Abrams v. McCray, No. 84-1426. If the Court wishes to decide 
this issue this coming term, it should do so in McCray rather 
than this case. 
I recommend a HOLD until the Court decides whether to grant 
Abrams v. McCray, No 84-1426. 
There is a response. 
March 25, 1985 Syverud opn in petn 
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84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky (Supreme Court of Ky.) 
MEMO TO FILE 
This case was granted to consider the present 
vitality of Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965) in which 
this Court rejected the claim that prosecutor ial use of 
preemptive challenges to strike black prospective jurors, 
by itself, violate equal protection. 
This Case 
There is no real dispute as to the evidence upon 
which petitioner, a black was convicted of second degree 
burglary, and of receiving stolen property, both in 
violation of Kentucky law. As a persistent felony 
offender, petitioner was sentenced to 20 years. The 
evidence at trial (apparently accepted by both parties) 
was that the victim of the burglary identified petitioner 
as the intruder she saw in her home stealing several 
purses. A neighbor also testified that at that time she 
had observed petitioner standing near the burglarized 
house, and later saw him running away. Finally, 
apparently undisputed evidence showed that petitioner and 
. . 
·' • • 2. 
a codefendant (tried separately) pawned two rings 
belonging to the burglary victims. 
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure seem to be 
carefully drawn. On the basis of the voir dire, 
challenges for cause are made first by the prosectuion and 
then by the defense. If a sufficient number of 
prospective jurors survive these challenges, each side is 
given a list of the qualified jurors equal to the number 
of jurors to be seated plus the total number of peremptory 
challenges allowed the parties. Peremptory challenges are 
then exercised "simultaneously" by each party st r icking 
names from the list, and returning it to the trial judge. 
Where a felony is charged, the state has five peremptory 
challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly are 
entitled to eight. If this process results in a surplus 
of qualified juror, the actual jury panel is chosen by 
lot. In this case, the prosecutor used \four]~is six 
peremptory challenges to strike black prospective jurors, 
leaving an all white jury panel. Petitioner moved to 
discharge the panel, contending he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to "an impartial trial, [by) a cross 
section of the community". The TC denied the motion, 
making a distinction between the composition of the venire 
. . • 3. 
(the group from which the trial jury is drawn) and the 
trial jury itself. The Kentucky Court of Appeals made the 
same distinction, in effect ruling that the "fair cross 
section doctrine" does not apply if the venire is properly 
~ 
constituted and the trial jury is drawn by lot from the 
members of the venire who remain after challenges for 
cause and preemptively 
As we see so often in the criminal cases that come 
here, no claim of i~cence is made. In view of the 
evidence in this case, and petitioners record as a 
persistent felony offender, one would assume that a 
fairminded all black jury would have convicted him. 
Petitioner's Contentions 
Petitioner argues that Swain's aurhority has been 
undercut by subsequent decisions. First, Duncan v. 
Louisiana (1968) decided for the first time that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial applied to the states. 
Petitioner then readsV Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 u.S. 522 
(1975) as holding that the "trial jury" must be 
representative of the community as well the venire or 
panel from which the trial jury is selected. In other 
words, petitioner strongly disagrees with the Kentucky 
Court's view that the fair cross section requirement does 
• 4. 
not apply to the trial jury if the venire has been 
properly selected, challenges for cause have been made, 
followed by the peremptory challenges allowed both sides 
• 
under the particular state law. 
Although I have not reread Taylor v. Louisiana (and 
hope to do so), my recollection is that Taylor did not 
make clear the distinction claimed by petitioner. 
Petitioner "proposes a remedy for improper use of 
peremptory challenges similar to that found in 
[California]." This would "permit a defendant to question 
the prosecutor's peremptory challenges when it appears 
that those challenges are being used to exclude a 
particular group of people." This remedy is said to be 
based on the "reasonable inference" that arises when it 
appears that a prosecutor is excluding otherwise qualified 
jurors solely on the basis of race. It is not entirely 
clear to me what happened under the petitioner's proposed 
remedy when defense counsel makes such a challenge. I 
suppose a trial judge would then require the prosecutor to 
explain, and in view of the "reasonable inference", the 
burden to rebut this would be on the State. 
The SG's amicus brief 
s. 
I find th~brief more helpful than that of the 
Kentucky Attorney General. He agrees fully with the ~ 
----:-- / 
distinction drawn by the Kentucky court between the /Venire 
and the jury finally selected to try the case. The SG 
says that "Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 u.s. 522 (1975) makes 
} 
clear that the fair cross section doctrine applies only to 
jury venires and lists, and not to the actual petit juries 
chosen from them. But even if the rule were overwise, the 
fair cross section cases would not require revision of 
Swain because even as applied to juries venires, [these 
,, 
cases] prohibit only s~stematic exclusion as reflected in 
------~ ~---~-------------
a consistent pattern of underrepresentation." See SG' s 
brief 4, 5 et seq. The SG also emphasizes that the free 
availability of peremptory challenges always has been, 
under our system, "an integral feature of the criminal 
jury trial that coexists with the fair cross section 
doctrine under the Sixth Amendment." 
I 
In emphasizing there was no proof in this case of 
"systematic exclusion" of blacks or of "a consistent 
pattern of underrepresentation" of blacks, the SG argues 
there must be such proof before there is any inference of 
racial discrimination that shifts the burden of proof to 
the prosecutor. 
• 6. 
The SG also makes the point that racially motivated 
exclusion (characterized as a pernicious practice) easily 
could be exposed where it existed. "Public defenders's 
offices and organizations of defense counsel could 
relatively easily keep the records necessary to make the 
required proof." The SG, in commenting on Swain, observes 
that it rests on the assumption that, given the limited 
information available to litigants (and their counsel) 
upon which to exercise peremptory challenges, the 
possibility that a prosecutor had been influenced in his 
challenges by a common group identity ••. is insufficient 
to create a prima facie case of unlawful intentional 
discrimination." 
The brief on behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
starts out with the statement that "The use of peremptory 
challenges affects every criminal trial in America. Under 
American adversary system, peremptory challenges are of 
great importance in affording the parties the confidence 
that the case will be heard by an impartial jury. Such 
challenges are an "integral part of the mechanism for 
choosing an impartial jury, just as is voir dire and the 
exercise of challenges for cause." 
. . 
7. 
I note that the petitioner's brief has a quotation 
from LaFave's book on Criminal Procedure that rebuts, to 
some extent, the SG's contention that systematic exclusion 
on the basis of race must be shown. LaFave said: 
Although courts are inclined to say that the 
defendant's burden of showing such systematic 
exclusion by the prosecutor 'is not 
insurmountable,' experience has clearly 
indicated the virtual impossibility of doing so. 
A great many cases are to be found holding the 
defendant did not meet this burden, but there 
are almost none ruling that the defendant had 
established such systematic exclusion by the 
prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges. 
This being so, courts have not had occasion to 
address the conundrum posed by this branch of 
Swain: whether, assuming proof of systematic 
exclusion, the prosecutor is now barred from 
using his peremptory strikes against black 
jurors, or whether it is then merely 
necessary~hat the prosecutor give some 
explanat P;n for such strikes, such as that it is 
his view that black jurors would unduly favor a 
black defendant (the kind of contention,. as 
noted earlier, which the peremptory challenge 
has served to keep out of sight).' 2 LaFave & 
Israel, Criminal Procedure §21. 3 (d) "Peremptory 
Challenges," p. 739 (1984). 
The case presents a troublesome issue. As the SG 
says, exclusion of any identifiable group from jury 
service because of prejudice against the race or origin of 
the group would be "pernicious". But it is not clear to 
me how our system would operate if Swain were overruled or 
. . • 8. 
substantially modified as petitioner suggests. In this 
country, and particularly in certain areas, we 
heterogenious people our nation is composed 
have a 
of a 
substantial number of different groups of racial, ethnic 
and national origin. Consider the Washington Metropolitan 
Area: I believe I saw recently that there are literally 
thousands of Vietnamese and Southeast Asian refugees who 
are in the schools and labor force here. In addition, the 
Chicano population is quite substantial (to the point 
where some of the schools teach both Spanish and English) • 
No doubt other such racial and ethnic groups could be 
identified and implicated in particular trials. We have 
on our argument docket a CA6 case involving the validity 
of layoffs of white school teachers, despite seniority, in 
order to preserve teaching positions for minorities. The 
collective bargaining agreement purported to protect 
blacks, Indians, Orientals, and persons of "Spanish 
descent" from being laid off. Would each of these groups 
be entitled to representation on a jury when one of its 
members was the defendant? If a peremptive challenge were 
used - say to strike a person of Spanish descent - would 
the Court be required to hold a hearing at which the 
prosecutor must justify the strike? 
• l • 9. 
My own experience in civil litigation leaves no doubt 
in my mind that lawyers quite understandably use 
~ challenges 
1-o 1\ potential jurors whom 
(or indeed challenge for cause) 
they think may be unsympathetic to 
their client case. In Richmond, for exampler records are 
kept by both the plaintiffs' and the defendants' bar on 
the performance of members of the jury venire in damage 
suit cases. A particular trial court may have the same 
venire, from which petit juries are drawn, for a period of 
several months. By keeping records of jury verdicts, and 
amounts of jury awards by particular members of the 
venire, lawyers can identify sympathetic or unsympathetic 
members of the venire whom they will then try to strike. 
As responsive as one may be to petitioner's claim (as I 
have no doubt that racial consideration may prompt 
peremptory challenges in some cases) , it is not easy to 
suggest a change in this traditional system that would not 
result in substantial new problems without benefiting any 
particular race. Moreover, I am unwilling to believe that 
many blacks will convict or acquit on the basis of race. 
Indeed, most crime by blacks is committed against blacks -
as FBI statistics prove. In the District of Columbia and 
other cities including Richmond, blacks constitute a 
' ' a • • 10. 
majority of most juries. I want the views of my 
clerk. It might be well to examine the common law with 
some care as well as the use of peremptory challenges in 
the colonial courts. 
LFP, JR. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell November 26, 1985 
From: Anne 
No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
(cert. to Ky. Sup. Ct.) (argument December 11, 1985) 
Question Presented 
Does the federal Constitution forbid a prosecutor to use 
his peremptory challenges to strike, over the objections of a 
black defendant, black persons contained in the jury venire 
solely because of their race? ~~~ 
~ '"O>~. 
Background 1~ ~ ;:_qv 5 ~ 
fue background to this case ~ Court's decision in 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965). In Swain, the prosecutor 
used peremptory challenges to strike from the petit jury the six 
blacks available in the venire. The defendant argued that this 
• 2. 
conduct violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court decided that the striking of blacks "in a 
particular case [was not] a denial of equal protection of the 
laws." Ibid. at 221. The decision was based on the nature and 
history of peremptory challenges and on the presumption "in any 
particular case" that "the prosecutor is using the State's 
challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury." Id. at 222. 
The Court believed that this presumption was not overcome by an 
allegation that in one case the prosecutor struck all available 
blacks from the venire. The Court went on, however, to note that 
the presumption protecting the prosecutor might be overcome if a -------- --------------
defendant could produce proof that the prosecutor systematically 
exercised his peremptories to remove blacks in case after case. ----Accordingly, I believe that, in Swain, the Court recognized that 
use of peremptories to strike black jurors because of their race 
was prohibited by the Four teen th Amendment. The holding in the 
---=-
case involved the lnature of the proo!J r~ablish 
-----'--~ 
invidious use of peremptories. 
The facts and procedural history of this case are 
uncomplicated. Petr was convicted by a Kentucky jury of burglary 
and receiving stolen property, and was sentenced to twenty years 
in prison on a finding of recidivist status. During voir dire, 
the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to strike the 
four black jurors included in the venire. Petr objected and 
moved to discharge the panel on the ground that the prosecutor's 
action violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The TC denied the motion. 
• 3. 
On appeal to Ky. Sup. Ct., petr pressed his claim 
concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. In a 
terse decision, the court rejected the claim. Ky. Sup. Ct. 
declined to follow the position taken by other states that have 
held that a prosecutor's exercise of peremptories in a particular 
case o discriminate against blacks violates the Sixth Amendment -- ~------ -and provisions of their state constitutions. See, e.g., People 
v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 ( 197 8) ; Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 
N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979). Rather, the court reaffirmed its 
reliance on Swain and held that "an allegation of the lack of a 
fair cross-sectional jury which does not concern a systematic 
exclusion from the jury drum does not rise to constitutional 
proportions." App. at 8. 
Discussion 
In voting to deny cert. in a recent case raising this 
issue, three Justices expressed their willingness to reconsider 
Swain. The three voted to deny cer t. in that case because there 
was then no conflict within the federal system and because it was 
a sound exercise of discretion to allow the States "to serve as 
laboratories" further to study the issue before the Court 
reconsidered it. McCray v. New York, 463 u.s. 961 (1983) 
(opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Powell and Blackmun, J. J.) . 
Two other Justices dissented from denial of cert. in McCray, id. 
at 963 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.). Since 
~ -:\ C/fz. 
McCray, l C  C~have ruled that the use of peremptor ies to d.. 
strike blacks in a particular case may violate a defendant's C./-1 (. 
Sixth Amendment rights. ,.------ __  _...;---- See Booker v. Jabe, No. 83-1136 (CA6 
4. 
Oct. 29, 198S); McCray v. Abrams, 7SO F.2d 1113 (CA2 1984). A 
panel of CAS has reached a similar result under supervisory 
--------------------------~--~'--------
powers, United States v. Leslie, 7S9 F.2d 366 (CAS 198S) 
(rehearing en bane granted). Moreover, state supreme courts, in 
addition to the courts of California and Massachusetts, ~ 
Wheeler, supra; Soares, supra, have reached similar conclusions 
based on their state constitutions, see Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 
~ ~ 
997 (Del. Sup. Ct. 198S); State v. Neil, 4S7 So.2d 481 (Fla. 
1984); see also State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486 (1980). 
1 believe that the use by prosecutors of peremptory 
challenges to strike black jurors is a "pernicious practice" that 
will not cease until this Court announces that a defendant may 
make out a prima facie equal protection violation by proof of the ~-
prosecutor's action in a ar case. 1 realize that my ~ 
s~ -if adopted, would require the Court to overrule recommendation, 
that portion of Swain concerning how a defendant can prove his 
claim. But, in my view, Swain has had the unfortunate result of 
diluting the effectiveness of the Court's decisions forbidding 
racial discrimination in selection of the jurors who make up the 
venire from which the petit jury is selected. Though blacks are 
now represented in the venire due to this Court's repeated 
rejection of discriminatory selection practices at that level, 
the discrimination has resurfaced at the level of the peremptory 
challenge and, under Swain, is largely immunized from review. ---
The following points, briefly stated, represent my thoughts about 
this issue. 
5. 
First, as early as 1880, the Court recognized that a black 
defendant forced to go to trial by a jury .,drawn from a panel 
from which the Sate has expressly excluded every man of his race, 
because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects .. 
is denied equal protection. ~trauder v. west Virginia, 100 u.s. 
303, 309 (1880). While Strauder involved a statute that on its 
face prevented blacks from serving as jurors, the case also 
recognized that the State could not discriminate against blacks 
because of their race in selecting the jury panel. Ibid. at 305. 
The Court stated: 
.,The very fact that colored people are singled out and 
expressly denied by a statute all right to participate 
in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of 
their color, though they are citizens, and may be in 
other respects, fully qualified, is practically a brand 
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their 
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice .,../-~ 
which is an impediment to securing to individuals of ~ 
the race that equal justice which the law aims tf.~r 
secure to all others ... !d. at 308. · 
!))> ' 
In my view, a prosecutor's use of peremptories to strike lacks 
because they are black is no less a brand of inferiority~ In 
some ways, the practice may be a worse stigma because of when it 
occurs. That is, a black person chosen to be in the venire 
through color-blind selection procedures is then informed, after 
he fulfills his civic duty to obey the summons, that he is not 
wanted because he has turned out to be black. 1 have attached to 
this memo a letter written to the District Attorney of Brooklyn, 
New York, and included as an appendix to her amicus brief, by a 
black person who was struck from a jury. His experience shows 
that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges can have an 
6. 
impact on individual perceptions of the fairness of the criminal 
justice system. 
Second, in Swain, the Court reviewed the history of 
peremptory challenges and concluded that the use of peremptories 
has deep roots in our system. Similarly, the various briefs that 
have been filed in this case by the parties and by amici discuss 
that history and draw upon it to support their conclusions. 
While Swain shows that the peremptory system has "old 
credentials," 380 u.s. at 212, its discussion also suggests that 
the prosecutor's use of peremptories is not as firmly grounded as 
the defendant's right to use them. 1 My view is that longstanding 
history cannot justify a holding that peremptories may be used to 
-----------------~---------------------------------
discriminate on the basis of race. The underlying justification 
-~ 
for peremptories is that, by allowing the parties to remove 
jurors as to whom they have an objection not rising to the level 
of cause, the fairness of the trial will be enhanced. Challenges 
based on racial bias cut directly against that justification: 
There simply is no support for the view that a person will be 7 
biased in favor of defendants of his own color or against 
defendants of another color, and such challenges lend a strong 
appearance of unfairness to the jury system. 
Third, the amicus briefs persuasively demonstrate, by 
citing to many cases raising the issue, that discriminatory use 
1 I will further research the history of peremptory challenges. 
The memo does not reflect that effort because I wished to give 
you my thoughts well in advance of argument on this case. 
• • 7. 
of peremptories is a pervasive problem that has eluded judicial v 
treatment because of the holding in Swain. Similarly, in McCray 
v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (CA2 1984), CA2 observed that Swain has 
placed an insurmountable burden of proof on defendants. I 
realize that the SG's brief takes the position reflected in Swain 
that it should not be difficult for defendants to show systematic 
use of peremptor ies to exclude blacks. With respect, 1 think 
that practice flatly contradicts this position. It appears that 
~ 1 only two defendants have ever made the showing required by Swain, 
and both cases involved a particular prosecutor who admitted that 
he struck blacks and whose use of peremptories had been 
repeatedly appealed by black defendants. McCray v. Abrams, 
supra, at 1120 & n. 2 (collecting cases in which claim was 
rejected); see also Amicus Brief of NAACP, American Jewish 
Committee, and American Jewish Congress at 13 (collecting cases 
in which claim was rejected). The amici explain that it is 
difficult for defendants to show systematic abuse of 
.,....-- -- ---------------------------
peremptories. For example, the amici claim that courts do not 
-------.....-
routinely record voir dires, the race of the jurors excused, or 
the grounds of excusal. Moreover, defendants may not have the 
resources to undertake an adequate investigation, and the issue 
arises in the middle of voir dire when there is no time t 
investigate systemic practice. See Amicus Brief of Michael 
McCray, New York Civil Liberties Union, and American Civil 
Liberties Union, at 44 n. 12. One state case plainly 
demonstrates that transcripts of voir dire do not routinely 
reflect the race of the jurors so that it is difficult to 
• 8. 
determine how many blacks are struck. People v. Wheeler, 22 
Cal. 3d 258, 263 (1978). 
Fourth, I believe that the issue in this case is not 
whether to condemn a prosecutor's use of perempt~ies to strike 
- --- - -- -- -· -------
blacks because they are black, but, rather, is the continuing 
vitality of the Swain holding concerning defendant's burden of 
proof. Because of 
question presented, 
guarantee of a jury 
the manner in which petr has framed his 
the Court must decide if the ~xth Amendment~ 
----~----- - --- ----
representing a fair cross section of the --------------~-
~0 ' f ourteenth 
'-I 
community the Amendment guarantee of equal 
protection is the source of the constitutional prohibition. 
Then, the CQUrt ~e how a defendant may prove his claim. 
(a) I feel strongly that the Court should not rely on the 
fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. First, it 
is clear that the Sixth Amendment cases do not purport to hold 
~ ~ - .Jt that a particular petit jury must represent a cross section, but 
~ that the pool from which the petit jury is drawn must do so. 
~ylor v. Louisiana, 419 u.s. 522, 538 (1975) (no requirement 
~that petit jury, as opposed to pool, must mirror community or 
~that defendant is entitled to jury of any particular 
Jr--
~/ composition). Second, by holding that the prosecutor may not 
~~ affirmatively thwart the cross-section ideal by using peremptory 
challenges to strike blacks, the Court would implicitly extend 
the cross-section requirement to the petit jury. I think that 
such extension would be extremely difficult to limit, with the 
result that a defendant potentially could complain any time he 
believed that the prosecutor used peremptories to strike members 
9. 
of some identifiable group. For example, the defendant could 
complain if persons allegedly sharing similar views on a 
particular issue were excluded. 
On the other hand, there is precedent supporting a holding ~ 
that , the Fte~ prohibits the States t~lk 
discriminate against persons because of their race when selecting ;¥1:1-
jurors--:---E~~ That authority makes clear that the ~ 
defendant has no right to a jury of a particular racial 
composition; his right is to have a jury selected by a process 
free of discrimination. By relying on the core values of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court could adopt a narrow holding, 
emphasizing that its concern is with discrimination against 
-----~--
blacks. 1 realize that such a holding would implicate other 
minorities. But the holding would properly be limited to suspect 
groups and could not be extended to encompass other kinds of 
groups. 
(b) If the Court does reaffirm that the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids a prosecutor to use peremptory challenges to 
discriminate on the basis of race, the Court then is faced with 
the burden of proof erected by Swain. There is no doubt that the 
Court should not lightly overrule its precedent. But, here, 1 
believe that such decision is justified. The requirement in 
Swain that a defendant establish systematic use of peremptories 
to strike blacks over a number of cases conflicts with more 
r:
ecent decisions showing that a person may challenge intention~ 
t
iscrimination aimed solely at him through use of judicially 
dev~ma facie proof rules. ~' United States Postal 
·-. ~~~, 
• 10. 
Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 u.s. 711 (1983) (prima 
facie Title VII disparate treatment case, which requires proof of 
intentional discrj mination, does not require "direct" proof of 
discriminatory intent and can be made out by showing employer 1 s 
actions in connection · with one employment decision) ; McDonnell 
Ibuglas Corp. v. Green, 411 u.s. 792 (1973) (establishing prima 
facie proof rules for use in Title VII cases). I see no reason 
why similar prima facie rules could not be used to govern this --
claim. Moreover, with respect, I do not think that Swain is --
particularly well reasoned. Since it is clear that equal 
protection rights are individual, there is no reason why a 
violation of one person 1 s rights should depend on proof that 
others also have been denied their rights in the past. 
(c) There remains the question of how a defendant may ~ 9 
establish his claim. In this connection, the state courts have 
acted as laboratories, and their decisions are instructive. In 
~~People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978), Ca. Sup. Ct. developed 
burden of proof rules that could guide the Court 1 S decision in 
this area. When a defendant believes that the prosecutor is 
using peremptor ies on the ground of racial bias, he must raise 
the point in timely fashion and must make a prima facie case of 
discrimination. That showing can be based on the totality of the 
circumstances of the particular case. C~up. Ct. requires the 
following showing (as adapted to fit my recommended equal 
protection holding). ~the defendant must establish that 
black jurors are being struck. Second, he must show, under all 
the circumstances of the case, "a strong likelihood that such 
• ~~..AJ!V'l ~ ~ ~ -.. R 
c:P"~~ 
persons are being challenged of their [race] rather than 
because of any specific biasn held by the juror. Ibid. at 280. 
This second showing can be made through evidence that the 
prosecutor has struck all or most blacks from the venire or nhas 
used a disproportionate number of his peremptories againstn 
blacks. Id. The circumstances may also reveal that the struck 
jurors share only race and that, in other respects, they are 
heterogeneous. Moreover, the fact that a prosecutor does not 
question black jurors to identify specific bias that they may 
actually harbor, but then automatically uses his peremptories to 
strike them, may give rise to an inference of discrimination. At ~ 
this point, the burden will be on the prosecutor to articulate a 
neutral reason, not rising to the level of cause, for striking 
the jurors in question. 
(d) There is no question that, if this approach is 
followed, the peremptory challenge system would change. In my 
view, such change would be for the better. The experience of the 
States that have prohibited racial use of peremptories shows that ------
peremptory challenges have survived. First, once the Court 
announced this rule, most prosecutors would stop exercising 
peremptor ies in a racially discriminatory manner. That is the 
simple answer. Second, for the prosecutors who allegedly do not 
stop this practice, the trial court will be in a position to 
assess the evidence. I have faith in the ability of trial judges 
to implement the system particularly since it involves burden of 
proof and credibility decisions with which they are familiar. 
12. 
Third, the experience of the states that have 
lived with this system for several years shows that the system 
does not place an undue burden on TCs or require abandoment of 
peremptory challenges. For example, amici explain that they have 
examined all of the reported cases involving this claim in 
California and Massachusetts, both of which have adopted a -----
similar approach. Since California adopted the approach in 1978, 
there have been fifteen reported cases involving the claim. 
Since Massachusetts adopted the system in 1979, there have been 
thirteen cases. Moreover, the cases also show that prosecutors 
have been able to satisfy TCs that they are not discriminating on 
the basis of race. ~, Commonwealth v. Kelly, 10 Mass. App. 
847 (1980) (court accepted prosecutor's challenge based on 
juror's "demeanor, manner and 'the smirk on her face'"); People 
v. Walker, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1060 (1984) (court accepted 
prosecutor's explanation that juror "stood out as 'a comic'"). 
Fourth, I believe that convictions will rarely, if ever, 
be reversed on this ground. The nature of the peremptory 
challenge system will require a defendant to raise the claim in a 
timely fashion in the TC. If the defendant does not raise the 
issue and make a record, there will be no basis for him later to 
contend that his rights have been violated. Moreover, the TC 
will be in the best position to evaluate the evidence, which will 
involve the credibility of the prosecutor's neutral explanation. 
Since the nature of the determination is very case-specific and 
.. · 
fact-bound, I . believe that a TC's de~ion that a prosecutor did 
not discriminate will rarely be set aside on appeal. See People 
. . 
13 • 
v. Walker, supra (appellate court used very narrow standard of 
review to evaluate decision of nexperienced trial judgen). If 
the Court did decide to adopt this new approach, it could apply 
the decision prospectively only, in light of the fact that the 
decision would be a departure from precedent. 
Finally, I confess that the ~roach that I advocate 
raises several questions~For example, is defense counsel also~ 
prohibited from us~ peremptories to strike members of a racial ~ 
0 z 
group? What remedy should be adopted in a case where the TC ~ ..... 
decides that the prosecutor has improperly struck jurors on the 
basis of race? How far does this holding extend? I believe that 
~ese questions do not cast doubt on the validity of the narrow -holding that the prosecutor is forbidden to strike blacks because 
they are black and that the defendant's prima facie case can be 
established based on the facts of a particular case. I also -
believe that the Court should not undertake to answer the 
questions on this record. The lower courts can grapple with 
subsidiary questions as they must whenever the Court announces a 
new holding. The question of remedy seems to me to be one that 
should be left to development by the lower courts since 
particular remedies should be shaped in connection with the jury 
selection procedures used by the particular jurisdiction. 
Conclusion - v 
I recommend that the Court reaffirm that portion of Swain 
v. Alabama that implicitly holds that the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids a prosecutor to strike black jurors solely on the basis 




portion of Swain that holds that a defendant cannot establish, on 
proof of the facts in the particular case, that a prosecutor has 
used peremptory challenges to discriminate blacks on the -----------
jury venire. Rather, the Court should approve use of burden of 
proof rules that permit a defendant to rely on the prosecutor's 
action in his case 
~
to make a prima facie showing. Then, the 
<== 
prosecutor will be required to justify his a~tLQn on the basis of 
a neutral explanation not rising to the level of cause. 
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CHAMI!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Chief, 
JTuJringbtn, ~.Of. 20~4~ 
December 13, 1985 
No. 85-6807 / 
Lee v. Illinois 
Batson v. Kentucky 
I'm going to try my hand at op1n1ons for the 
Court in both of the above cases. Together with 
the two I assigned to myself last week, this 
brings my assignments to six, which at least 
approaches the total assignments to some of my 
colleagues. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
D cernber 9, 1985 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear. Chief: 
I understan that Batson has now been assigned to 
me in place of Thornburg v. G ngles. 
My thanks to you and Bill Brenn n. I id not think 
I could write Thornburg - an important case - in accord with 
the view of a majority of the Court as ex~ressed at Confer-
ence. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
• 
December 20, 1985 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear Byron: 
As the Chief h s now asqigned this case to me, I am 
particularly interested in your views as the author of Swain 
as to how an op nion s ould be written. 
I enclose a copy of my Conference notes recording 
my understanding of your position. I believe you can read 
the noteq despite poor handwriting and bad grammar. o 
these accurately reflect the substance of what you said -
though t greater lengt ? I appreciate, of course, that how 
these views are written out will be what counts. 
You may recall that I asked to what extent you 
think Swain Jl\USt be overruled. It woul '-) heJ. ful f you 
also 1ould share your thinking on this with n~. 
I recorded in my own notes the fo .lowing: 
"As I understand BRW, I think I could agree." 










Anne DATE: Jan. 11, 1986 
Lewis .F. Powell, Jr. 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
I have read the first draft of 
and admiration. It is well 
our opinion with 
organized, well 
written, and persuasive. In addition to my usual language 
editing, I make the following points - some as questions 
and others as suggesting additional thoughts. I make the 
points in no particular order. 
1. Perhaps it should be made more clearly - in 
the early part of Part II - that we consistently have 
recognized that the rule requiring that a jury be 
representative of the community has been applied uniformly 
to the venire rather than the petit jury. In view of the 
size of petit juries - particularly now that six member 
juries are lawful - it is quite impossible for the concept 
of representation to be applied at the trial jury level. 
This was explicitly said in Edwards v. Louisiana, as well 
as in Swain and other cases. Thus, the authorities we 
rely on for the relevant principles - and that you have 
marshaled extremely well - are cases involving the venire. 
2. 
Yet, the principles can be applied, as you have done, in 
the special circumstances addressed in this case. 
2. The structure of analysis that the draft 
opinion requires is that a defendant must make a prima 
facie showing that the striking of blacks from the jury 
was motivated by purposeful discrimination. When such a 
showing is made, the burden of going forward to rebut the 
prima facie case shifts to the prosecution. But the 
ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the defendant. 
This general procedure was described in my McDonnell-
Douglas decision (1972 Term, as I recall), and in a couple 
of subsequent Title VII cases. Has it been followed in 
any of the discrimination cases involving the venire? In 
any event, it seems to me to the proper procedure. You 
may be able, in a footnote, to cite decisions from CAs or 
possibly state courts that have outlined this procedure in 
equal protection cases. 
3. You have 







Kearse in McCray, or in any other CA case. I quite agree 
that this is prudent. 
4. At Conference, Justice White acknowledged 
that Swain in effect would have to be overruled in part. 
3. 
It is clear from your draft that, if this becomes a Court 
opinion, Swain would be modified or overruled in part. 
You have properly made clear that the equal protection 
principles reiterated by the Court in Swain were correct, 
and that we extend their application of those principles 
to cases where preemptory challenges are used for no 
reason other than the race of the prospective juror. 
5. Finally, it is important to add - perhaps in 
rebutting the state's arguments that given the 
heterogeneous population of our country, public respect 
for our system of justice and the rule of law will be 
enhanced if we make clear that no citizen should be 
disqualified from jury service solely because of his or 
her race. Or putting it differently, the race of a juror 
is irrelevant to the basic question whether or not he or 
she is qualified to serve with objectivity and 
impartiality. 
I now suggest that you do a second draft - giving 
this priority over bench memos - and that that draft then 
be reviewed by Bill. Of course, I leave entirely to you 
and Bill as to how best to cooperate. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
CHAMBERS 0 F 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.ittp'Uutt Qfttnrlttf tJrt ~tb .itatt.&' 
Jlagftittgt.cm. ~. (!f. 2tlgi~~ 
January 21, 1986 
/ 
84-6263 - Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear Lewis , 
Your draft is somewhat harder on Swain 
than it need be since it in effect finds that 
the decision was indefensible at the time in 
light of prior decisions. But perhaps this 
is just a matter of style. You should 















From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: JAN 2 2 l9SG 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-6263 
JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER 
v. KENTUCKY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF KENTUCKY 
[January -, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to reexamine that portion of Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning the evidentiary 
burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has 
been denied equal protection through the State's use of pe-
remptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the 
petit jury. 1 
1 Following the lead of a number of state courts construing their state's 
constitution, two federal Courts of Appeal recently have accepted the view 
that use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors in a particular case 
violates the Sixth Amendment. Booker v. J abe, 775 F. 2d 762 (CA6 1985), 
cert. pending, No. 85-1028; McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113 (CA2 
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 
583 P . 2d 748 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997, 1009-1013 (Del. 1985); 
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 
Mass. 461, 387 N. E . 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). See also 
State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980). Other Courts 
of Appeal have rejected that position, adhering to the requirement that a 
defendant must prove systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury to 
establish a constitutional violation. United States v. Childress, 715 F. 2d 
1313 (CA8 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1063 (1984); United 
States v. Whitfield, 715 F . 2d 145, 147 (CA4 1983). See Beed v. State , 271 
Ark. 526, 530-531, 609 S. W. 2d 898, 903 (1980); Blackwell v. State, 248 
Ga. 138, 281 S. E. 2d 599, 599-600 (1981); Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576, 
579 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U. s: 867 (1983); People v. McCray, 57 N. Y. 
2d 542, 546-549, 443 N. E. 2d 915, 916-919 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 
961 (1983); State v. Lynch, 300 N. C. 534, 546-547, 268 S. E. 2d 161, 
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I 
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on 
charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen 
goods. On the first day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court, 
the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire, ex-
cused certain jurors for cause, and permitted the parties to 
exercise peremptory challenges. 2 The prosecutor used his 
peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the 
venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was se-
lected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before 
it was sworn on the ground that the prosecutor's removal of 
the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a 
cross-section of the community, and under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel re-
quested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling 
on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the 
parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to 
"strike anybody they want to." The judge then denied peti-
tioner's motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement 
applies only to selection of the venire and not to selection of 
the petit jury itself. 
168-169 (1980). Federal Courts of Appeal also have held that the prosecu-
tor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case may be scruti-
nized under supervisory power. United States v. Leslie, 759 F . 2d 366, 
370-375, rehearing en bane granted, 761 F. 2d 195 (CA5 1985); United 
States v. Jackson, 696 F . 2d 578, 592-593 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460 
U. S. 1073 (1983). See also United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 
1243 (ED La. 1974). 
2 The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the trial court to 
permit counsel to conduct voir dire examination or to conduct the examina-
tion itself. Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.38. After jurors have been excused · 
for cause, the parties exercise their peremptory challenges simultaneously 
by striking names from a list of qualified jurors equal to the number to be 
seated plus the number of allowable peremptory challenges. Rule 9.36. 
Since the offense charged in this case was a felony , and an alternate juror 
was called, the prosecutor was entitled to six peremptory challenges, and 
defense counsel to nine. Rule 9.40. 
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The jury convicted petitioner on both <;aunts. On appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner pressed, 
among other claims, the argument concerning the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges. Conceding that Swain 
v. Alabama, supra, apparently foreclosed an equal protec-
tion claim based solely on the prosecutor's conduct in this 
case, petitioner urged the court to follow decisions of other 
states, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 
(1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 
2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979), and to hold that 
such conduct violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment 
and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution to a jury drawn 
from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner also con-
tended that the facts showed that the prosecutor had en-
gaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges in this case 
and established an equal protection violation under Swain. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. In a single 
paragraph, the court declined petitioner's invitation to adopt 
the reasoning of People v. Wheeler, supra, and Common-
wealth v. Soares, supra. The court observed that it recently 
had reaffirmed its reliance on Swain, and had held that a de-
fendant alleging lack of a fair cross-section must demonstrate 
systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire. 
See Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S. W. 2d 924 (1984). 
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. -- (1985), and now 
reverse. 
II 
In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a 
"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on ac-
count of race of participation as jurors in the administration 
of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U. S., 
at 203-204. This principle has been "consistently and re-
peatedly" reaffirmed, id., at 204, in numerous decisions of 
this Court both preceding and following Swain. 3 We re-
a See, e. g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); Neal v. 
.. 
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affirm the principle today. 4 
A 
More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State 
denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it 
puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his 
race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). That decision laid the foun-
dation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial 
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire 
from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, the 
Court explained that the central concern of the recently rati-
fied Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to govern-
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); 
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947); 
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 
(1954); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 
U. S. 24 (1967) (per curiam); Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene 
County, 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); 
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. -
(1986). 
The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation 
in jury service on account of their race "are essentially the same for grand 
juries and for petit juries." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 626, 
n. 3 (1972); see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587,589 (1935). These prin-
ciples are reinforced by the criminal laws of the United States. 18 
u. s. c. § 243. 
'In this Court, petitioner has argued that the prosecutor's conduct vio-
lated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impar-
tial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Peti-
tioner has framed his argument in these terms in an apparent effort to 
avoid inviting the Court directly to reconsider one of its own precedents. 
On the other hand, the State has insisted that petitioner is claiming a de-
nial of equal protection and that we must reconsider Swain to find a con-
stitutional violation on this record. We agree with the State that resolu-
tion of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection 
principles and express no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth 
Amendment arguments. 
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mental discrimination on account of race. Id., at 306-307. 
Exclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes 
a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to cure. 
In holding that racial discrimination in jury selection of-
fends the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Strauder 
recognized, however, that a defendant has no right to a "petit 
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race." 
I d., at 305.5 "The number of our races and nationalities 
stands in the way of evolution of such a conception" of the de-
mand of equal protection. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 
403 (1945). 6 But the defendant does have the right to be 
tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to non-
discriminatory criteria. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 
(1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). The 
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the 
State will not exclude members of his race from the jury ve-
nire on account of race, Strauder, supra, at 305,7 or on the 
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not 
qualified to serve as jurors, see Norris v. Alabama, 294 
U. S. 587, 599 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397 
(1881). 
•see Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 
282, 286-287 (1950) (plurality opinion); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 
(1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 
supra, at 394. 
6 Similarly, though the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury 
will be selected from a pool of names representing a cross-section of the 
community, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), we have never held 
that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries actually chosen must 
mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population," id., at 538. Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept 
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heteroge-
neous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the 
Court's holding that a jury of six persons is not unconstitutional. Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 102-103 (1970). 
7 See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, supra, at 
287; Akins v. Texas, supra, at 403; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394. 
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Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire 
violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it de-
nies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to se-
cure. "The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the 
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or 
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, as-
sociates, persons having the same legal status in society as 
that which he holds." Strauder, supra, at 308; see Carter v. 
Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U. S. 320, 330 
(1970). The petit jury has occupied a central position in our 
system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime 
against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or 
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968).8 
Those on the venire must be "indifferently chosen," 9 to se-
cure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to "protection of life and liberty against race or color preju-
dice." Strauder, supra, at 309. 
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only 
the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try. 
8 See Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, at 530; Williams v. Florida, supra, 
at 100. See also Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1 
(1966). 
In Duncan v. Louisiana, decided after Swain, the Court concluded that 
the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was such a fundamental feature 
of the American system of justice that it was protected against state action 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 391 U. S., at 
147-158. The Court emphasized that a defendant's right to be tried by a 
jury of his peers is designed "to prevent oppression by the Government." 
Id., at 155, 156-157. For a jury to perform its intended function as a 
check on official power, it must be a body drawn from the community. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 156; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 
60, 86-88 (1942). By compromising the representative quality of the jury, 
discriminatory selection procedures make "juries ready weapons for offi-
cials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered 
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., 
at 408 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
• 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (Cooley ed. 1899) (quoted in Dun-
can v. Lousiana, supra, at 152). 
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Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an as-
sessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to 
consider evidence presented at a trial. See Thiel v. South-
ern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1946). A person's 
race simply "is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." Id., at 
227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As long ago as Strauder, 
therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person 
participation in jury service on account of his race, the State 
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror. 
100 U. S., at 308; see Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene 
County, supra, at 329-330; Neal v. Delaware, supra, at 386. 
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends be-
yond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to 
touch the entire community. Selection procedures that pur-
posefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public 
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. See 
Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946); McCray 
v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 968 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). Discrimination within the 
judicial system is most pernicious because it is "a stimulant to 
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to 
[black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to se-
cure to all others." Strauder, supra, at 308. 
B 
In Strauder, the Court invalidated a state statute that pro-
vided that only white men could serve as jurors. 100 U. S., 
at 305. We can be confident that no state now has such a 
law. The Constitution requires, however, that we look be-
yond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and 
also consider challenged selection practices to afford "protec-
tion against action of the State through its administrative of-
ficers in effecting the prohibited discrimination." Norris v. 
Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; see Hernandez v. Texas, 347 
U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at 
346-347. Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protec-
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tion where the procedures implementing _a neutral statute op-
erated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds, 10 
and has made clear that the Constitution prohibits all forms 
of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors. 11 
While decisions of this Court have been concerned largely 
with discrimination during selection of the venire, the prin-
ciples announced there also forbid discrimination on account 
of race in selection of the petit jury. Since the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings 
bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406 
(1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to 
neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other 
stages in the selection process," Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 
559, 562 (1953); see McCray v. New York, supra, at 965, 968 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also 
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972). 
Accordingly, the component of the jury selection process at 
issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors 
through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 Although a prosecutor or-
10 E. g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 407 (1967) (per curiam); Whitus 
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 548-549; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S., at 561. 
11 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S., 
at 319; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394, 397. 
12 We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on 
the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel. 
Nor do we express any views on the techniques used by lawyers who 
seek to obtain information about the community in which a case is to be 
tried, and about members of the venire from which the jury is likely to be 
drawn. See generally J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Un-
certain Commitment to Representative Panels, 183-189 (1977). Prior to 
voir dire examination, which serves as the basis for exercise of challenges, 
lawyers wish to know as much as possible about prospective jurors, includ-
ing their age, education, employment, and economic status, so that they 
can ensure selection of jurors who at least have an open mind about the 
case. In some jurisdictions, where a pool of jurors serves for a substantial 
period of time, see J. Van Dyke, supra, at 116-118, counsel also may seek 
to learn which members of the pool served on juries in other cases and the 
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dinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory chal-
lenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related 
to his view concerning the outcome" of the case to be tried, 
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (Conn. 
1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. New-
man, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977), the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 
account of their race. 13 
III 
The principles announced in Strauder never have been 
questioned in any subsequent decision of this Court. 
Rather, the Court has been called upon repeatedly to review 
the application of those principles to particular facts. 14 A re-
curring question in these cases, as in any case alleging a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether the 
defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful dis-
crimination on the part of the State. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U. S., at 550; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-481; 
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 403-404; Martin v. Texas, 200 
U. S. 316 (1906). That question also was at the heart of the 
outcome of those cases. Counsel even may employ professional investiga-
tors to interview persons who have served on a particular petit jury. We 
have had no occasion to consider particularly this practice. Of course, 
counsel's efforts to obtain possibly relevant information about prospective 
jurors is to be distinguised from the practice at issue here. 
13 This conclusion is consistent with Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 
(1965). The Court viewed Alabama's peremptory challenge practice, 
when properly exercised, as serving to eliminate a potential juror for rea-
sons related to the "context of the case to be tried." !d., at 221; see id., at 
224. Moreover, the decision left no doubt that the Equal Protection 
Clause forbade a prosecutor to strike black jurors on account of their race. 
!d., at 223-224. 
1•See, e. g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.- (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 
443 U. S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U. S. 545, 549-550 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, supra, at 205; Coleman v. 
Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589 
(1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394. 
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portion of Swain v. Alabama we reexarnip.e today. 15 
A 
Swain required the Court to decide, among other issues, 
whether a black defendant was denied equal protection by 
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude 
members of his race from the petit jury. 380 U. S., at 
209-210. The record in Swain showed that the prosecutor 
had used the State's peremptory challenges to strike the six 
black persons included on the petit jury venire. I d., at 210. 
While rejecting the defendant's claim for failure to prove pur-
poseful discrimination, the Court nonetheless indicated that 
the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on the State's 
exercise of peremptory challenges. I d., at 222-224. 
The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's histori-
cal privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control, 
id., at 214-220, and the constitutional prohibition on exclu-
sion of persons from jury service on account of race, id., at 
222-224. While the Constitution does not confer a right to 
peremptory challenges, id., at 219 (citing Stilson v. United 
15 The decision in Swain has been the subject of extensive commentary. 
Some authors have argued that the Court should reconsider the decision. 
E. g., J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commit-
ment to Representative Panels 166-167 (1977); Imlay, Federal Jury Ref-
ormation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 
268-270 (1973); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory Challenge-
Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. 
L. J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint 
for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966). 
See also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 
1611 (1985). 
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that we should ad-
here to Swain. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the 
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 
337 (1982). . 
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States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919)), those challenges tradition-
ally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection 
of a qualified and unbiased jury, 380 U. S. , at 219. 16 To pre-
serve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenge, 
the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his actions in a par-
ticular case by relying on a presumption that he properly ex-
ercised the State's challenges. I d., at 221-222. 
The Court went on to observe, however, that a state may 
not exercise its challenges in contravention of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. It was impermissible for a prosecutor to use 
his challenges to exclude blacks from the jury "for reasons 
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on 
trial" or to deny to blacks "the same right and opportunity to 
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the 
white population." Id., at 224. Accordingly, a black de-
fendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system 
was "being perverted" in that manner. Ibid. For example, 
an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on 
evidence that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the 
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defend-
ant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of 
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the 
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for 
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit ju-
ries." Id., at 223. Evidence offered by the defendant in 
Swain was insufficien,t because, though showing that pros-
ecutors in the jurisdiction systematically had exercised their 
strikes to exclude blacks from the jury, it did not demon-
strate the circumstances under which the prosecutor alone 
was responsible for striking black jurors beyond the facts of 
the defendant's case. Id., at 224-228. 
16 In Swain, the Court reviewed the "very old credentials" of the pe-
remptory challenge system and noted the "long and widely held belief that 
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." 380 U. S. , at 
219; see id., at 212-219. 
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A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain 
reasoned that proof of systematic striking of blacks over a 
number of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 17 Since this interpretation of Swain 
has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 18 pros-
ecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. For reasons that follow, we reject 
this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards 
that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima 
facie case under the Equal Protection Clause. 
B 
Since the decision in Swain, we have explained that our 
cases concerning selection of the venire reflect the general 
equal protection principle that the "invidious quality'' of gov-
ernmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory "must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). As in any 
equal protection case, the "burden is, of course," on the de-
17 E. g., United States v. Jenkins, 701 F. 2d 850, 859-860 (CAlO 1983); 
United States v. Boykin, 679 F. 2d 1240, 1245 (CA8 1982); United States v. 
Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1218 (CA5 1971); Thigpen v. State, 49 Ala. 
App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666, 673 (1972); Jackson v. State, 245 Ark. 331, 432 
S. W. 2d 876, 878 (1968); Johnson v. Maryland, 9 Md. App. 143, 262 A. 2d 
792, 796-797 (1970); State v. Johnson, 125 N. J. Super. 438, 311 A. 2d 389 
(1973) (per curiam); State v. Shaw, 284 N. C. 366, 200 S. E. 2d 585 (1973). 
18 See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113, 1120, and n. 2 (CA2 1984), 
cert. pending, No. 84-1426. The lower courts have noted the practical dif-
ficulties of proving that the State systematically has exercised peremptory 
challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of race. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the defendant would have 
to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the par-
ticular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and 
the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges. 
United States v. Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1217 (CA51971). The court be-
lieved this burden to be "most difficult" to meet. Ibid. In jurisdictions 
where court records do not reflect the jurors' race and where voir dire pro-
ceedings are not transcribed, the burden would be insurmountable. See 
.People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748, 767-768 (1978). 
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fendant who alleges discriminatory selecti_on of the venire "to 
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus 
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 550 (citing Tarrance v. Florida, 188 
U. S. 519 (1903)). In deciding if the defendant has carried 
his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake "a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent 
as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 
(1977). Circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may in-
clude proof of disproportionate impact. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. We have observed that under 
some circumstances proof of discriminatory impact "may for 
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality be-
cause in various circumstances the discrimination is very dif-
ficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Ibid. For example, 
"total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes 
from jury venires," ibid., "is itself such an 'unequal applica-
tion of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination,'" 
id., at 241 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 404). 
Moreover, since Swain, we have recognized that a black 
defendant alleging that members of his race have been imper-
missibly excluded from the venire may make out a prima 
facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the 
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, supra, at 
239-242. Once the defendant makes the. requisite showing, 
the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial 
exclusion. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. The 
State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions 
that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly 
performed their official duties. See Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 632; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24, 25 (1967). 
Rather, the State must demonstrate that "permissible ra-
cially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced 
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the monochromatic result." Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 
at 632; see Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241. 19 
The showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in selection of the venire may be 
discerned in this Court's decisions. E. g., Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977); Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 631-632. The defendant initially must show 
that he is a member of a racial group capable of being singled 
out for differential treatment. Castaneda v. Partida, 
supra, at 494. In combination with that evidence, a defend-
ant may then make a prima facie case by proving that in the 
particular jurisdiction members of his race have not been 
summoned for jury service over an extended period of time. 
I d. , at 494. Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire 
raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the 
"result bespeaks discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas, 
supra, at 482; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Corp., supra, at 266. 
Since the ultimate issue is whether the State has discrimi-
nated in selecting the defendant's venire, however, the de-
fendant may establish a prima facie case "in other ways than 
by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence" of mem-
bers of his race "from many panels." Cassell v. Texas, 339 
U. S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion). In cases involving 
the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case on proof 
that members of the defendant's race were substantially un-
derrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, 
and that the venire was selected under a practice providing 
"the opportunity for discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia, 
19 Our decisions in the context of Title VII "disparate treatment" have 
explained the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. See M cDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); United States Postal 
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983). The party 
alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination carries the 
ultimate burden of persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, supra, at 252-256. 
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385 U. S., at 552; see Castaneda v. Partida, supra, at 494; 
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241; Aiexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 629-631. This combination of factors raises 
the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because 
the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of 
black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection 
mechanism is subject to abuse. When circumstances sug-
gest the need, the trial court must undertake a "factual in-
quiry'' that "takes into account all possible explanatory fac-
tors" in the particular case. Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 
at 630. 
Thus, since the decision in Swain, this Court has recog-
nized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of 
purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by 
relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case. 
These decisions are in accordance with the proposition, artic-
ulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 
that "a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is 
not "a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion -Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory govern-
mental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such dis-
crimination in the making of other comparable decisions." 
429 U. S., at 266, n. 14. For evidentiary requirements to 
dictate that "several must suffer discrimination" before one 
could object, McCray v. New York, 461 U. S., at 965 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), would be in-
consistent with the promise of equal protection to all. 20 
c 
The standards for assessing a prima facie case in the con-
text of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully 
articulated since Swain. See Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 
20 Decisions under Title VII also recognize that a person claiming that he 
has been the victim of intentional discrimination may make out a prima 
facie case by relying solely on the facts concerning the alleged discrimina-
tion against him. See cases at supra, n. 19. 
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at 494-495; Washington v. Davis supra, at 241-242; Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. These principles fully 
support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of 
the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's 
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. 
To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that 
he is a member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. 
Partida, supra, at 494, and that the prosecutor has exercised 
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members 
of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to 
rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that pe-
remptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that 
permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate. " Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 562. Finally, the de-
fendant must show that these facts and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on 
account of their race. This combination of factors in the 
empanelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, 
raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. 
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite 
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circum-
stances. For example, a "pattern" of strikes against black 
jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an 
inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's 
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in 
exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference 
of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illus-
trative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced 
in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circum-
stances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against 
black jurors. 
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the bur-
den shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral 
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explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this re-
quirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full pe-
remptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize 
that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level 
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. See McCray v. 
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762, 
773 (CA6 1985), cert. pending 85-1028. But the prosecutor 
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the de-
fendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judg-
ment-that they would be partial to the defendant. Cf. 
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 598-599; see Thompson v. 
United States,-- U.S.--,-- (BRENNAN, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari). Nor may the prosecutor rebut 
the defendant's case by simply denying that he had a dis-
criminatory motive or "affirming his good faith in individual 
selections." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. If 
mere "general assertions" were accepted as rebutting a de-
fendant's prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause 
"would be but a vain and illusory requirement." Norris v. 
Alabama, supra, at 598. The prosecutor therefore must 
articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case 
to be tried. 21 The trial court then will have the duty to 
determine if the defendant has established purposeful 
discrimination. 22 
21 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v. 
Abrams, 750 F . 2d, at 1132, that "[t]here are any number of bases" on 
which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a 
juror who is not excusable for cause. As we explained in another context, 
however, the prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" ex-
planation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges. Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981). 
22 In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that "a finding 
of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact" entitled to appropriate def-
erence by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. -
(1985). Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration 
• 
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IV 
The State contends that our holding will eviscerate the fair 
trial values served by the peremptory challenge. Conceding 
that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to peremp-
tory challenges and that Swain did state that their use ulti-
mately is subject to the strictures of equal protection, the 
State argues that the privilege of unfettered exercise of the 
challenge is of vital importance to the criminal justice 
system. 
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory chal-
lenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures, 
we do not agree that our decision today will undermine the 
contribution the challenge generally makes to the administra-
tion of justice. The reality of practice, amply reflected in 
many state and federal court opinions, shows that the chal-
lenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to 
discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts 
to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal 
protection and furthers the ends of justice. In view of the 
heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our 
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strength-
ened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury 
service because of his race. 
Nor are we persuaded by the State's suggestion that our 
holding will create serious administrative difficulties. In 
those states applying a version of the evidentiary standard 
we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious ad-
ministrative burdens, 23 and the peremptory challenge system 
has survived. We decline, however, to formulate particular 
here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordi-
narily should give those findings great deference. !d., at-. 
28 For example, in People v. Hall , 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), 
the California Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show 
that procedures implementing its version of this standard, imposed five 




procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection 
to a prosecutor's challenges. 24 
v 
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the pros-
ecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because 
the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring 
the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we re-
mand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court de-
cides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful dis-
crimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a 
neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require 
that petitioner's conviction be reversed. E. g., Whitus v. 
Georgia, 385 U. S., at 549-550; Hernandez v. Texas, supra, 
at 482; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S., at 469. 
It is so ordered. 
24 In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state 
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how 
best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no 
view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding 
of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the 
venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with 
the case, see Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d, at 773, or to disallow the discrimi-
natory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged ju-
rors reinstated on the venire, see United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 
467, 474 (Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. New-
man, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977). 
January 22, 1986 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear B ron: 
I1 the ra~t I am ci~cu atinq today, I have made a 
number of ch qes that I hope w:l satisfy the concerns that 
you express~~. 
In oart'cu r, ! ~~ve 1irni ated in appropriate 
p aces citations to ~ci i ns prior to Swain. Similarly 
particularly i~ fo tnote 15 - T have eliminated citations to 
a nu~ er of t c articles discugsing Swain. Moreover, I have 
shown in te~tual changes that there have been significant 
deveJopments since Swain that lea us to reexamine its hold-
ing. With these changes, I am circulat ng my opin on today. 
If you have suggestions for changes in language, I 
w'll certain y consider t)em. If I had been a member of the 
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No. 84-6293 Batson v. Kentucky 
I was pleased this case was assigned to you. You 
have produced a fine opinion, and I plan to join it. I have 
a question and a suggestion that I would appreciate your 
considering, although my joinder will not be conditioned 
upon either one. 
(1) The opinion leaves somwhat uncertain whether a 
race-based peremptory would violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
even if the defendant and the racially excluded jurors were 
of different races. On page 14 (first full paragraph) the 
opin1~s that in that circumstance a defendant could 
not make out a prima facie case of discrimination. On page 
7, the opinion suggests that a juror excluded on the basis 
of race has suffered unconstitutional disrimination 
regardless of the race of the defendant. I realize that the 
Court's cases are less than crystal clear on this point. 
But I incline towards the position that any race-based 
effort to cull certain jurors from the venire represents 
unlawful discrimination. If the opinion is saying that only/ 
excluded jurors and defendants of the same race as the 
excluded juror have standing to object to the 
unconstitutional act1on, perhaps that could be clarified 
with a brief footnote. 
(2) The principal error of Swain, in my view, was 
that it left prosecutors with the impression that racially 
motivated peremptories were permissible as long as the 
motivation was to improve the chances of obtaining a 
favorable verdict. In other words, Swain drew a distinction 
between striking blacks because the prosecutor believed that 
they had no place in the judicial system and striking blacks 
because they were thought to be acquittal-prone. The 
opinion seemed to suggest that the latter was permissible, 
while the former was not. 
As your opinion correctly holds on pag~ 17, a 
peremptory challenge motivated solely by the v1ew that 
blacks, as a race, are acquittal-prone violates the Equal 
2. 
Protection Clause. The carr~o~~aph on pages 7-8, 
however, could be read he dichotomy 
seemingly rel~Swain. The sentence~ now reads, with 
internal quC>tations and c1tations omitted: 
"Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled 
to exercise permitted peremptory challenges 
for any reason at all@ as long as that reason 
is related to his view concerning the outcome 
of the case to be tried, the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge 
potential jurors solely on account of their 
race." 
~ U?-<t~.c.c- ~ 
Perhaps something along the f~lowing lines could be 
added to the end of the sentence: "or <>th:&oeeot~n t of general 
assumptions about the attitudes towar s the criminal justice 
system held by members of a given race." 
I assume that peremptory strikes would still be 
allowed if, for example, voir dire questioning reve~ a 
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[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to reexamine that portion of Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning the evidentiary 
burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has 
been denied equal protection through the State's use of pe-
remptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the 
petit jury. 1 
1 Following the lead of a number of state courts construing their state's 
constitution, two federal Courts of Appeal recently have accepted the view 
that use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors in a particular case 
violates the Sixth Amendment. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762 (CA6 1985), 
cert. pending, No. 85-1028; McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113 (CA2 
1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 
583 P. 2d 748 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997, 1009-1013 (Del. 1985); 
State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 
Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). See also 
State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980). Other Courts 
of Appeal have rejected that position, adhering to the requirement that a 
defendant must prove systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit jury to 
establish a constitutional violation. United States v. Childress, 715 F. 2d 
1313 (CA8 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1063 (1984); United 
States v. Whitfield, 715 F. 2d 145, 147 (CA4 1983). See Beed v. State, 271 
Ark. 526, 530-531, 609 S. W. 2d 898, 903 (1980); Blackwell v. State, 248 
Ga. 138, 281 S. E. 2d 599, 599-600 (1981); Gilliard v. State, 428 So. 2d 576, 
579 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 867 (1983); People v. McCray, 57 N. Y. 
2d 542, 546-549, 443 N. E. 2d 915, 916-919 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U. S. 
961 (1983); State v. Lynch, 300 N. C. 534, 546-547, 268 S. E. 2d 161, 
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I 
Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on 
charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen 
goods. On the first day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court, 
the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire, ex-
cused certain jurors for cause, and permitted the parties to 
exercise peremptory challenges. 2 The prosecutor used his 
peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the 
venire, and a jury composed only_ of white persons was se-
lected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before 
it was sworn on the ground that the prosecutor's removal of 
the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a 
cross-section of the community, and under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel re-
quested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling 
on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the 
parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to 
"strike anybody they want to." The judge then denied peti-
tioner's motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement 
applies only to selection of the venire and not to selection of 
the petit jury itself. 
168-169 (1980). Federal Courts of Appeal also have held that the prosecu-
tor's exercise of peremptory challenges in a particular case may be scruti-
nized under supervisory power. United States v. Leslie, 759 F. 2d 366, 
370-375, rehearing en bane granted, 761 F . 2d 195 (CA5 1985); United 
States v. Jackson, 696 F. 2d 578, 592-593 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460 
U. S. 1073 (1983). See also United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 
1243 (ED La. 1974). 
2 The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the trial court to 
permit counsel to conduct voir dire examination or to conduct the eiamina-
tion itself. Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.38. After jurors have been excused 
for cause, the parties exercise their peremptory challenges simultaneously 
by striking names from a list of qualified jurors equal to the number to be 
seated plus the number of allowable peremptory challenges. Rule 9.36. 
Since the offense charged in this case was a felony, and an alternate juror 
was called, the prosecutor was entitled to six peremptory challenges, and 
defense counsel to nine. Rule 9.40. 
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The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. On appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner pressed, 
among other claims, the argument concerning the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges. Conceding that Swain 
v. Alabama, supra, apparently foreclosed an equal protec-
tion claim based solely on the prosecutor's conduct in this 
case, petitioner urged the court to follow decisions of other 
states, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 
(1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 
2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979), and to hold that 
such conduct violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment 
and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution to a jury drawn 
from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner also con-
tended that the facts showed that the prosecutor had en-
gaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges in this case 
and established an equal protection violation under Swain. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. In a single 
paragraph, the court declined petitioner's invitation to adopt 
the reasoning of People v. Wheeler, supra, and Common-
wealth v. Soares, supra. The court observed that it recently 
had reaffirmed its reliance on Swain, and had held that a de-
fendant alleging lack of a fair cross-section must demonstrate 
systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire. 
See Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S. W. 2d 924 (1984). 
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. -- (1985), and now 
reverse. 
II 
In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a 
"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on ac-
count of race of participation as jurors in the administration 
of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U. S., 
at 203-204. This principle has been "consistently and re-
peatedly" reaffirmed, id., at 204, in numerous decisions of 
this Court both preceding and following Swain. 3 We re-
3 See, e. g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); Neal v. 
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affirm the principle today. 4 
A 
More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State 
denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it 
puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his 
race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). That decision laid the foun-
dation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial 
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire 
from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, the 
Court explained that the central concern of the recently rati-
fied Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to govern-
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); 
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947); 
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 
(1954); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 
U. S. 24 (1967) (per curiam); Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene 
County , 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); 
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. -
(1986). 
The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation 
in jury service on account of their race "are essentially the same for grand 
juries and for petit juries." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 626, 
n. 3 (1972); see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589 (1935). These prin-
ciples are reinforced by the criminal laws of the United States. 18 
u. s. c. § 243. 
• In this Court, petitioner has argued that the prosecutor's conduct vio-
lated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impar-
tial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Peti-
tioner has framed his argument ·in these terms in an apparent effort to 
avoid inviting the Court directly to reconsider one of its own precedents. 
On the other hand, the State has insisted that petitioner is claiming a de-
nial of equal protection and that we must reconsider Swain to find a con-
stitutional violation on this record. We agree with the State that resolu-
tion of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection 





mental discrimination on account of race. Id., at 306-307. 
Exclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes 
a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to cure. 
In holding that racial discrimination in jury selection of-
fends the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Strauder 
recognized, however, that a defendant has no right to a "petit 
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race." 
I d., at 305. 5 "The number of our races and nationalities 
stands in the way of evolution of such a conception" of the de-
mand of equal protection. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 
403 (1945). 6 But the defendant does have the right to be 
tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to non-
discriminatory criteria. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 
(1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). The 
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the 
State will not exclude members of his race from the jury ve-
nire on account of race, Strauder, supra, at 305,7 or on the 
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not 
qualified to serve as jurors, see Norris v. Alabama, 294 
U. S. 587, 599 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397 
(1881). 
5 See Hernandez v. Texas , supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 286-287 (1950) (plurality opinion); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 
(1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 (1906); Neal v. Delaware, 
supra, at 394. 
6 Similarly, though the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury 
will be selected from a pool of names representing a cross-section of the 
community, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), we have never held 
that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries actually chosen must 
mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population," id., at 538. Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept 
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heteroge-
neous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the 
Court's holding that a jury of six persons is not unconstitutional. Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 102-103 (1970). 
7 See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, supra, at 




Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire 
violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it de-
nies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to se-
cure. "The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the 
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or 
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, as-
sociates, persons having the same legal status in society as 
that which he holds." Strauder, supra, at 308; see Carter v. 
Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U. S. 320, 330 
(1970). The petit jury has occupied a central position in our 
system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime 
against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or 
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968). 8 
Those on the venire must be "indifferently chosen," 9 to se-
cure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to "protection of life and liberty against race or color preju-
dice." Strauder, supra, at 309. 
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only 
the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try. 
8 See Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, at 530; Williams v. Florida, supra, 
at 100. See also Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1 
(1966). 
In Duncan v. Louisiana, decided after Swain, the Court concluded that 
the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was such a fundamental feature 
of the American system of justice that it was protected against state action 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 391 U. S., at 
147-158. The Court emphasized that a defendant's right to be tried by a 
jury of his peers is designed "to prevent oppression by the Government." 
!d., at 155, 156-157. For a jury to perform its intended function as a 
check on official power, it must be a body drawn from the community. 
·Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 156; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 
60, 86-88 (1942). By compromising the representative quality of the jury, 
discriminatory selection procedures make "juries ready weapons for offi-
cials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered 
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., 
at 408 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
9 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (Cooley ed. 1899) (quoted in Dun-
can v. Lousiana, supra, at 152). 
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Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an as-
sessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to 
consider evidence presented at a trial. See Thiel v. South-
ern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1946). A person's 
race simply "is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." I d., at 
227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As long ago as Strauder, 
therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person 
participation in jury service on account of his race, the State 
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror. 
100 U. S., at 308; see Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene 
County, supra, at 329-330; Neal v. Delaware, supra, at 386. 
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends be-
yond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to 
touch the entire community. Selection procedures that pur-
posefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public 
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. See 
Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946); McCray 
v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 968 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). Discrimination within the 
judicial system is most pernicious because it is "a stimulant to 
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to 
[black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to se-
cure to all others." Strauder, supra, at 308. 
B 
In Strauder, the Court invalidated a state statute that pro-
vided that only white men could serve as jurors. 100 U. S., 
at 305. We can be confident that no state now has such a 
law. The Constitution requires, however, that we look be-
yond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and 
also consider challenged selection practices to afford "protec-
tion against action of the State through its administrative of-
ficers in effecting the prohibited discrimination." Norris v. 
Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; see Hernandez v. Texas, 347 
U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at 
346-347. Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protec-
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tion where the procedures implementing a neutral statute op-
erated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds, 10 
and has made clear that the Constitution prohibits all forms 
of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors. 11 
While decisions of this Court have been concerned largely 
with discrimination during selection of the venire, the prin-
ciples announced there also forbid discrimination on account 
of race in selection of the petit jury. Since the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings 
bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406 
(1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to 
neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other 
stages in the selection process," Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 
559, 562 (1953); see McCray v. New York, supra, at 965, 968 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also 
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972). 
Accordingly, the component of the jury selection process at 
issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors 
through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 Although a prosecutor or-
10 E. g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 407 (1967) (per curiam); Whitus 
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 548-549; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S., at 561. 
11 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S., 
at 319; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394, 397. 
12 We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on 
the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel. 
Nor do we express any views on the techniques used by lawyers who 
seek to obtain information about the community in which a case is to be 
tried, and about members of the venire from which the jury is likely to be 
drawn. See generally J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Un-
certain Commitment to Representative Panels, 183-189 (1977). Prior to 
voir dire examination, which serves as the basis for exercise of challenges, 
lawyers wish to know as much as possible about prospective jurors, includ-
ing their age, education, employment, and economic status, so that they 
can ensure selection of jurors who at least have an open mind about the 
case. In some jurisdictions, where a pool of jurors serves for a substantial 
period of time, see J. Van Dyke, supra, at 116-118, counsel also may seek 
to learn which members of the pool served on juries in other cases and the 
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dinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory chal-
lenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related 
to his view concerning the outcome" of the case to be tried, 
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (Conn. 
1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. New-
man, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977), the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as \ 
a group will be unable impartially to consider the state's case 
against a black defendant. 13 
III 
The principles announced in Strauder never have been 
questioned in any subsequent decision of this Court. 
Rather, the Court has been called upon repeatedly to review 
the application of those principles to particular facts. 14 A re-
curring question in these cases, as in any case alleging a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether the 
defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful dis-
crimination on the part of the State. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U. 8., at 550; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. 8., at 478-481; 
outcome of those cases. Counsel even may employ professional investiga-
tors to interview persons who have served on a particular petit jury. We 
have had no occasion to consider particularly this practice. Of course, 
counsel's efforts to obtain possibly relevant information about prospective 
jurors is to be distinguised from the practice at issue here. 
'
3 We note that, in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), the Court 
viewed Alabama's peremptory challenge practice, when properly exer-
cised, as serving to eliminate a potential juror for reasons related to the 
"context of the case to be tried." I d., at 221; see id., at 224. Moreover, 
the decision left no doubt that the Equal Protection Clause forbade a pros-
ecutor to strike black jurors on account of their race. I d., at 223-224. 
"See, e. g., Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U. S. -- (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 
443 U. S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U. S. 545, 549-550 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, supra, at 205; Coleman v. 
Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589 
(1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394. 
tr/( 
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Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 403-404; Martin v. Texas, 200 
U. S. 316 (1906). That question also was at the heart of the 
portion of Swain v. Alabama we reexamine today. 15 
A 
Swain required the Court to decide, among other issues, 
whether a black defendant was denied equal protection by 
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude 
members of his race from the petit jury. 380 U. S., at 
209-210. The record in Swain showed that the prosecutor 
had used the State's peremptory challenges to strike the six 
black persons included on the petit jury venire. I d., at 210. 
While rejecting the defendant's claim for failure to prove pur-
poseful discrimination, the Court nonetheless indicated that 
the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on the State's 
exercise of peremptory challenges. I d., at 222-224. 
The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's histori-
cal privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control, 
id., at 214-220, and the constitutional prohibition on exclu-
sion of persons from jury service on account of race, id., at 
222-224. While the Constitution does not confer a right to 
15 The decision in Swain has been the subject of extensive commentary. 
Some authors have argued that the Court should reconsider the decision. 
E. g., J . Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commit-
ment to Representative Panels 166-167 (1977); Imlay, Federal Jury Ref-
ormation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 
268-270 (1973); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory Challenge-
Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. 
L. J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint 
for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966). 
See also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 
1611 (1985). 
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that we should ad-
here to Swain. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the 
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 
337 (1982). 
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peremptory challenges, id., at 219 (citing Stilson v. United 
States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919)), those challenges tradition-
ally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection 
of a qualified and unbiased jury, 380 U.S., at 219. 16 To pre-
serve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenge, 
the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his actions in a par-
ticular case by relying on a presumption that he properly ex-
ercised the State's challenges. I d., at 221-222. 
The Court went on to observe, however, that a state may 
not exercise its challenges in contravention of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. It was impermissible for a prosecutor to use 
his challenges to exclude blacks from the jury "for reasons 
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on 
trial" or to deny to blacks "the same right and opportunity to 
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the 
white population." Id. , at 224. Accordingly, a black de-
fendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system 
was "being perverted" in that manner. Ibid. For example, 
an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on 
evidence that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the 
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defend-
ant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of 
Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the 
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for 
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit ju-
ries." Id., at 223. Evidence offered by the defendant in 
Swain was insufficient because, though showing that pros- I 1' 
() 
-u 
ecutors in the jurisdiction had exercised their strikes to ex-
elude blacks from the jury, it did not demonstrate the circum-
stances under which prosecutors were responsible for 
16 In Swain, the Court reviewed the "very old credentials" of the pe-
remptory challenge system and noted the "long and widely held belief that 
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." 380 U. S. , at 
219; see id., at 212-219. 
• 
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striking black jurors beyond the facts of the defendant's case. 
!d. , at 224-228. 
A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain 
reasoned that proof of repeated striking of blacks over a num-
ber of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 17 Since this interpretation of Swain 
has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 18 pros-
ecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. For reasons that follow, we reject 
this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards 
that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima 
facie case under the Equal Protection Clause. 
B 
Since the decision in Swain, we have explained that our 
cases concerning selection of the venire reflect the general 
equal protection principle that the "invidious quality" of gov-
ernmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory "must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 
17 E . g., United States v. Jenkins , 701 F. 2d 850, 859-860 (CAlO 1983); 
United States v. Boykin, 679 F. 2d 1240, 1245 (CA8 1982); United States v. 
Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1218 (CA5 1971); Thigpen v. State , 49 Ala. 
App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666, 673 (1972); Jackson v. State, 245 Ark. 331, 432 
S. W. 2d 876, 878 (1968); Johnson v. Maryland, 9 Md. App. 143, 262 A. 2d 
792, 796-797 (1970); State v. Johnson, 125 N. J. Super. 438, 311 A. 2d 389 
(1973) (per curiam); State v. Shaw, 284 N. C. 366, 200 S. E. 2d 585 (1973). 
18 See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F . 2d 1113, 1120, and n. 2 (CA2 1984), 
cert. pending, No. 84-1426. The lower courts have noted the practical dif-
ficulties of proving that the State systematically has exercised peremptory 
challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of race. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the defendant would have 
to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the par-
ticular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and 
the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges. 
United States v. Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1217 (CA51971). The court be-
lieved this burden to be "most difficult" to meet. Ibid. In jurisdictions 
where court records do not reflect the jurors' race and where voir dire pro-
ceedings are not transcribed, the burden would be insurmountable. See 
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748, 767-768 (1978). 
.I 
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Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). As in any 
equal protection case, the "burden is, of course," on the de-
fendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire "to 
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus 
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 550 (citing Tarrance v. Florida, 188 
U. S. 519 (1903)). In deciding if the defendant has carried 
his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake "a sensitive 
inqui..!"Y into such circumstantial and direct evidehce of intent 
as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 
(1977). Circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may in-
clude proof of disproportionate impact. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. We have observed that under 
some circumstances proof of discriminatory impact "may for 
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality be-
cause in various circumstances the discrimination is very dif-
ficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Ibid. For example, 
"total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes 
from jury venires," ibid., "is itself such an 'unequal applica-
tion of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination,'" 
id., at 241 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 404). 
Moreover, since Swain, we have recognized that a black 
defendant alleging that members of his race have been imper-
missibly excluded from the venire may make out a prima 
facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the 
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, supra, at 
239-242. Once the defendant makes the requisite showing, 
the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial 
exclusion. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. The 
State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions 
that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly 
performed their official duties. See Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 632; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24, 25 (1967). 
Rather, the State must demonstrate that "permissible ra-
cially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced 
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the monochromatic result." Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 
at 632; see Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241. 19 
The showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in selection of the venire may be 
discerned in this Court's decisions. E. g., Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977); Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 631-632. The defendant initially must show 
that he is a member of a racial group capable of being singled 
out for differential treatment. Castaneda v. Partida, 
supra, at 494. In combination with that evidence, a defend-
ant may then make a prima facie case by proving that in the 
particular jurisdiction members of his race have not been 
summoned for jury service over an extended period of time. 
I d., at 494. Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire 
raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the 
"result bespeaks discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas, 
supra, at 482; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Corp., supra, at 266. 
Since the ultimate issue is whether the State has discrimi-
nated in selecting the defendant's venire, however, the de-
fendant may establish a prima facie case "in other ways than 
by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence" of mem-
bers of his race "from many panels." Cassell v. Texas, 339 
U. S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion). In cases involving 
the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case on proof 
that members of the defendant's race were substantially un-
derrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, 
and that the venire was selected under a practice providing 
"the opportunity for discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia, 
'
9 Our decisions in the context of Title VII "disparate treatment" have 
explained tpe operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. See M cDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. GTeen, 411 U. S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); United States Postal 
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983). The party 
alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination carries the 
ultimate burden of persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, supra, at 252-256. 
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385 U. S., at 552; see Castaneda v. Partida, supra, at 494; 
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241; Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 629-631. This combination of factors raises 
the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because 
the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of 
black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection 
mechanism is subject to abuse. When circumstances sug-
gest the need, the trial court must undertake a "factual in-
quiry'' that "takes into account all possible explanatory fac-
tors" in the particular case. Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 
at 630. 
Thus, since the decision in Swain, this Court has recog-
nized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of 
purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by 
relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case. 
These decisions are in accordance with the proposition, artic-
ulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 
that "a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is 
not "a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory govern-
mental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such dis-
crimination in the making of other comparable decisions." 
429 U. S., at 266, n. 14. For evidentiary requirements to 
dictate that "several must suffer discrimination" before one 
could object, McCray v. New York, 461 U. S., at 965 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), would be in-
consistent with the promise of equal protection to all. 2Q 
c 
The standards for _assessing a prima facie case in the con-
text of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully 
articulated since Swain. See Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 
20 Decisions under Title VII also recognize that a person claiming that he 
has been the victim of intentional discrimination may make out a prima 
facie case by relying ' solely on the facts concerning the alleged discrimina-
tion against him. See cases at supra, n. 19. 
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I 
at 494-495; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241-242; Alexan- ;../ • 
der v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. These principles sup-
port our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima 
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit 
jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise 
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To estab-
lish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a 
member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida, 
supra, at 494, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremp-
tory challenges to remove from the venire members of the 
defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely 
on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremp-
tory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that per-
mits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate." Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 562. Finally, the 
defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on 
account of their race. This combination of factors in the 
em panelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, 
raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. 
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite 
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circum-
stances. For example, a "pattern" of strikes against black 
jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an 
inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's 
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in 
exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference 
of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illus-
trative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced 
in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circum-
stances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against 
black jurors. 
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the bur-
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explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this re-
quirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full pe-
remptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize 
that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level 
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. See McCray v. 
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762, 
773 (CA6 1985), cert. pending 85-1028. But the prosecutor 
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the de-
fendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judg-
ment-that they would be partial to the defendant simply I 
because of their shared race. Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 
U. S., at 598-599; see Thompson v. United States, --
U. S. --, -- (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari). Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case 
by simply denying that he had a discriminatory motive or "af-
firming his good faith in individual selections." Alexander v. 
Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. If these general assertions \ 
were accepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, 
the Equal Protection Clause "would be but a vain and illusory 
requirement." Norris v. Alabama, supra, at 598. The 
prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral explanation 
related to the particular case to be tried. 21 The trial court 
then will have the duty to 
determine if the defendant has established purposeful 
discrimination. 22 
21 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v. 
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132, that "[t]here are any number of bases" on 
which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a 
juror who is not excusable for cause. As we explained in another context, 
however, the prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" ex-
planation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges. Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981). 
22 In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that "a finding 
of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact" entitled to appropriate def-
erence by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S.-
(1985). Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration 
. .. 
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IV 
The State contends that our holding will eviscerate the fair 
trial values served by the peremptory challenge. Conce mg 
that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to peremp-
tory challenges and that Swain did state that their use ulti-
mately is subject to the strictures of equal protection, the 
State argues that the privilege of unfettered exercise of the 
challenge is of vital importance to the criminal justice 
system. 
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory cha~­
lenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures 
we do not agree tnat Oti?clec 1 to a Will unaermine t 
contribution the challenge generally makes to the administra-
tion of justice. The reality of practice, amply reflected in 
many state and federal court opinions, shows that the chal-
lenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to 
discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts 
to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal 
protection and furthers the ends of justice. In view of the 
heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our 
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strength-
ened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury 
service because of his race. 
Nor are we persuaded by the State's suggestion that our 
holding will create serious administrative difficulties. In 
those states applying a version of the evidentiary standard 
we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious ad-
ministrative burdens, 23 and the peremptory challenge system 
has survived. We decline, however, to formulate particular 
here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordi-
narily should give those findings great deference. ld., at-. 
23 For example, in People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), 
the California Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show 
that procedures implementing its version of this standard, imposed five 
years earlier, were burdensome for trial judges. 
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procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection 
to a prosecutor's challenges. 24 
v 
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the pros-
ecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because 
the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring 
the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we re-
mand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court de-
cides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful dis-
crimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a 
neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require 
that petitioner's conviction be reversed. E. g., Whitus v. 
Georgia, 385 U. S., at 549-550; Hernandez v. Texas, supra, 
at 482; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S., at 469. 25 
It is so ordered. 
zc In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state 
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how 
best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no 
view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding 
of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the 
venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with 
the case, see Booker v. Jabe, 775 F . 2d, at 773, or to disallow the discrimi-
natory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged ju-
rors reinstated on the venire, see United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 
467, 474 (Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. New-
man, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977). 
25 To the extent that anything in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 
(1965), is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is 
overruled. 
• 
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Dear Sandra: 
Thank you for your letter. I am delighted you ex-
pect to join my opinion. 
In the draft I have circulated today, I have made 
some textual changes that make explicitly clear that the 
Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to strike 
black jurors simply because he believes that blacks as a 
group are biased. I have revised the sentence that caused 
you concern that carries over from page 8 to page 9. Simi-
larly, I have revised a sentence on page 17 to emphasize 
that the prosecutor may not rebut a prima facie case by 
stating that he struck the jur.ors because he assumed they 
shared a group bias. Althouqh I have used language somewhat 
different from what you proposed, I have made the same 
point. 
The question of standing to raise a claim of this 
kind is one that has occurred to me. But I am inclined not 
to mention it, as standing is not a problem in this case. 
I add that I fully agree that the prosecutor would 
be entitled to strike a juror where the voir dire indicated 





JUSTICE w ... J. BRENNAN, JR. 
~~mu~curlM~t~~~mh$ 
._aslp:n:gbm .. ~. ~· 20bi~~ 
January 24, 1986 
No. 84-6263 
Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear Lewis, 
I have sent you my "join" in 
Batson. Thank you so much for your 
consideration of my suggestions. They 
completely meet my concerns. It's 
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Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. I may add something by 
way of concurrence to comment upon whether the challenge 
to strikes by the prosecution can be made only by a 
defendant of the same race as those peremptorily excused 
and whether defense peremptory strikes are also subject 
to challenge by the state. 
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Justice Powell 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-6263 
JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER 
v. KENTUCKY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT ,..., d.v, 
OF KENTUCKY r:;rv--- ~ 
[February-, 19 ~ p. 1 
RSHALL, concurring in part. 
I join~ rts I and II of JusTICE PowELL's eloquent opinion 
for the C rt, and ·n agreement with all but the "bottom 
line." The ourt's opinion cogently explains the pernicious 
nature of the growing use of peremptory challenges to 
achieve racially discriminatory jury selection, and the repug-
nancy of such discrimination to the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court's opinion also ably demonstrates the inadequacy of 
any burden of proof for racially discriminatory use of 
peremptories that requires that "justice ... sit supinely by 
and be flaunted in case after case before a remedy is avail-
able." 1 I nonetheless write separately, because the Court's 
opinion will not end the racial discrimination that 
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That 
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory 
challenges entirely. 
I 
A little over a century ago, this Court invalidated a state 
statute providing that black citizens could not serve as ju-
rors. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). 
State officials then turned to somewhat more subtle ways of 
'Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A. 2d 290, 295 (1975) 
(Nix, J., dissenting), quoted in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 965, 
n. 2 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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keeping blacks off jury venires. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U. S. 202, 231-238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Kuhn, 
Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235 
(1968); see also J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 
155-157 (1977). Although the means used to exclude blacks 
have changed, the same pernicious consequence has 
continued. 
Misuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors 
has become both common and flagrant. Black defendants 
rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent 
of that practice, but the few cases setting out such figures are 
instructive. See United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844, 848 
(CA8 1975) (in 15 criminal cases in 1974 in the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri involving black defendants, prosecutors pe-
remptorily challenged 81% of bla~k jurors), cert. denied, 425 
U. S. 961 (1976); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 
1243 (ED La. 1974) (in 53 criminal cases in 1972-1974 in East-
ern District of Louisiana involving black defendants, federal 
prosecutors used 68.9% of their peremptory challenges 
against black jurors, who made up less than one quarter of 
the venire); McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015, 
1017-1018 (D. S. C. 1974) (in 13 criminal trials in 1970-1971 
in Spartansburg County, South Carolina involving black de-
fendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of black 
jurors), aff'd mem., 529 F. 2d 516 (CA4 1975).2 Prosecutors 
have explained to courts that they routinely strike black ju-
rors, see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1163-1164 
(La. 1979). An instruction book used by the prosecutor's of-
fice in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly advised prosecutors 
that they conduct jury selection so as to eliminate "any mem-
2 See also Harris v. Texas,- U.S.- (1984) (MARSHALL, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U. S. 981 (1984) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Comment, A Case 
Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection 
and Due Process, 18 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 662 (1974). 
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her of a minority group." Van Dyke, supra, at 152, quoting 
Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, at 9. 
The Court's discussion of the utter unconstitutionality of 
that practice needs no amplification. This Court explained 
more than a century ago that "in the selection of jurors to 
pass upon [a defendant's] life, liberty or property, there shall 
be no exclusion of his race and no discrimination against 
them, because of their color." Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 
370, 394 (1881), quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 323 
(1880). Exclusion of blacks from a jury, solely because of 
their race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks are 
less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically 
the State's case against a black defendant than it can be justi-
fied by a belief that blacks lack the "intelligence, experience, 
or moral integrity," Neal, supra, at 397, to be entrusted with 
that role. 
II 
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court's conclusion that use 
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries, on 
the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
I would go further, however, in fashioning a rem~de­
quat~t discrimination. Merely alfowing de-
fen ants the opportunity to challenge the racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not 
end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge. 
The evidentiary analysis set out by the Court, ante, at 17, 
has been adopted as a matter of state law in States including 
Massachusetts and California. Cases from those jurisdic-
tions illustrate the limitations of the approach. ~t, de-
fendants cannot attack the discriminato use of eremptory 
challenges at all unless the c allenges are so flagrant as to es-
tablis a r1 a 1e cas . 1 m ans, or example, that 
where on y o or o ack jurors survive the challenges for 
cause, the prosecutor need have no compunction about strik-
ing them from the jury because of their race. See Common-
wealth v. Robinson, 415 N. E. 2d 805, 809-810 (Mass. 1981) 
. ---·-- ·--- ·- ··- ·-·---------
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(no prima facie case of discrimination where defendant is 
black, prospective jurors include three blacks and one Puerto 
Rican, and prosecutor excludes one for cause and strikes the 
remainder peremptorily, producing all-white jury); People v. 
Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 536-537, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (no prima facie case where prosecutor 
peremptorily strikes only two blacks on jury panel). Pros-
ecutors are left free to discriminate against blacks in jury /'f1 
selection provided that t~ey hold !hat di~rimination..1Q_an 
"acceptable" level. 
~a defendant can establish a prima facie case, 
the Court's approach places on trial courts the difficult bur-
den of assessing prosecutors' motives. See King v. County 
of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (ED NY 1984). Any 
prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for strik-
ing a juror, and trial courts are ill-equipped to second-guess 
those reasons. How is the court to treat a prosecutor's 
statement that he struck a juror because the juror had a son 
about the same age as defendant, see People v. Hall, 35 
Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), or seemed 
"uncommunicative," King, supra, at 498, or "never cracked a 
smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitivities neces-
sary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in 
this case," Hall, 672 P. 2d, at 856. If such easily generated 
explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor's ob-
ligation to justify his strikes on non-racial grounds, then the 
protection erected by the Court today may be illusory. 
Nor is · ht revarication by rosec tors an-
ger he,re. "[l]t is even possi e that an attorney mcur lie to 
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are 
legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion 
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a 
characterization that wuld not have come to his mind if a 
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an ex-
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planation as well-supported. Even if all parties approach 
the Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, 
that maiidatei="eciUire; them to confront and overcome their 
own racism on alll evelS--"aCi1a!Ienge I 00u.6t air of them can 
me~emembering that "114 years after the 
close of the War Between the States and nearly 100 years 
after Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still 
remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our 
society as a whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 
558-559 (1979), quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. --, 
- (1986). 
III 
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort 
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on ra-
cial grounds should lead the Court to ban them entirely from 
the criminal justice system. See Van Dyke, supra, at 
167-169; Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Demo-
cratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 269-270 (1973). 
Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, emphasized that 
"[ w ]ere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the 
right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with 
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a I 
choice of the former." 380 U. S., at 244. · I believe that this 
case presents just such a choice, and I would resolve that 
choice by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely in crim-
inal cases. 
Some authors have suggested that the courts might ban 
prosecutors' peremptories entirely, while zealously guarding 
the defendant's peremptory as "essential to the fairness of 
trial by jury," Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 376 
(1892), and "one of the most important of the rights secured 
to the accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 408 
(1894). See Van Dyke, supra, at 167; Brown, McGuire, & 
Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative De-
vice in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 New 
, -- ,---- ---· ----- ----
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Eng. L. Rev. 192 (1978). I would not find that an acceptable 
answer. Our criminal justice system "requires not only free-
dom from any bias against the accused, but also from any 
prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the 
State the scales are to be evenly held." Hayes v. Missouri, 
120 U. S. 68, 70 d 887). Respondent argues that the need to 
maintain that balance counsels against any limitation on pros-
ecutors' use of the peremptory challenge. We should main-
tain that balance, however, not by permitting both prosecu-
tor and defendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury 
selection, but by banning the use of peremptory challenges 
by prosecutors and by allowing the States to eliminate the 
defendant's peremptory as well. 
Much ink has been spilled regarding the historic impor-
tance of defendants' peremptory challenges. The approving 
comments of the Lewis and Pointer Courts are noted above; 
the Swain Court emphasized the "very old credentials" of the 
peremptory challenge, 380 U. S. at 212, and cited the "long 
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a neces-
sary part of trial by jury." !d., at 219. But this Court has 
also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory challenge 
is not of Constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld alto-
gether without impairing the Constitutional guarantee of im-
partial jury and fair trial. Frazier v. United States, 335 
U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 
123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 
(1919); see also Swain, supra, at 219. If the prosecutor's 
peremptory challenge can be eliminated only at the cost of 
eliminating the defendant's challenge as well, I do not think 
that is too great a price to pay. 
I applaud the Court's holding that the racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. However, only by banning peremptories en-
tirely can such discrimination be ended. Accordingly, I 
concur in only part of the opinion of the Court. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
tall's concurring opinion in this 
hat most of his opinion merits no 
This reaction is based largely on my belief 
that the concurring opinion depends on Justice Marshall's partie-
ular view of the world, namely, that people cannot overcome their 
own racism. With respect, I disagree with that pessimistic view 
of human nature, but I think that little could be gained from 
responding to it. Moreover, Justice Marshall's remedy is so ex-
treme and so out of line with the case law (namely, by in effect 
presuming that prosecutors are racially biased) that I see little 
point in responding. 
But I think that Part Il of Justice Marshall's opinion may 
warrant some response. Frankly, I am astonished that he would 
include such language in his opinion; the section suggests ways 
in which prosecutors can get around the rules laid down in your 




mischaracterizes the nature of the test that you set out, which 
was drafted to avoid the very gloss that Justice Marshall now 
puts on it. With your permission, 1 would like to call the clerk 
who worked on Justice Marshall's opinion, point out the mischief 
that the concurring opinion may work in the lower courts, and ask 
him to consider some changes. If they refuse to make changes, it 
may be worthwhile for you to drop a footnote, perhaps not refer-
ring directly to the concurrence, that makes plain that prosecu-
tors cannot avoid the mandate of your opinion by keeping their 
discrimination at "acceptable levels," as Justice Marshall puts 
it. 
lfp/ss 02j20j86 Rider A, p. (Batson) 
BATB SALLY-POW 
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, 
agrees with much that we have said. He would go further, 
however, and "eliminat[e] peremptory challenges entirely 
in criminal cases". As this Court has held that the 
Constitution does not grant the right of peremptory 
challenge (see, ~cite cases), presumably Justice 
Marshall would have this Court exercise its supervisory 
power to end such challenges in federal courts. We 
decline to disapprove the use of peremptory challenges 
that since colonial times(?) have been a feature of our 
jury trial system. It has been recognized generally that 
the right to challenge peremptorily has contributed to the 
selection of fair and impartial juries. (citation) 
2. 
Nor do we agree with the view of Justice Marshall 
that trial judges, in light of today's decision, will not 
be able to exercise oversight of the use of challenges to 
assure that they are not racially motivated. The fact 
that motivation often is subjective is not a reason for 
abolishing the use of a procedure that have well served 
our system of criminal justice. We certainly do not share 
the view that prosecutors, in order to circumvent this 
Court's decision will engage in covert discrimination 
J 
including "outright prevarication". Infra, at p. 4. 
Finally, the procedures outlined above have not been found 
to impose responsibilities on trial judges that they 
cannot reasonably discharge. See People v. Hall, 35 
Calif. 3rd 162, 672 P.2d 854 (1983). 
arne 02/21/86 
February 21, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
My tentative view of how best to respond to Justice Mar-
shall's concurring opinion would be to insert a footnote in your 
opinion (in the section describing the evidentiary standard), 
along the lines of the second page of the footnote that you pro-
pose and to add one sentence concluding that there is no basis 
for rejecting perernptories altogether. Justice Marshall's views 
are so extreme that 1 feel that we need spend few words defending 
your opinion from them. 1 also feel strongly that the language 
we use should not sound defensive. Please consider the following 
language: 
• < / 
"We firmly believe that trial judges, complying with 
today's decision, will be able to exercise reasonable oversight 
of the exercise of challenges to assure that prosecutors do not 
strike jurors on account of race. The fact that the appropriate 
inquiry turns in some sense on the prosecutor's rnoti vat ion pro-
vides no support for abolishing a trial practice that has served 
well our system of cr irninal justice. Trial judges frequently 
~ /. t 
.. 
page 2 . 
must evaluate 8i!'Jj e: e tz ive evidence in order to determine if it 
gives rise to an inference of invidious purpose. We also are 
confident that prosecutors will fulfill their constitutional duty 
as described ig th's pinion to ensure that their challenges are 
1'1'-k't~ 
based o eutral reasons related to the case to be tried. In 
this way, consistently with the requirements of the Constitution, 
challenges will continue to serve their purpose in the selection 
of an impartial jury." 
As 1 mentioned in my previous memo regarding Justice Mar-
shall's opinion, Justice Brennan's law clerk is hopeful that Jus-
tice Marshall can be persuaded to add language showing that your 
opinion should not be interpreted as permitting easy circumven-
tion by prosecutors. If he does, maybe you will not need to re-
vise your opinion. 
• 




Anne DATE: Feb. 26, 1986 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-6263 Batson 
Although your draft of a possible footnote in 
response to Justice Marshall's opinion is quite good, I am 
inclined to be somewhat more conclusory. His views are so 
extreme that I prefer not to dignify them by an elaborate 
response. Bill Brennan, in view of his closeness to 
Justice Marshall on criminal law matters, may well write 
anyway. 




do not share the views 
opinion, concurring 
expressed in Justice 
in part, as to 
prosecutorial and judicial enforcement of our holding 
today. The standard we adopt under the federal 
Constitution is designed to ensure that a state does not 
use peremptory challenges for the purpose of striking any 
black juror because of his race. We have no reason to 
believe, as the concurring opinion suggests, that 
/ 
2. 
prosecutors will not fulfill their duty touse peremptory 
challenges only for legitimate purposes. 
Court may assume that trial judges, in 
Certainly, this 
supervising the 
voir dire in light of our decision today, will identify a 
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Peremptory 
challenges have long served their purpose of facilitating 
the selection of an impartial jury. We reject the view 
that the use of such challenges should be abolished 
because of an apprehension that prosecutors and trial 
judges will not conscientiously perform their respective 




JUSTICE SANDR A DAY O'CO NNO R 
jnvrttttt Ofllltrl af tqt 1!lnittb jta:tt.s-
'~lht,gltittgtan. !). OJ. 2llb!'ll~ 
March 3, 1986 
No. 84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear Lewis, 
/ 
I have decided not to write separately by 
way of a concurring opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
March 6, 1986 
Dear Mr. Lind, 
Thank you for sendin me the draft syllabus in No. 84-
6263, Batson v. Kentucky. I have marked on t;e draft sever-
al changes. I al o am sending you two copies of the third 
draft of the opinion so t at you can decide if the syllabus 
requires further revision . 
Sincere y, 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-6263 
JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER 
v. KENTUCKY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF KENTUCKY 
[March -, 1986] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
The Court states, in the opening line of its opinion, that 
this case involves only a reexamination of that portion of 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning "the evi-
dentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims 
that he has been denied equal protection through the State's 
use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of his race 
from the petit jury." Ante, at 1 (footnote omitted). But in 
reality the majority opinion deals with much more than "evi-
dentiary burden[s]." With little discussion and less analysis, / 
the Court also overrules one of the fundamental substantive 
holdings of Swain, namely, that the State may use its pe-
remptory challenges to remove from the jury, on a case-spe-
cific basis, prospective jurors of the same race as the defend-
ant. Because I find the Court's rejection of this holding both 
ill-considered and unjustifiable under established principles 
of equal protection, I dissent. 
In Swain, this Court carefully distinguished two possible 
scenarios involving the State's use of its peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude blacks from juries in criminal cases. In 
part III of the majority opinion, the Swain Court concluded 
that the first of these scenarios, namely, the exclusion of 
blacks "for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the 
particular case on trial ... to deny Negroes the same right · 
and opportunity to participate in the adminstration of justice 
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enjoyed by the white population," id., at 224, might violate 
the guarantees of equal protection. See id., at 222-228. 
The Court felt that the important and historic purposes of the 
peremptory challenge were not furthered by the exclusion of 
blacks "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, what-
ever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may 
be." !d., at 223 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the Court 
ultimately held that "the record in this case is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that th[is] rule has been violated .... 
Petitioner has the burden of proof and he has failed to carry 
it." I d., at 224, 226. Three Justices dissented, arguing that 
the petitioner's evidentiary burden was satisfied by testi-
mony that no black had ever served on a petit jury in the rel-
evant county. See id., at 228-247 (Goldberg, J., joined by 
Warren, C. J., and Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Significantly, the Swain Court reached a very different 
conclusion with respect to the second kind of peremptory-
challenge scenario. In part II of its opinion, the Court held 
that the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude 
blacks from a particular jury based the assumption or belief 
that they would be more likely to favor a black defendant 
does not violate equal protection. I d., at 209-222. JUSTICE 
WHITE, writing for the Court, explained: 
"While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on 
a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable 
basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for 
a real or imagined partiality that is less easily desig-
nated or demonstrable. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 
68, 70 [xxxx]. It is often exercised upon the 'sudden im-
pressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to 
conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another,' 
Lewis [v. United States, 146 U. S. 370,] 376 [xxxx], upon 
a juror's 'habits and associations,' Hayes v. Missouri, 
supra, at 70, or upon the feeling that 'the bare question-
ing [a juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke a re-
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sentment,' Lewis, supra, at 376. It is no less frequently 
exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to 
legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, re-
ligion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people 
summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor 
or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of 
a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but 
whether one from a different group is less likely to be. 
Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as 
individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory 
challenges. Rather they are challenged in light of the 
limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may in-
clude their group affiliations, in the context of the case 
to be tried. 
With these considerations in mind, we cannot hold that 
the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of 
equal protection of the laws. In the quest for an impar-
tial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and 
Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without 
cause. To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any par-
ticular case to the demands and traditional standards of 
the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical 
change in the nature and operation of the challenge. 
The challenge, pro tanto, would no longer be peremptory 
" ld., at 220-222 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted). 
At the beginning of part III of the opinion, the Swain Court 
reiterated: "We have decided that it is permissible to insulate 
from inquiry the removal of Negroes from a particular jury 
on the assumption that the prosecutor is acting on ·acceptable 
considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular 
defendant involved and the particular crime charged." I d., 
at 223 (emphasis added). 
Even the Swain dissenters did not take issue with the ma-
jority's position that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
84-6263--DISSENT 
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prohibit the State from using its peremptory challenges to 
exclude blacks based on the assumption or belief that they 
would be partial to a black defendant. The dissenters em-
phasized that their view concerning the evidentiary burden 
facing a defendant who alleges an equal protection claim 
based on the State's use of peremptory challenges "would 
[not] mean that where systematic exclusion of Negroes from 
jury service has not been shown, a prosecutor's motives are 
subject to question or judicial inquiry when he excludes Ne-
groes or any other group from sitting on a jury in a particu-
lar case." ld., at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
The Court today asserts, however, that "the Equal Protec-
tion Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential ju-
rors solely . . . on the assumption that black jurors as a group 
will be unable impartially to consider the state's case against 
a black defendant." Ante, at 9. Later, in discussing the 
State's need to establish a nondiscriminatory basis for strik-
ing blacks from the jury, the Court states that "the prosecu-
tor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of dis-
crimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the 
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judg-
ment-that they would be partial to the defendant simply be-
cause of their shared race." Ante, at 17. Neither of these 
statements has anything to do with the "evidentiary burden" 
necessary to establish an equal protection claim in this con-
text, and both statements are directly contrary to the view of 
the Equal Protection Clause shared by the majority and the 
dissenters in Swain. Yet the Court in the instant case offers 
absolutely no analysis in support of its decision to overrule 
Swain in this regard, and in fact does not discuss part II of 
the Swain opinion at all. 
I cannot subscribe to the Court's unprecedented use of the 
Equal Protection Clause to restrict the historic scope of the 
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sary part of trial by jury." Swain, supra, at 219. In my 
view, there is simply nothing "unequal" about the State using 
its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in 
cases involving black defendants, so long as such challenges 
are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white de-
fendants, Hispanics in cases involving Hispanic defendants, 
Asians in cases involving Asian defendants, and so on. This 
case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the State does 
not single out blacks, or members of any other race for that 
matter, for discriminatory treatment. 1 Such use of 
peremptories is at best based upon seat-of-the-pants in-
stincts, which are undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may 
in many cases be hopelessly mistaken. But as long as they 
are applied across the board to jurors of all races and nation-
alities, I do not see-and the Court most certainly has not ex-
plained-how their use violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Nor does such use of peremptory challenges by the State 
infringe upon any other constitutional interests. The Court 
does not suggest that exclusion of blacks from the jury 
through the State's use of peremptory challenges results in a 
violation of either the fair cross-section or impartiality com-
ponent of the Sixth Amendment. See ante, at 4, n. 4. And 
because the case-specific use of peremptory challenges by the 
State does not deny blacks the right to serve as jurors in 
cases involving non-black defendants, it harms neither the 
excluded jurors nor the remainder of the community. See 
ante, at 6-7. 
The use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or occupa-
tion, as a "proxy" for potential juror partiality, based on the 
1 I note that the Court does not rely on the argument that, because there 
ru:e fewer "minorities" in a given population than there are "majorities," 
the equal use of peremptory challenges against members of "majority" and 
"minority" racial groups has an unequal impact. The flaws in this argu-
ment are demonstrated in Judge Garwood's thoughtful opinion for the en 
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assumption or belief that members of one group are more 
likely to favor defendants who belong to the same group, has 
long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges. See Swain, supra; United 
States v. Leslie,-- F. 2d -- (CA5 1986) (en bane); United 
States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844 (CA 8 1975), cert. denied, 425 
U. S. 961 (1976). Indeed, given the need for reasonable 
limitations on the time devoted to voir dire, the use of such 
"proxies" by both the State and the defendant 2 may be ex-
tremely useful in eliminating from the jury persons who 
might be biased in one way or another. The Court today 
holds that the State may not use its peremptory challenges to 
strike black prospective jurors on this basis without violating 
the Constitution. But I do not believe there is anything in 
the Equal Protection Clause, or any other constitutional pro-
vision, that justifies such a departure from the substantive 
holding contained in part II of Swain. Petitioner in the in-
stant case failed to make a sufficient showing to overcome the 
presumption announced in Swain that the State's use of pe-
remptory challenges was related to the context of the case. 
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court below. 
2 See, e. g., Commonwealth v. DiMatteo , 12 Mass. App. 547, 427 N. E. 
2d 754 (1982) (under State constitution, trial judge properly rejected white 
defendant's attempted peremptory challenge of black prospective juror). 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-6263 
JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER 
v. KENTUCKY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF KENTUCKY 
[March -, 1986] 
JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. 
The Court overturns the principal holding in Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), that the Constitution does notre-
quire in any given case an inquiry into the prosecutor's rea-
sons for using his peremptory challenges to strike blacks 
from the petit jury panel in the criminal trial of a black de-
fendant _fojld that in such a case it will be presumed that the 
prosecutor is acting for legitimate trial-related reasons. The 
Court now rules that such use of peremptory challenges in a 
given case may, but does not necessarily, raise an inference, 
which the prosecutor carries the burden of refuting, that his 
strikes were based on the belief that no black citizen could be 
a satisfactory juror or fairly try a black defendant. 
I agree that, to this extent, Swain should be overruled. I 
do so because Swain itself indicated that the presumption of 
legitimacy with respect to the striking of black venire per-
sons could be overcome by evidence that over a period of time 
the prosecution had consistently excluded blacks from petit 
juries.* This should have warned prosecutors that using 
peremptories to exclude blacks on the assumption that no 
*Nor would it have been inconsistent with Swain for the trial judge to 
invalidate peremptory challenges of blacks if the prosecutor, in response to 
an objection to his strikes, stated that he struck blacks because he believed 
they were not qualified to serve as jurors, especially in the trial of a black 
defendant. 
84-6263-CONCUR 
2 BATSON~ KENTUCKY 
black juror could fairly judge a black defendant would violate 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
It appears, however, that the practice of peremptorily 
eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black de-
fendant remains widespread, so much so that I agree that an 
opportunity to inquire should be afforded when this occurs. 
If the defendant objects, the judge, in whom the Court puts 
considerable trust, may determine that the prosecution must 
respond. If not persuaded otherwise, the judge may con-
clude that the challenges rest on the belief that blacks could 
not fairly try a black defendant. This, in effect, attributes to 
the prosecutor the view that all blacks should be eliminated 
from the entire venire. Hence, the Court's prior cases deal-
ing with jury venires rather than petit juries are not without 
relevance in this case. 
The Court emphasizes that using peremptory challenges to 
strike blacks does not end the inquiry; it is not unconstitu-
tional, without more, to strike one or more blacks from the 
jury. The judge may not require the prosecutor to respond 
at all. If he does, the prosecutor, who in most cases has had 
a chance to voir dire the prospective jurors, will have an 
opportunity to give trial-related reasons for his strikes-
some satisfactory ground other than the belief that black ju-
rors should not be allowed to judge a black defendant. 
Much litigation will be required to spell out the contours of 
the Court's Equal Protection holding today, and the signifi-
cant effect it will have on the conduct of criminal trials cannot ~ 
be gainsaid. But I agree with the Court that the time has 
come to rule as it has, and I join its opinion and judgment. 
I would, however, adhere to the rule announced in 
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968), that Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), which held that the States 
cannot deny jury trials in serious criminal cases, did not re-
quire reversal of a state conviction for failure to grant a jury 
trial where the trial began prior to the date of the announce-
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in DeStefano with respect to the retroactivity of Bloom v. Il-
linois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968), as it was in Daniel v. Louisiana, 
420 U. S. 31 (1975)(per curiam), with respect to the decision 
in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), holding that the 
systematic exclusion of women from jury panels violated the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part. 
I join Parts I and II of JUSTICE POWELL's eloquent opinion 
for the Court, and am in agreement with all but the "bottom 
line." The Court's opinion cogently explains the pernicious 
nature of the growing use of peremptory challenges to 
achieve racially discriminatory jury selection, and the repug-
nancy of such discrimination to the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court's opinion also ably demonstrates the inadequacy of 
any burden of proof for racially discriminatory use of 
peremptories that requires that "justice ... sit supinely by" 
and be flouted in case after case before a remedy is 
available. 1 I nonetheless write separately, because the 
Court's opinion will not end the racial discrimination that 
peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That 
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory 
challenges entirely. 
I 
A little over a century ago, this Court invalidated a state 
statute providing that black citizens could not serve as ju-
rors. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). 
State officials then turned to somewhat more subtle ways of 
' Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A. 2d 290, 295 (1975) 
(Nix, J. , dissenting), quoted in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 965, 
n. 2 (1983) (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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keeping blacks off jury venires. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U. S. 202, 231-238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Kuhn, 
Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235 
(1968); see also J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 
155-157 (1977) (hereinafter Van Dyke). Although the means 
used to exclude blacks have changed, the same pernicious 
consequence has continued. 
Misuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors 
has become both common and flagrant. Black defendants 
rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent 
of that practice, but the few cases setting out such figures are 
instructive. See United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844, 848 
(CAS 1975) (in 15 criminal cases in 1974 in the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri involving black defendants, prosecutors pe-
remptorily challenged 81% of black jurors), cert. denied, 425 
U. S. 961 (1976); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 
1243 (ED La. 1974) (in 53 criminal cases in 1972-1974 in East-
ern District of Louisiana involving black defendants, federal 
prosecutors used 68.9% of their peremptory challenges 
against black jurors, who made up less than one quarter of 
the venire); McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015, 
1017-1018 (SC 1974) (in 13 criminal trials in 1970-1971 in 
Spartansburg County, South Carolina, involving black de-
fendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of black 
jurors), affirmance order, .529 F. 2d 516 (CA4 1975). 2 Pros-
ecutors have explained to courts that they routinely strike 
black jurors, see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 
1163-1164 (La. 1979). An instruction book used by the pros-
ecutor's office in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly advised 
prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to elimi-
nate "'any member of a minority group."' 3 In 100 felony 
' See also Harris v. Texas, 467 U. S. 1261 (1984) (MARSHALL, J ., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois , 466 U. S. 981 (1984) 
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
' Van Dyke, supra, at 152, quoting Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, p. 9, 
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trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors perempto- Jj j. I 
rily struck 405 out of 467 eligibl~urors; the chance of a quali- 1 b .-.c.- c:. 
fied black sitting on a jury was' 6ne-in-ten, compared to one-
in-two for a white. 4 
The Court's discussion of the utter unconstitutionality of 
that practice needs no amplification. This Court explained 
more than a century ago that "'in the selection of jurors to 
pass upon [a defendant's] life, liberty, or property, there 
shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against 
them, because of their color."' Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 
370, 394 (1881), quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 323 
(1880). Exclusion of blacks from a jury, solely because of 
their race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks are 
less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically 
the State's case against a black defendant than it can be justi-
fied by a belief that blacks lack the "intelligence, experience, 
or moral integrity," Neal, supra, at 397, to be entrusted with 
that role. 
II 
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court's conclusion that use 
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries, on 
the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
I would go further, however, in fashioning a remedy ade-
quate to eliminate that discrimination. Merely allowing de-
fendants the opportunity to challenge the racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not 
end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge. 
Evidentiary analysis similar to that set out by the Court, { 
ante, at 17, has been adopted as a matter of state law in 
States including Massachusetts and California. Cases from 
instructed prosecutors: "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a I 
member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well 
educated." Quoted in Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 29, col. 1. 
' Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 1, col. 1; see also Comment, A 
Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process, 18 St. Louis U. L. J. 662 (1974). 
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those jurisdictions illustrate the limitations of the approach. 
First, defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so fla-
grant as to establish a prima facie case. This means, in those 
States, that where only one or two black jurors survive the 
challenges for cause, the prosecutor need have no compunc-
tion about striking them from the jury because of their race. 
See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 195, 415 
N. E. 2d 805, 809-810 (1981) (no prima facie case of dis-
crimination where defendant is black, prospective jurors in-
clude three blacks and one Puerto Rican, and prosecutor ex-
cludes one for cause and strikes the remainder peremptorily, 
producing all-white jury); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 
3d 526, 536-537, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897-898 (1982) (no prima 
facie case where prosecutor peremptorily strikes only two 
blacks on jury panel). Prosecutors are left free to discrimi-
nate against blacks in jury selection provided that they hold 
that discrimination to an "acceptable" level. 
I 
Second, when a defendant can establish a prima facie case, 
trial courts face the difficult burden of assessing prosecutors' / 
motives. See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 
501-502 (EDNY 1984). Any prosecutor can easily assert fa-
cially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are 
ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons. How is the court 
to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror be-
cause the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, 
see People v. Hall, 35 Cal.3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), or 
seemed "uncommunicative," King, supra, at 498, or "never 
cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitiv-
ities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide 
the facts in this case," Hall, supra, at 165, 672 P. 2d, at 856? 
If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to dis-
charge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on 
nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court 
today may be illusory. 
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Nor is outright prevarication by prosecutors the only dan-
ger here. "[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to 
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are 
legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion 
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a 
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a 
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an ex-
planation as well supported. Even if all parties approach the 
Court's mandate with the best of conscious intentions, that 
mandate requires them to confront and overcome their own 
racism on all levels-a challenge I doubt all of them can meet. 
It is worth remembering that "114 years after the close of the 
War Between the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, 
racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of 
life, in the administration of justice as in our society as a 
whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 558-559 (1979), 
quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. --, -- (1986). 
III 
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort 
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on ra-
cial grounds should lead the Court to ban them entirely from 
the criminal justice system. See Van Dyke, at 167-169; 
Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Insti-
tution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 269-270 (1973). Justice 
Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, emphasized that "[ w ]ere it 
necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a 
defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to 
challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of 
the former." 380 U. S., at 244. I believe that this case 
presents just such a choice, and I would resolve that choice 
by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely in criminal 
cases. 
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Some authors have suggested that the courts might ban 
prosecutors' peremptories entirely, while zealously guarding 
the defendant's peremptory as "essential to the fairness of 
trial by jury," Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 376 
(1892), and "one of the most important of the rights secured . 
to the accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 408 
(1894). See Van Dyke, at 167; Brown, McGuire, & Winters, 
The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Crim-
inal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 New England L. 
Rev. 192 (1978). I would not find that an acceptable answer. 
Our criminal justice system "requires not only freedom from 
any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice 
against his prosecution. Between him and the state the 
scales are to be evenly held." Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 
68, 70 (1887). Respondent argues that the need to maintain 
that balance counsels against any limitation on prosecutors' 
use of the peremptory challenge. We should maintain that 
balance, however, not by permitting both prosecutor and de-
fendant to engage in racial discrimination in jury selection, 
but by banning the use of peremptory challenges by prosecu-
tors and by allowing the States to eliminate the defendant's 
peremptory as well. 
Much ink has been spilled regarding the historic impor-
tance of defendants' peremptory challenges. The approving 
comments of the Lewis and Pointer Courts are noted above; 
the Swain Court emphasized the "very old credentials" of the 
peremptory challenge, 380 U. S., at 212, and cited the "long 
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a neces-
sary part of trial by jury." !d., at 219. But this Court has 
also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory challenge 
is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld alto-
gether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of im-
partial jury and fair trial. Frazier v. United States, 335 
U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 
123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 
(1919); see also Swain, supra, at 219. If the prosecutor's 
\ 
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peremptory challenge can be eliminated only at the cost of 
eliminating the defendant's challenge as well, I do not think 
that is too great a price to pay. 
I applaud the Court's holding that the racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. However, only by banning peremptories en-
tirely can such discrimination be ended. Accordingly, I 
concur in only part of the opinion of the Court. 
• 
To: Justice Brennan 
Justice White -/_ /'j AJ 
Justice Marshall ~ T ~ (/ 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. (P ) 
Today the Court sets aside the peremptory challenge; a 
procedure which has been part of the common law for many 
centuries and part of our jury system for nearly 200 years. 
It does so on the basis of a constitutional argument that was 
rejected, without a single dissent, in Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U. S. 2(J2 (1965). Reversal of such settled principles would 
be unusual enough on its own terms, for we have recognized 
that "stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive 
on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands re-
spect in a society governed by the rule of law." Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, 420 
(1983). What makes today's holding truly extraordinary is 
that it is based on a constitutional argument that the peti-
tioner expressly declared he was not relying on, both in his 
brief to this Court and in oral argument. The Court blithely 
ignores this factor as well as history. 
I 
We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioner was 
tried "in violation of constitutional provisions guaranteeing 
the defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of per-
sons representing a fair cross section of the community." 
Pet. for Cert. i. The "constitutional provisions" petitioner 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment relied upon 
by the majority. In his brief on the merits, under a heading 
distinguishing equal protection cases, petitioner noted "the 
irrelevance of the Swain analysis to the present case," Brief 
for Petitioner 11, and relied instead solely on Sixth Amend-
ment analysis of cases such as Taylor v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 
522 (1975), and other cases. During oral argument, counsel 
for petitioner was pointedly asked: 
"QUESTION: Mr. Niehaus, Swain was an equal pro-
tection challenge, was it not? 
MR. NIEHAUS: Yes. 
QUESTION: Your claim here is based solely on the 
Sixth Amendment? 
MR. NIEHAUS: Yes. 
QUESTION: Is that correct? 
MR. NIEHAUS: That is what we are arguing, yes. 
QUESTION: You are not asking for a reconsideration 
of Swain, and you are making no equal protection claim 
here. Is that correct? 
MR. NIEHAUS: We have not made an equal protec-
tion claim. I think that Swain will have to be reconsid-
ered to a certain extent if only to consider the arguments 
that are made on behalf of affirmance by the respondent 
and the solicitor general. . . . We have not made a spe- · 
cific argument in the briefs that have been filed either in 
the Supreme Court or Kentucky or in this Court saying 
that we are attacking Swain as such .... " Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 5-6. 
A short time later, after discussing the difficulties attendant 
with a Sixth Amendment claim, the following colloquy 
occurred: 
"QUESTION: So I come back again to my question 
why you didn't attack Swain head on, but I take it if the 
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Court were to overrule Swain, you wouldn't like that 
result. . 
MR. NIEHAUS: Simply overrule Swain without 
adopting the remedy? 
QUESTION: Yes. 
MR. NIEHAUS: I do not think that would give us 
much comfort, Your Honor, no. 
QUESTION: That is a concession." Tr. of Oral Arg. 
10. 
Later, petitioner's counsel refused to answer the Court's 
questions concerning the · implications of a holding based on 
equal protection ·concerns: 
"MR. NIEHAUS: ... there is no state action in-
volved where the defendant is exercising his peremptory 
challenge. 
QUESTION: But there might be under an equal pro-
tection challenge if it is the state system that allows that 
kind of a strike. 
MR. NIEHAUS: I believe that is possible. I am 
really not prepared to answer that specific question 
.... " Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. 
In reaching this issue despite petitioner's clear refusal to 
present it, the Court departs dramatically from its normal 
procedure without any explanation. When we granted cer-
tiorari, we could have directed the parties to brief the equal 
protection question in addition to the Sixth Amendment 
question. See, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 408 
U. S. 921 (1972); Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U. S. --
(1986). 1 Even following oral argument, we could have di-
' In Colorado v. Connelly, JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE STE-
VENS, filed a memorandum objecting to this briefing of an additional ques-
tion , explaining that "it is hardly for this Court to 'second chair' the pros-
ecutor to alter his strategy or guard him from mistakes. Under our Rule 
2l.l(a), '[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included 
therein will be considered by the Court.' Given petitioner's express dis-
claimer that [this] issue is not presented, that question obviously is not 
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rected reargument on this particular question. See, e. g., 
Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U. S. 972 (1953); Illinois 
v. Gates, 459 U. S. 1028 (1982); New Jersey v. T. L. 0., 468 
U. S. 1214 (1984). 2 This step is particularly appropriate 
where reversal of a prior decision is under consideration. 
See, e. g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 
468 U. S. 1213 (1984) (directing reargument and briefing on 
issue of whether National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U. S. 833 (1976) should be reconsidered); Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 422 U. S. 1005 (1975) (di-
recting reargument-and briefing on issue of whether the hold-
ing in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 
(1964) should be reconsidered). Alternatively, we could 
have simply dismissed this petition as improvidently granted. 
The Court decides today to depart from these accepted 
courses of action, choosing instead to reverse a 21-year-old 
'fairly included' in the question submitted. The Court's direction that the 
parties address it anyway makes meaningless in this case the provisions of 
this rule and is plainly cause for concern, particularly since it is clear that a 
similar dispensation would not be granted a criminal defendant, however 
strong his claim." 474 U. S. , at-- (memorandum of BRENNAN, J .). If 
the Court's limited step of directing briefing on an additional point at the 
time certiorari was granted was "cause .for concern," I would think a 
fortiorari that the far more expansive action the Court takes today would 
warrant similar concern. 
2 JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL, dissented from the order directing reargument in New Jersey v. 
T. L. 0. They explained: 
"The single question presented to the Court has now been briefed and 
argued. Evidently unable or unwilling to decide the question presented 
by the parties, the Court, instead of dismissing the writ of certiorari as im-
providently granted, orders reargument directed to the questions that [pe-
titioner] decided not to bring here .. · .. Volunteering unwanted advice is 
rarely a wise course of action .... 
"I believe that the adversary process functions most effectively when we 
rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fash-
ion the questions for review." 468 U. S. 1214, -- (1984). 
I am at a loss to discern how one can consistently hold these views and 
still reach the question the Court reaches today. 
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unanimous constitutional holding of this Court on the basis of 
constitutional arguments expressly disclaimed by petitioner. 
This is not a case warranting precipitate disposition. It can-
not be doubted that the Court's decision will have "a signifi-
cant effect ... on the conduct of criminal trials," ante, at 2 
(WHITE, J., concurring), because it "entail[s] a radical change 
in the nature and operation of the peremptory challenge." 
Swain, supra, at 221-222. Before considering such a hold-
ing, I would at least direct reargument and briefing on the 
issue of whether Swain should be reconsidered. 
II 
Because the Court nonetheless chooses to decide this case 
on the equal protection grounds not presented, I believe it 
proper to discuss this issue as well. The Court acknowl-
edges, albeit in a footnote, the "'very old credentials'" of the 
peremptory challenge and "'the widely held belief that the 
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury."' 
Ante, at 10 n. 15 (quoting Swain, supra, at 219). But proper 
resolution of this case requires more than a nodding refer-
ence to the purpose of the challenge. It is of critical impor-
tance to recognize that "[t]he right of challenge is almost es-
sential for the purpose of securing perfect fairness and 
impartiality in a trial." W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 
175 (1852). Accordingly, the peremptory challenge has been 
in use without scrutiny into its basis for nearly as long as ju-
ries have existed. "It was in use amongst the Romans in 
criminal cases, and the Lex Servilia (B.C. 104) enacted that 
the accuser and the accused should severally propose one 
hundred judices, and that each might reject fifty from the list 
of the other, so that one hundred would remain to try the al-
leged crime." Ibid. 
Swain traced the development of the peremptory challenge 
from the early days of the jury trial in England: 
"In all trials for felonies at common law, the defendant 
was allowed to challenge peremptorily 35 jurors, and the 
6 
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prosecutor originally had a right to challenge any num-
ber of jurors without cause, a right which was said to 
tend to 'infinite delayes and danger.' Coke on Littleton 
156 (14th ed. 1791). Thus The Ordinance of Inquests, 33 
Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305), provided that if 'they that sue for 
the King will challenge any . . . Jurors, they shall assign 
... a Cause certain.' So persistent was the view that a 
proper jury trial required peremptories on both sides, 
however, that the statute was construed to allow the 
prosecution to direct any juror after examination to 
'stand aside' until the entire panel was gone over and the 
defendant had exercised his challenges; only if there was 
a deficiency of jurors in the box at that point did the 
Crown have to show cause in respect to jurors recalled to 
make up the settled number. Peremptories on both 
sides became the settled law of England, continuing in 
the above form until after the separation of the Colo-
nies." 380 U. S. , at 201-202. 
Peremptory challenges have a venerable tradition in this 
country as well: 
"In the federal system, Congress early took a part of 
the subject in hand in establishing that the defendant 
was entitled to 35 peremptories in trials for treason and 
20 in trials for other felonies specified in the 1790 Act as 
punishable by death, 1 Stat. 119 (1790). In regard to 
trials for other offenses without the 1790 statute, both 
the defendant and the Government were thought to have 
a right of peremptory challenge, although the source of 
this right was not wholly clear . ... 
"The course in the States apparently paralleled that in 
· the federal system. The defendant's right of challenge 
was early conferred by statute, the number often cor-
responding to the English practice, the prosecution was 
thought to have retained the Crown's common-law right 
to stand aside, and by 1870, most if not all, States had 
enacted statutes conferring on the prosecution a sub-
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stantial number of peremptory challenges, the number 
generally being at least half, but often equal to, the num-
ber had by the defendant." ld., at 214-216. 
The Court's opinion, in addition to neglecting the teachings 
of history, also contrasts with Swain in its failure to even dis-
cuss the rationale of the peremptory challenge. Swain ob-
served that 
"[t]he function of the challenge is not only to eliminate 
extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the 
parties that the jurors before whom they try the cases 
will decide on the basis of the evidence placed for them, 
and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory satis-
fied the rule that 'to perform its high function in the best 
way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."' 
!d., at 219 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 
(internal quotation omitted)). 
Permitting unexplained peremptories strengthens our jury 
system in other ways as well. One commentator has recog-
nized that: 
"[t]he peremptory, made without giving any reason, 
avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common 
stereotypes. . .. Common human experience, common 
sense, psychosociological studies, and public opinion 
polls tell us that it is likely that certain classes of people 
statistically have predispositions that would make them 
inappropriate jurors for particular kinds of cases. But 
to allow this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative 
terms necessary for challenges for cause would undercut 
our desire for a society in which all people are judged as 
individuals and in which each is held reasonable and open 
to compromise. . . . [For example,] [a]lthough experi-
ence reveals that black males as a class can be biased 
against young alienated blacks who have not tried to join 
the middle class, to enunciate this in the concrete ex-
pression required of a challenge for cause is societally 
8 
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divisive. Instead we have evolved in the peremptory 
challenge a system that allows the covert expression of 
what we dare not say but know is true more often than 
not." Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful 
Power," 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 553-554. 
For reasons such as these, "the challenge is 'one of the most 
important of the rights'" in our justice system. Swain, 
supra, at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 
396, 408 (1893)). "The denial or impairment of the right is 
reversible error without a showing of prejudice." Swain, 
supra, at 219. Because of the importance of the peremptory 
challenge, "any system that prevents or embarrasses the full, 
unrestricted exercise of that right of challenge must be con-
demned." Pointer v. United States, supra, at 408. 
Instead of even considering the history or function of the 
peremptory challenge, the bulk of the Court's opinion is 
spent recounting the well-established principle that inten-
tional exclusion of racial groups from jury venires is a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. I too reaffirm that prin-
ciple, which has been well established since at least Strauder 
v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). But if today's deci-
sion is nothing more than mere "application" of the "princi-
ples announced in Strauder," as the Court maintains, ante, at 
9, it seems curious that the application went unrecognized for 
over a century. The Court in Swain had no difficulty in 
unanimously concluding that cases such as Strauder did not 
require inquiry into the basis for a peremptory challenge. 
See post at 2-4 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). More recently 
we held that "[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any 
particular composition .... " Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
u. s. 522, 538 (1979). 
A moment's reflection quickly reveals the vast differences 
between the racial exclusions involved in Strauder and the 
allegations before us today: 
"Exclusion from the venire summons process implies 
that the government (usually the legislative or judicial 
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branch) . . . has made the general determination that 
those excluded are unfit to try any case. Exercise of 
the peremptory challenge, by contrast, represents the 
discrete decision, made by one of two or more opposed 
litigants in the trial phase of our adversary system of 
justice, that the challenged venireperson will likely be 
more unfavorable to that litigant in that particular case 
than others on the same venire. 
"Thus, excluding a particular cognizable group from all 
venire pools is stigmatizing and discriminatory in several 
interrelated ways that the peremptory challenge is not. 
The former singles out the excluded group, while indi-
viduals of all groups are equally subject to peremptory 
challenge on any basis, including their group affiliation. 
Further, venire-pool exclusion bespeaks a priori across-
the-board total unfitness, while peremptory-strike exclu-
sion merely suggests potential partiality in a particular 
isolated case. Exclusion from venires focuses on the in-
herent attributes of the excluded group and infers its in-
feriority, but the peremptory does not. To suggest that 
a particular race is unfit to judge in any case necessarily 
is racially insulting. To suggest that each race may 
have its own special concerns, or even may tend to favor 
its own, is not." United States v. Leslie, 783 F. 2d. 541, 
554 (CA5 1986) (en bane). 
Unwilling to rest solely on jury venire cases such as 
Strauder, the Court also invokes general equal protection 
principles in support of its holding. But peremptory chal-
lenges are often lodged, of necessity, for reasons "normally 
though to be irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, 
namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affili-
ations of people summoned for jury duty." Swain, supra, at 
220. Moreover, in making peremptory challenges, both the 
prosecutor and defense attorney necessarily act on only lim-
ited information or hunch. It is no indictment of the process 
that such decisions are made on the basis of "assumption" or 
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"intuitive judgment." Ante, at 17. As a result, 
unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable 
to peremptory challenges exercised in any single case. A 
clause that requires a minimum "rationality" in government 
actions has no application to "'an arbitrary and capricious 
right,"' Swain, supra, at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United 
States, 146 U. S. 370, 378 (1892)); a constitutional principle 
that may invalidate state action on the basis of "stereotypic 
notions," Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U. S. 718, 725 (1982), does not explain the breadth of a proce-
dure exercised on the "'sudden impressions and unaccount-
able prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks 
and gestures of another."' Lewis, supra, at 376 (quoting 4 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *353). 
That the Court is not applying conventional equal protec-
tion analysis is shown by its limitation of its new rule to alle-
gations of impermissible selection on the basis of race. The 
Court's opinion clearly contains such a limitation. See ante, 
at 16 (emphasis added) (to establish a prima facie case, "the 
defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable 
racial group"); id. (emphasis added) ("[f]inally, the defendant 
must show that these facts and any other relevant circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that prac-
tice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account 
of their race"). But if conventional equal protection princi-
ples apply, then presumably defendants could o~t to exclu-
sions on the basis of not only ~e, but also sex, Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976); ~e, MassachuyJ!_s Ed. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976); political prefer-
ence, Davis v.~andemer, -- U. S. -- (1986) (opinion of 
WHITE, J.); 'fllental capacity, City of Clebu~: Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. -- (1985); number of chil-
dren, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970); living ar-
rangements, U. ~Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 
528 (1973); andl-Efmployment in a particular industry, Minne-
sota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 (1981), or 
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profession, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 
(1955). 3 In short, it is quite probable that every peremptory 
challenge could be objected to on the basis that, because it 
excluded a venireman who had some characteristic not 
shared by the remaining members of the venire, it consti-
tuted a "classification" subject to equal protection scrutiny. 
See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113, 1139 (CA2 1984) 
(Meskill, J., dissenting). Compounding the difficulties, 
under conventional equal protection principles some uses of 
peremptories would be reviewed under "strict scrutiny and 
... sustained only if .. ·. suitably tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest," City of Cleburne, supra, at--; others 
would be reviewed to determined if "they were substantially 
related to a sufficiently important government interest," id.; 
and still others would be reviewed to determine whether 
they were "a rational means to serve a legitimate end." I d. 
The Court never applies this conventional equal protection 
framework to the claims at hand, perhaps to avoid acknowl-
edging that the State interest involved here is substantial, if 
not compelling. Peremptory challenges are exercised to 
achieve an impartial jury that will be sympathetic toward 
neither an accused nor witnesses for the State because of 
some shared factor of race, religion, occupation, or other 
characteristics. This Court has long recognized that the pe-
remptory challenge is "essential to the fairness of trial by 
jury." Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 376 (1892). 
Under conventional equal protection principles, a state inter-
est of this ancient lineage and great magnitude might well 
overcome an equal protection objection to the application of 
peremptory challenges. The Court, however, is silent on 
the strength of the state's interest, apparently leaving this 
issue, among many others, to the further "litigation [that] 
3 While all these distinctions might support a claim under conventional 
equal protection principles, a defendant would also have to establish stand-
ing to raise them before obtaining any relief. See Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, 405 U. S. 625, 633 (1975). 
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will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's Equal 
Protection holding today .... " Ante, at 2 (WHITE, J., 
concurring). 4 
The Court also purports to express "no views on whether 
the Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges by defense counsel." Ante, at 8. But the 
clear and inescapable import of this novel holding will be to 
limit the use of this valuable tool to both prosecutors and 
defense attorneys alike. Could anyone rationally say that 
prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory challenges 
but defendants are not? 5 "Our criminal justice system 're-
quires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, 
but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Be-
tween him and the State the scales are to be evenly held.'" 
Ante, at 6 (MARSHALL, J., concurring) (quoting Hayes v. 
Missouri 120 U. S. 68, 70 (1887)). 
Rather than applying straightforward equal protection 
analysis, the Court substitutes for Swain a curious hybrid. 
The defendant must first establish a "prima facie case," ante, 
at 13, of invidious discrimination, then the "burden shifts to 
the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for chal-
lenging black jurors." I d., at 16. The Court explains that 
"the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules" is estab-
lished in "[o]ur decisions in the context of Title VII 'disparate 
treatment' .... " !d., at 13. The Court then adds, borrow-
• The Court is also silent on whether a State may demonstrate that its 
use ofperemptories rests not merely on "assumptions," ante, at 17, but on 
sociological studies or other similar foundations. See Saltzburg & Powers, 
Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group 
Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 337, 365 & n. 124 (1982). For "[i]f the 
assessment of a juror's prejudices based on group affiliation is accurate, 
.. . then counsel has exercised the challenge as it was intended-to re-
move the most partial jurors." Id., at 365. 
5 "[E]very jurisdiction which has spoken to the matter, and prohibited 
prosecution case-specific peremptory challenges on the basis of cognizable 
group affiliation, has held that the defense must likewise be so prohibited. " 
United States v. Leslie, 783 F . 2d 541, 565 (CA5 1986) (en bane). 
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ing again from a Title VII case, that "the prosecutor must 
give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legiti-
mate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Ante, at 17 
n. 20 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981)). 6 
While undoubtedly these rules are well suited to other con-
texts, particularly where (as with Title VII) they are re-
quired by an act of Congress, 7 they seem out of place when 
applied to peremptory challenges. Our system permits two 
types of challenges: challenges for cause and peremptory 
challenges. Challenges for cause obviously have to be ex-
plained; by definition, peremptory challenges do not. "It is 
called a peremptory challenge, because the prisoner may 
challenge peremptorily, on his own dislike, without showing 
of any cause." H. Joy, On Peremptory Challenge of Jurors 
1 (1844) (emphasis added). Analytically, there is no middle 
ground: A challenge either has to be explained or its does not. 
It is readily apparent, then, that to permit inquiry into the 
basis for a peremptory challenge would force "the peremp-
tory challenge [to] collapse into the challenge for cause." 
Clark v. United States, 737 F. 2d 679, 682 (CA7 1984). In-
deed, the Court recognized without dissent in Swain that, if 
'One court has warned that overturning Swain has "[t]he potential for 
stretching out criminal trials that are already too long, by making the voir 
dire a Title VII proceeding in miniature." United States v. Clark, 737 F. 
2d 679, 682 (CA 7 1984). That "potential" is clearly about to be realized. 
'It is worth observing that Congress has been unable to locate the Con-
stitutional deficiencies in the peremptory challenge system that the Court 
discerns today. As the Solicitor General explains in urging a rejection of 
the Sixth Amendment issue presented by this petition and an affirmance of 
the decision below, "[i]n reconciling the traditional peremptory challenge 
system with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment it is instructive to 
consider the accommodation made by Congress in the Jury Selection and 
Service Act of 1968, 28 U. S. C. 1861 et seq . ... [T]he House Report 
makes clear that ... 'the bill leaves undisturbed the right of a litigant to 
exercise his peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors for purely subjec-
tive reasons.'" Brief for the United States at 20 n. 11 (quoting H. R. 
Rep. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1968)). 
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scrutiny were permitted, "[t]he challenge, pro tanto, would 
no longer be peremptory, each and every challenge being 
open to examination, either at the time of the challenge or at 
a hearing afterwards." Swain, supra, at 222. 
The Court today attempts to decree a middle ground. To 
rebut a prima facie case, the Court requires a "neutral ex-
planation" for the challenge, but is at pains to "emphasize" 
that the "explanation need not rise to the level justifying ex-
ercise of a challenge for cause." Ante, at 16-17. I am at a 
loss to discern the governing principles here. A "clear and 
reasonably specific" explanation of "legitimate reasons" for 
exercising the challenge will be difficult to distinguish from a 
challenge for cause. Anything short of a challenge for cause 
may well be seen as an "arbitrary and capricious" challenge, 
to use Blackstone's characterization of the peremptory. See 
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *353. Apparently the 
Court envisions permissible challenges short of a challenge 
for cause that are just a little bit arbitrary-but not too 
much. While our trial judges are "experienced in supervis-
ing voir dire," ante, at 16, they have no experience in admin-
istering rules like this. 
An example will quickly demonstrate how today's holding, 
while purporting to "further the ends of justice," ante, at 18, 
encourages nothing of the sort. Assume an Asian defend-
ant, on trial for the capital murder of a white victim, asks 
prospective jury members, most of whom are white, whether 
they harbor racial prejudice against Asians. See Turner v. 
Murray,-- U. S. --, -- (1986). The basis for such a 
question is to flush out any "juror who believes that [Asians] 
are violence-prone or morally inferior .... " I d., at --.8 
Assume further that all white jurors deny harboring racial 
8 This question, required by Turner in certain capital cases, demon-
strates the inapplicability of traditional equal protection analysis to a jury 
voir dire seeking an impartial jury. Surely the question rests on general-
ized, stereotypic racial notions that would be condemned on equal protec-
tion grounds in other contexts. 
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prejudice but that the defendant, on trial for his life, remains 
unconvinced by these protestations. Instead, he continues 
to harbor a hunch, an "assumption" or "intuitive judgment," 
ante, at 17, that these white jurors will be prejudiced against 
him, no doubt based in part on their race. The time honored 
rule before today was that peremptory challenges could be 
exercised on such a basis. The Court explained in Lewis v. 
United States, 
"how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to defend 
his life) should have good opinion of his jury, the want of 
which might totally disconcert him; the law wills not that 
he should be tried by any one man against whom he has 
conceived a prejudice even without being able to assign a 
reason for such his dislike." 146 U. S. 370, 376 (1892). 
The effect of the Court's decision, however, will be to force 
the defendant to come forward and "articulate a neutral ex-
planation," ante, at 17, for his peremptory, a burden he prob-
ably cannot meet. This example demonstrates that today's 
holding will produce juries that the parties do not believe are 
truly impartial. This will surely do more than "disconcert" 
litigants; it will undoubtedly diminish confidence in the jury 
system. 
A further painful paradox of the Court's decision is that it 
is likely to interject racial matters back into the jury selection 
process, contrary to the general thrust of a long line of Court 
decisions and the notion of our country as a racial "melting 
pot." In Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953), for in-
stance, the Court confronted a situation where the selection 
of the venire was done through the selection of tickets from a 
box; the names of whites were printed on white tickets and 
the names of blacks were printed on different color tickets. 
The Court had no difficulty in striking down such a scheme. 
Justice Frankfurter observed that "opportunity for working 
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of a discriminatory system exists whenever the mechanism 
for jury selection has a component part, such as the slips 
here, that differentiates between white and colored .... " 
Id., at 564 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Today marks the 
return of racial differentiation to our jury selection process. 
Prosecutors and defense attorney's alike will build records in 
support of their claims that peremptory challenges have been 
exercised in a racially discriminatory fashion by asking jurors 
to state their racial background and national origin for the 
record, despite 'the fact that "such questions may be offensive 
to some jurors and thus are not ordinarily asked on voir 
dire." California v. Matton, 39 Cal. 3d 596, 604, 704 P. 2d 
176, 180, 217 Cal. Rptr. 416, 420 (1985). 9 This process is 
sure to tax even the most capable counsel and judges since 
determining whether a prima facie case has been established 
will "require a continued monitoring and recording of the 
'group' composition of the panel present and prospective 
.... " People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 294, 583 P. 2d 748, 
773, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 914 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
Even after a "record" on this issue has been created, dis-
putes will inevitably arise. In one case, for instance, a 
conviction was reversed based on the assumption that no 
blacks were on the jury that convicted a defendant. See 
California v. Motten, supra. However, after the court's de-
cision was announced, Carolyn Pritchett, who had served on 
the jury, called the press to state that the court was in error 
and that she was black. Did You Miss Me? Black was on 
"All-White" Jury, 71 A.B.A.J. 22 (November, 1985). The 
• The California Supreme Court has attempted to finesse this problem 
by asserting that "discrimination is more often based on appearances than 
verified racial descent, and a showing that the prosecution was systemati-
cally excusing persons who appear to be Black would establish a prima 
facie case" of racial discrimination. California v. Motton, 39 Cal. 3d 596, 
604 (1985). This suggests, however, that proper inquiry here concerns not 
the actual race of the jurors who are excluded, but rather counsel's subjec-
tive impressions as to what race they spring from. It is unclear how a 
"record" of such impressions is to made. 
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court nonetheless denied a rehearing petition and did not 
comment on this apparent error. 10 
The Court does not tarry long over any of these difficult 
problems, preferring instead to gloss over them as swiftly as 
it slides over centurie$ of history: "[W]e make no attempt to 
instruct [trial] courts on how best to implement our holding 
today." Ante, at 19 n. 24. That leaves roughly 7,000 state 
trial judges and 500 federal trial judges at large to find their 
way through the morass the Court creates today. In so 
doing, the Court simply wishes these judges well as they 
begin the difficult enterprise of sorting out the implications of 
the Court's newly created "right." I join my colleagues in 
wishing the nation's judges well as they struggle to imple-
ment today's holding. To my mind, however, attention to 
these "implementation" questions leads quickly to the conclu-
sion that there is no "best" way to implement the holding, let 
alone a good way. As one apparently frustrated judge ex-
plained after reviewing a case under a rule like that promul-
gated by the Court today, judicial inquiry into peremptory 
challenges 
"from case to case will take the courts into the quagmire 
of quotas for groups that are difficult to define and even 
more difficult to quantify in the courtroom. The pursuit 
of judicial perfection will require both trial and appellate 
courts to provide speculative and impractical answers to 
artificial questions." Holley v. J & S Sweeping Co., 143 
Cal. App. 3d 588, 595-596, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74, 79 (1983). 
10 Similar difficulties may lurk in this case on remand. The Court states 
as fact that "a jury composed only of white persons was selected." Ante , 
at 2. The only basis for the Court's finding is the prosecutor's statement, 
. in response to a question from defense counsel, that "(i]n looking at them, 
yes; it's an all-white jury." Tr. >;; 8. 
It should also be underscored that the Court today does not hold that 
petitioner has established a "prima facie case" entitling him to any form of 
relief. Ante, at 19-20. 
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The Court's effort to "further the ends of justice," ante, at 18, 
and achieve utopian bliss may be admired, but it is far more 
likely to enlarge the evil "sporting contest" theory of criminal 
justice condemned by Roscoe Pound almost 80 years ago to 
the day. See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with 
the Administration of Justice, 40 American L. Rev. 729 
(1906). Pound warned then that "too much of the current 
dissatisfaction has a just origin in our judicial organization 
and procedure." I d., at 749. I am afraid that today's newly 
created constitutional right will justly give rise to similar 
disapproval. 
III 
I also add my assent to JUSTICE WHITE's conclusion that 
today's decision does not apply retroactively. Ante, at 2-3 
(WHITE, J., concurring). We held in Solem v. Stumes, 465 
U. S. 638, 643 (1984), that 
'"[t]he criteria guiding resolution of the [retroactivity] 
question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the 
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law en-
forcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the 
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive 
application of the new standards.' Stovall v. Denno, 
388 u. s. 293, 297 (1967)." 
All three of these factors point conclusively to a nonretroac-
tive holding. With respect to the first factor, the new rule 
the Court announces today is not designed to avert "the clear 
danger of convicting the innocent." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 639 (1965). Second, it readily apparent that 
"law enforcement authorities and state courts have justifi-
ably relied on a prior rule of law .... " Solem, 465 U. S., at 
645-646. Today's holding clearly "overrule[s] [a] prior deci-
sion" and drastically "transform[s] standard practice." Id ., 
at 647. This fact alone "virtually compel[s]" the conclusion 
of nonretroactivity. United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 
537, 549-550 (1982). "[W]here the Court has expressly de-
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clared a rule of criminal procedure to be 'a clear break with 
the past,' it almost invariably has gone on to find such a 
newly minted principle nonretroactive." I d., at 549 (internal 
citation omitted). Third, applying today's decision retroac-
tively obviously would lead to a whole host of problems, if not 
chaos. Determining whether a defendant has made a "prima 
facie showing" of invidious intent, ante, at 16, and, if so, 
whether the State has a sufficient "neutral explanation" for 
its actions, ibid., essentially requires reconstructing the en-
tire voir dire, something that will be extremely difficult even 
if undertaken soon after the close of the trial. 11 In most 
cases, therefore, retroactive application of today's decision 
will be "a virtual impossibility." State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 
481, 488 (Fla. 1984). 
In sum, under our prior holdings it is impossible to con-
struct even a colorable argument for retroactive application. 
The few states that have adopted judicially-created rules sim-
ilar to that announced by the Court today have all refused full 
retroactive application. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 
258, 283 n. 31, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 907 n. 31, 583 P. 2d 748, 
766 n. 31 (1978); State v. Neil, supra, at 488; Commonwealth 
v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 493 n. 38; 387 N. E. 2d 499, 518 
n. 38, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). 12 I therefore am 
persuaded by JuSTICE WHITE's position, ante, at 2-3 
(WHITE, J., concurring), that today's novel decision is not to 
be given retroactive effect. 
IV 
The Court today works a dramatic change in peremptory 
challenges with uncertain implications. An institution that 
11 Petitioner concedes that it would be virtually impossible for the pros-
ecutor in this case to recall why he used his peremptory challenges in the 
fashion he did . Brief for Petitioner 35. 
12 Although Delaware has suggested that it might follow a rule like that 
adopted by the Court today, see Riley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997 (Del. 1985), 
the issue of retroactive application of the rule does not appear to have been 
litigated in a published decision. 
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is nearly as old as the jury system itself should not be casu-
ally cast aside on a basis not raised or argued by the peti-
tioner. As one commentator aptly observed, 
"the real question is whether to tinker with a system·, be 
it of jury selection or anything else, that has done the job 
for centuries. We stand on the shoulders of our ances-
tors, as Burke said. It is not so much that the past is 
always worth preserving, he argued, but rather that 'it 
is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture 
upon pulling down an edifice, which has answered in any 
tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society 
.. . . "' Younger, Unlawful Peremptory Challenges, 7 
Litigation 23 (Fall 1980). 
At the very least this case ought to be set for reargument 
next October. 
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(ly JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring. 
(J ~ In his dissenting opinion, THE CHIEF JUSTICE correctly 
l/ identifies an apparent inconsistency between my criticism of 
the Court's action in Colorado v. Connelly, 474 U. S. --
(1986) (Memorandum of BRENNAN, J., joined by STEVENS, 
J.) and New Jersey v. TLO, 468 U. S. 1214 (1984) (STEVENS, 
J ., dissenting)-cases in which the Court directed the State 
to brief and argue questions not presented in its petition for 
certiorari-and our action today in finding a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause despite the failure of petitioner's 
counsel to rely on that ground of decision. Post at 3-4, nn. 1 
& 2. In this case, however-unlike Connelly and TLO-the 
party defending the judgment has explicitly rested on the 
issue in question as a controlling basis for affirmance. In de-
fending the Kentucky Supreme Court's judgment, Ken-
tucky's Assistant Attorney General emphasized the State's 
position on the centrality of the Equal Protection issue: 
"Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the 
issue before this Court today is whether Swain versus 
Alabama should be reaffirmed. . .. 
"We believe that it is the Fourteenth Amendment that 
is the item that should be challenged, and presents per-
haps an address to the problem. Swain dealt primarily 
with the use of peremptory challenges to strike individ-
uals who were of a cognizable or identifiable group. 
t ~ , \ . •' 
2 
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"Petitioners show no case other than the State of Cali-
fornia's case dealing with the use of peremptories 
wherein the Sixth Amendment was cited as authority for 
resolving the problem. So, we believe that the Four-
teenth Amendment is indeed the issue. That was the 
guts and primarily the basic concern of Swain. 
"In closing, we believe that the trial court of Kentucky 
and the Supreme Court of Kentucky have firmly em-
braced Swain, and we respectfully request that this 
Court affirm the opinion of the Kentucky court as well as 
to reaffirm Swain versus Alabama." 1 
In addition to the party's reliance on the Equal Protection 
argument in defense of the judgment, several amici curiae 
also addressed that argument. For instance, the argument 
in the brief filed by the Solicitor General of the United States 
begins: 
"PETITIONER DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT HE 
WAS DEPRIVED OF A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED 
PETIT JURY OR DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF THE LAWS 
"A. Under Swain v. Alabama A Defendant Cannot Es-
tablish An Equal Protection Violation By Showing 
Only That Black "Veniremen Were Subjected To Pe-
remptory challenge By The Prosecution In His 
Case" 2 
Several other amici similarly emphasized this issue. 3 
1 Tr. of oral arg., 27-28, 43. 
2 Brief for the United States as amicus curiae Supporting Affirmance, 
p. 7. 
' The argument section of the brief of the National District Attorneys 
Association, Inc. as amicus curiae in support of respondent begins as 
follows: 
"This Court should conclude that the prosecutorial peremptory challenges 
exercised in this case were proper under the fourteenth amendment equal 
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In these circumstances, although I suppose it is possible 
that reargument might enable some of us to have a better in-
formed view of a problem that has been percolating in the 
courts for several years, 4 I believe the Court acts wisely in 
resolving the issue now on the basis of the arguments that 
have already been fully presented without any special invita-
tion from this Court. 5 
protection clause and the sixth amendment. This Court should further de-
termine that there is no constitutional need to change or otherwise modify 
this Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama." !d., at p. 5. 
Amici supporting the petitioner also emphasized the importance of the 
equal protection issue. See, e. g., Amicus Brief of NAACP Defense and 
Educational Fund, American Jewish Committee, and American Jewish 
Congress, 24-36; Amicus Brief of Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
Under Law, 11-17; Amicus Brief for Elizabeth Holtzman, 13. 
•see McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961 (opinion of STEVENS, J., re-
specting the denial of certiorari); id. at 963 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
5 Although I disagree with his criticism of the Court in this case, I fully 
subscribe to THE CHIEF JUSTICE's view, expressed today, that the Court 
should only address issues necessary to the disposition of the case or peti-
tion. For contrasting views, see, e. g., Bender v. Williamsport School 
Dist., -- U. S. --,-- (1986) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (addressing 
merits even though majority of the Court has concluded that petitioner 
lacks standing); Colorado v. Nunez, 465 U. S. 324 (1984) (concurring opin-
ion, joined by BURGER, C. J.) (expressing view on merits even though writ 
is dismissed as improvidently granted because state court judgment rested 
on adequate and independent state grounds); Florida v. Casal, 462 U. S. 
637, 639 (1983) (BURGER, C. J., concurring) (1983) (agreeing with Court 
that writ should be ·dismissed as improvidently granted because judgment 
rests on adequate and independent state grounds, but noting that "the citi-
zens of the state must be aware that they have the power to amend state 
law to ensure rational law enforcement"). See also Colorado v. Connelly, 
-- U. S. -- (1986) (ordering parties to address issues that neither 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurrin . 
I join JUSTICE POWELL' e oquent pinion for the Court, 
w 1c ta es a 1s onc s ep e · 1 
practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries." 
The Court's opinion cogently explains the pernicious nature 
of the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, 
and the repugnancy of such discrimination to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The Court's opinion also ably demonstrates 
the inadequacy of any burden of proof for racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptories that requires that "justice . . . sit 
supinely by" and be flouted in case after case before a remedy 
is available. 1 I nonetheless write separately, to express my 
views. The decision today will not end the racial discrimina-
tion that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. 
That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremp-
tory challenges entirely. 
I 
A little over a century ago, this Court invalidated a state 
statute providing that black citizens could not serve as ju-
rors. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). 
State officials then turned to somewhat more subtle ways of 
1 Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 299, 336 A. 2d 290, 295 (1975) 
(Nix, J., dissenting), quoted in McCray v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 965, 
n. 2 (1983) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
\ 
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keeping blacks off jury venires. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 
U. S. 202, 231-238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting); Kuhn, 
Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. Rev. 235 
(1968); see also J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures 
155-157 (1977) (hereinafter Van Dyke). Although the means 
used to exclude blacks have changed, the same pernicious 
consequence has continued. 
Misuse of the peremptory challenge to exclude black jurors 
has become both common and flagrant. Black defendants 
rarely have been able to compile statistics showing the extent 
of that practice, but the few cases setting out such figures are 
instructive. See United States v. Carter, 528 F. 2d 844, 848 
(CAS 1975) (in 15 criminal cases in 1974 in the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri involving black defendants, prosecutors pe-
remptorily challenged 81% of black jurors), cert. denied, 425 
U. S. 961 (1976); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 
1243 (ED La. 1974) (in 53 criminal cases in 1972-1974 in East-
ern District of Louisiana involving black defendants, federal 
prosecutors used 68.9% of their peremptory challenges 
against black jurors, who made up less than one quarter of 
the venire); McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015, 
1017-1018 (SC 1974) (in 13 criminal trials in 1970-1971 in 
Spartansburg County, South Carolina, involving black de-
fendants, prosecutors peremptorily challenged 82% of black 
jurors), affirmance order, 529 F. 2d 516 (CA4 1975). 2 Pros-
ecutors have explained to courts that they routinely strike 
black jurors, see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 
1163-1164 (La. 1979). An instruction book used by the pros-
ecutor's office in Dallas County, Texas, explicitly advised 
prosecutors that they conduct jury selection so as to elimi-
nate "'any member of a minority group.'" 3 In 100 felony 
' See also Harris v. Texas, 467 U. S. 1261 (1984) (MARSHALL, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); Williams v. Illinois, 466 U. S. 981 (1984) 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
3 Van Dyke, supra, at 152, quoting Texas Observer, May 11, 1973, p. 9, 
col. 2. An earlier jury-selection treatise circulated in the same county in-
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trials in Dallas County in 1983-1984, prosecutors perempto-
rily struck 405 out of 467 eligible black jurors; the chance of a 
qualified black sitting on a jury was one-in-ten, compared to 
one-in-two for a white. 4 · 
The Court's discussion of the utter unconstitutionality of 
that practice needs no amplification. This Court explained 
more than a century ago that "'in the selection of jurors to 
pass upon [a defendant's] life, liberty, or property, there 
shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against 
them, because of their color."' Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 
370, 394 (1881), quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 323 
(1880). JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting, concedes that ex-
clusion of blacks from a jury, solely because they are black, is 
at best based upon "crudely stereotypical and . . . in many 
cases hopelessly mistaken" notions. Post, at 5. Yet the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from taking any ac-
tion based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes-even an 
action that does not serve the State's interests. Exclusion of 
blacks from a jury, solely because of race, can no more be jus-
tified by a belief that blacks are less likely than whites to con-
sider fairly or sympathetically the State's case against a black 
defendant than it can be justified by the notion that blacks 
lack the "intelligence, experience, or moral integrity," Neal , 
supra, at 397, to be entrusted with that role. 
II 
I wholeheartedly concur in the Court's conclusion that use 
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries, on 
the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
I would go further, however, in fashioning a remedy ade-
quate to eliminate that discrimination. Merely allowing de-
structed prosecutors: "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a 
member of any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well 
educated." Quoted in Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 29, col. 1. 
' Dallas Morning News, March 9, 1986, p. 1, col. 1; see also Comment, A 
Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process, 18 St. Louis U. L. J. 662 (1974). 
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fendants the opportunity to challenge the racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges in individual cases will not 
end the illegitimate use of the peremptory challenge. 
Evidentiary analysis similar to that set out by the Court, 
ante, at 17, has been adopted as a matter of state law in 
States including Massachusetts and California. Cases from 
those jurisdictions illustrate the limitations of the approach. 
First, defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so fla-
grant as to establish a prima facie case. This means, in those 
States, that where only one or two black jurors survive the 
challenges for cause, the prosecutor need have no compunc-
tion about striking them from the jury because of their race. 
See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 195, 415 
N. E. 2d 805, 809-810 (1981) (no prima facie case of dis-
crimination where defendant is black, prospective jurors in-
clude three blacks and one Puerto Rican, and prosecutor ex-
cludes one for cause and strikes the remainder peremptorily, 
producing all-white jury); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 
3d 526, 536-537, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 897-898 (1982) (no prima 
facie case where prosecutor peremptorily strikes only two 
blacks on jury panel). Prosecutors are left free to discrimi-
nate against blacks in jury selection provided that they hold 
that discrimination to an "acceptable" level. 
Second, when a defendant can establish a prima facie case, 
trial courts face the difficult burden of assessing prosecutors' 
motives. See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 
501-502 (EDNY 1984). Any prosecutor can easily assert fa-
cially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are 
ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons. How is the court 
to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror be-
cause the juror had a son about the same age as defendant, · 
see People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), or 
seemed "uncommunicative," King, supra, at 498, or "never 
cracked a smile" and, therefore "did not possess the sensitiv-
ities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide 
84-6263-CONCUR 
BATSON v. KENTUCKY 5 
the facts in this case," Hall, supra, at 165, 672 P. 2d, at 856? 
If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to dis-
charge the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on 
nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court 
today may be illusory. 
Nor is outright prevarication by prosecutors the only dan-
ger here. "(I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to 
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are 
legal." King, supra, at 502. A prosecutor's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion 
that a prospective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a 
characterization that would not have come to his mind if a 
white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an ex-
planation as well supported. As JusTICE REHNQUIST con-
cedes, prosecutor's peremptories are based on their "seat-of-
the-pants instincts" as to how particular jurors will vote. 
Post, at 5; see also the CHIEF JUSTICE's dissenting opinion, 
post, at 9-10. Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may often be 
just another term for racial prejudice. Even if all parties ap-
proach the Court's mandate with the best of conscious inten-
tions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome 
their own racism on all levels-a challenge I doubt all of them 
can meet. It is worth remembering that "114 years after the 
close of the War Between the States and nearly 100 years 
after Strauder, racial and other forms of discrimination still 
remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our 
society as a whole." Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 
558-559 (1979), quoted in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. --, 
- (1986). 
III 
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort 
the jury process by permitting the exclusion of jurors on ra-
cial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them en-
tirely from the criminal justice system. See Van Dyke, at 
167-169; Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Demo-
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cratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 269-270 (1973). 
Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, emphasized that 
"[ w ]ere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the 
right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with 
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a 
choice of the former." 380 U.S., at 244. I believe that this 
case presents just such a choice, and I would resolve that 
choice by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely in crim-
inal cases. 
Some authors have suggested that the courts should ban 
prosecutors' peremptories entirely, but should zealously 
guard the defendant's peremptory as "essential to the fair-
ness of trial by jury," Lewis v. United States, 146 U. S. 370, 
376 (1892), and "one of the most important of the rights se-
cured to the accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 
396, 408 (1894). See Van Dyke, at 167; Brown, McGuire, & 
Winters, The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative De-
vice in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 New 
England L. Rev. 192 (1978). I would not find that an accept-
able solution. Our criminal justice system "requires not only 
freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any 
prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the 
state the scales are to be evenly held." Hayes v. Missouri, 
120 U. S. 68, 70 (1887). We can maintain that balance, not 
by permitting both prosecutor and defendant to engage in ra-
cial discrimination in jury selection, but by banning the use of 
peremptory challenges by prosecutors and by allowing the 
States to eliminate the defendant's peremptory as well. 
Much ink has been spilled regarding the historic impor-
tance of defendants' peremptory challenges. The approving 
comments of the Lewis and Pointer Courts are noted above; 
the Swain Court emphasized the "very old credentials" of the. 
peremptory challenge, 380 U. S., at 212, and cited the "long 
and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a neces-
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also repeatedly stated that the right of peremptory challenge 
is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be withheld alto-
gether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of im-
partial jury and fair trial. Frazier v. United States, 335 
U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 
123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 
(1919); see also Swain, supra, at 219. The potential for ra- I 
cial prejudice, further, inheres in the defendants challenge as 
well. If the prosecutor's peremptory challenge could be 
eliminated only at the cost of eliminating the defendant's 
challenge as well, I do not think that would be too great a 
price to pay. 
I applaud the Court's holding that the racially discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and I join the Court's opinion. However, only j 
by banning peremptories entirely can such discrimination be C .J 
ended. 
April 17, 1986 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
The opinions of the Chief Justice, Justice hite, 
and Justice O'Connor state that the Court's decision in this 
case should not be pplied retroact'vely. 1 agree with this 
view. 
Reliance on Swain has been extensive for many 
years, and the effect on the administration of ;ustice of a 
retroactive application of the Court's decision in this case 
would be significant. 
If this view is shared by a majority of the Jus-








April 17, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: Retroactivity 
The retroactivity analysis that you have endorsed is "Jus-
tice Harlan's suggestion that a new rule of constitutional law 
should be applied only to review of criminal convictions not yet 
final when the rule is announced." Solem v. Stumes, 465 u.s. 
638, 652-653 (1984) (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). This 
approach "follows directly from a proper conception of the scope 
of the writ of habeas corpus, as contrasted to direct review." 
Id., at 653. Since I believe it is clear that Batson announces a 
new rule, I would recommend that you hold that the rule apply to 
cases pending on direct appeal when Batson is announced, but not 
to collateral review of final convictions. 
While I hope that a majority of the Justices joining your 
opinion go along with our suggestion that we add a footnote along 
these lines, we could encounter a fight with respect to the ap-
propriate analysis to use. Writing for the Court in Solem v. 
~umes, supra, Justice White followed an approach that turns on 
application of the so-called Linkletter /Stovall factors: "'the 
criteria guiding resolution of the [retroactivity] question im-
plicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) 
·, 
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the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the 
old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of jus-
tice of a retroactive application of the new standards."' Id., 
at 643. You explained that it was unnecessary to consider these 
factors because the "costs imposed upon the State by retroactive 
application of new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus • 
far outweighs the benefits of this application." Id., at 
654. In this case, I assume that we could follow the approach 
taken by the Court in Stumes, particularly since it would obtain 
the same result as that under your approach. 
I am doing further research into the various retroactivity 
approaches used in recent precedents of this Court--my impression 
is that Justice Blackmun has taken yet another approach, Shea v. 
Louisiana, 105 S.Ct. 1065, and I would not be at all surprised to 
learn that Justices Brennan and Marshall have their own views of 
this issue. 
In the event that our majority divides over either the 
result concerning or the approach to retroactivity, may I make a 
suggestion? We could propose to Grant the next case coming here 
en habeas raising a Batson claim, and decide the retroactivity 
question there. (I have gone through the holds for Batson. 
'lhere is one federal habeas case that raises a Batson claim. 
~ejean v. Blackburn, No. 85-5609. The case is not a good candi-
date because it raises a number of questions including whether it 
is constitutional to sentence a minor to death (the defendant was 
17 when he committed the murder) and the issue pending in 
McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-6811, concerning racially discrimina-
• page 3. 
tory application of capital punishment. If the Court ultimately 
denies McCleskey, it might consider granting cert. in No. 85-5609 
limited to the Batson claim.) If we could decide the retroactiv-
ity issue soon, but in another case, you could hand down Batson 
without fracturing your majority over the issue, while still aid-
ing the lower courts by resolving retroactivity. After the foot-
note in your dissent in Vasquez v. Hillery concerning the prece-
dential value of portions of opinions not joined by Justices who 
also joined the judgment, it seems preferable not to add anything 
about retroactivity unless five of the concurring Justices go 
along. Moreover, we took pains to be kind to Justice White in 
our draft and thus wrote the opinion to suggest that we were not 
saying anything "new." It might seem odd for us then to hold in 
the same opinion that the rule is nonretroactive because the rule 
is new. Finally, since four Justices have indicated separately 
that the Batson holding is nonretroactive, there is little danger 
that the lower courts will err when faced with the issue. 
arne 04/18/86 
April 18, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
The two cases cited in the Chief Justice's dissent that 
have not yet been handed down are Davis v. Bandemer, No. 84-1244 
~age 10 of dissent), and Turner v. Murray, No. 84-6646 (page 14 
of dissent). His citation of Turner may not be much of a prob-
lem, since I assume that the decision will be handed down fairly 
soon. (My review of the file indicates that all of the Justices 
have circulated memos joining the various opinions written in 
Turner). On the other hand, Davis will not come down for a long 
time since Justice O'Connor has not yet circulated her opinion. 
I am sure that the Chief Justice's law clerk could come up with 
another citation to substitute for Davis, since he uses it merely 
to illustrate that the Equal Protection Clause protects political 
groups. 
• 
April 18, 1986 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
On second thought, 1 think it best not to address 
the retroactiv issue in my op nion for the Court. 
~hen we have the oppo tun'ty we can grant a case 
for th·s purpose. 
L.F.P., Jr . 
ss 
' 
April 8, 1986 
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Dear Chief: 
At Conference this morning Harry noted that your 
dissent cites Davis v. Bandemer, 84-1244 (p. 10 of dissent), 
and Turner v. Murray, 84-6646 (p. 14), neither of which has 
been han ed down. 
1 believe all of the writing is nin" on Turner, and 
so it may come down fairly soon. Bandemer (the Indiana re-
apportionment case) may well be held up for some time. San-
dra is writing - according to the "clerk grapevine" - a long 
opinion on the justiciability issue. 
lt occurs to me that probably you could cite other 
cases for the points you make. Of course, however, 1 am 
entirely willing to hold Batson for young convenience. 
1 am making a minor chanqe in Batson in view of 
Thurgood's recent changes in his opinion. Thus, Batson will 
not be ready until next week's Conference in any event. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
Dear Lewis; 
• 
~tntt <!fcttrl cf tlft 'Jihtittb ~taft.s 
~uftinghttt. ~. <!J. 211~~~ 
April 18, 1986 
No. 84-6263 
Batson v. Kentucky 
Although I am inclined to agree with you that 
Batson should not be applied retroactively, I 
believe that we should wait to decide that 
question until it is properly presented to us. 
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Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear Lewis: 
April 18, 1986 
/ 
I agree with Bill Brennan. It seems to me, however, 
that you already have a majority for the retroactivity 
observation, namely, the Chief, Byron, yourself, Bill 
Rehnquist, and Sandra. I include Bill Rehnquist because my 
notes indicate that he has joined the Chief in dissent. 
Justice Powell 
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From: Justice Powell 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-6263 
JAMES KIRKLAND BATSON, PETITIONER 
v. KENTUCKY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF KENTUCKY 
[April -, 1986] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to reexamine that portion of Swain v. 
Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), concerning the evidentiary 
burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he has 
been denied equal protection through the State's use of pe-
remptory challenges to exclude members of his race from the 
petit jury.' 
'Following the lead of a number of state courts construing their state's 
constitution, two federal Courts of Appeals recently have accepted the 
view that peremptory challenges used to strike black jurors in a particular 
case may violate the Sixth Amendment. Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762 
(CA6 1985), cert. pending, No. 85-1028; McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 
1113 (CA2 1984), cert. pending, No. 84-1426. See People v. Wheeler, 22 
Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978); Riley v. State, 496 A. 2d 997, 1009-1013 
(Del. 1985); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. 
Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. 2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979). 
See also State v. Crespin, 94 N. M. 486, 612 P. 2d 716 (App. 1980). Other 
Courts of Appeals have rejected that position, adhering to the requirement 
that a defendant must prove systematic exclusion of blacks from the petit 
jury to establish a constitutional violation. United States v. Childress, 
715 F. 2d 1313 (CA8 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1063 (1984); 
United States v. Whitfield, 715 F. 2d 145, 147 (CA4 1983). See Beed v. 
State, 271 Ark. 526, 530-531, 609 S. W. 2d 898, 903 (1980); Blackwell v. 
State, 248 Ga. 138, 281 S. E. 2d 599, 599-600 (1981); Gilliard v. State, 428 
So. 2d 576, 579 (Miss.), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 867 (1983); People v. 
McCray, 57 N. Y. 2d 542, 546-549, 443 N. E. 2d 915, 916-919 (1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U. S. 961 (1983); State v. Lynch, 300 N. C. 534, 546-547, 268 
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Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Kentucky on 
charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen 
goods. On the first day of trial in Jefferson Circuit Court, 
the judge conducted voir dire examination of the venire, ex-
cused certain jurors for cause, and permitted the parties to 
exercise peremptory challenges. 2 The prosecutor used his 
peremptory challenges to strike all four black persons on the 
venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was se-
lected. Defense counsel moved to discharge the jury before 
it was sworn on the ground that the prosecutor's removal of 
the black veniremen violated petitioner's rights under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury drawn from a 
cross-section of the community, and under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to equal protection of the laws. Counsel re-
quested a hearing on his motion. Without expressly ruling 
on the request for a hearing, the trial judge observed that the 
parties were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to 
"strike anybody they want to." The judge then denied peti-
tioner's motion, reasoning that the cross-section requirement 
applies only to selection of the venire and not to selection of 
the petit jury itself. 
S. E . 2d 161, 168-169 (1980). Federal Courts of Appeals also have dis-
agreed over the circumstances under which supervisory power may be 
used to scrutinize the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to 
strike blacks from the venire. Compare United States v. Leslie, --F. 
2d -- (CA5 1986) (en bane), with United States v. Jackson, 696 F. 2d 
578, 592-593 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1073 (1983). See also 
United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (ED La. 1974). 
2 The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the trial court to 
permit counsel to conduct voir dire examination or to conduct the examina-
tion itself. Ky. Rule Crim. Proc. 9.38. After jurors have been excused 
for cause, the parties exercise their peremptory challenges simultaneously 
by striking names from a list of qualified jurors equal to the number to be 
seated plus the number of allowable peremptory challenges. Rule 9.36. 
Since the offense charged in this case was a felony, and an alternate juror 
was called, the prosecutor was entitled to six peremptory challenges, and 
defense counsel to nine. Rule 9.40. 
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The jury convicted petitioner on both counts. On appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, petitioner pressed, 
among other claims, the argument concerning the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges. Conceding that Swain 
v. Alabama, supra, apparently foreclosed an equal protec-
tion claim based solely on the prosecutor's conduct in this 
case, petitioner urged the court to follow decisions of other 
states, People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 
(1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461 , 387 N. E. 
2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U. S. 881 (1979), and to hold that 
such conduct violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment 
and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution to a jury drawn 
from a cross-section of the community. Petitioner also con-
tended that the facts showed that the prosecutor had en-
gaged in a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges in this case 
and established an equal protection violation under Swain. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed. In a single 
paragraph, the court declined petitioner's invitation to adopt 
the reasoning of People v. Wheeler, supra, and Common-
wealth v. Soares, supra. The court observed that it recently 
had reaffirmed its reliance on Swain, and had held that a de-
fendant alleging lack of a fair cross-section must demonstrate 
systematic exclusion of a group of jurors from the venire. 
See Commonwealth v. McFerron, 680 S. W. 2d 924 (1984). 
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. -- (1985), and now 
reverse. 
II 
In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a 
"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on ac-
count of race of participation as jurors in the administration 
of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U. S. , 
at 203-204. This principle has been "consistently and re-
peatedly" reaffirmed, id., at 204, in numerous decisions of 
this Court both preceding and following Swain. 3 We re-
' See, e. g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880); Neal v. 
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affirm the principle today. 4 
A 
More than a century ago, the Court decided that the State 
denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it 
puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his 
race have been purposefully excluded. Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). That decision laid the foun-
dation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial 
discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire 
from which individual jurors are drawn. In Strauder, the 
Court explained that the central concern of the recently rati-
fied Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to govern-
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1881); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935); 
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S. 394 (1935) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisi-
ana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 463 (1947); 
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 
(1954); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U. S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 
U. S. 24 (1967) (per curiam); Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene 
County , 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); 
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U. S. --
(1986). 
The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons from participation 
in jury service on account of their race "are essentially the same for grand 
juries and for petit juries." Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 626, 
n. 3 (1972); see Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589 (1935). These prin-
ciples are reinforced by the criminal laws of the United States. 18 
u. s. c. § 243. 
' In this Court, petitioner has argued that the prosecutor's conduct vio-
lated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impar-
tial jury and to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Peti-
tioner has framed his argument in these terms in an apparent effort to 
avoid inviting the Court directly to reconsider one of its own precedents. 
On the other hand, the State has insisted that petitioner is claiming a de-
nial of equal protection and that we must reconsider Swain to find a con-
stitutional violation on this record. We agree with the State that resolu-
tion of petitioner's claim properly turns on application of equal protection 
principles and express no view on the merits of any of petitioner's Sixth 
Amendment arguments. 
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mental discrimination on account of race. I d., at 306-307. 
Exclusion of black citizens from service as jurors constitutes 
a primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to cure. 
In holding that racial discrimination in jury selection of-
fends the Equal Protection Clause, the Court in Strauder 
recognized, however, that a defendant has no right to a "petit 
jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race." 
I d., at 305. 5 "The number of our races and nationalities 
stands in the way of evolution of such a conception" of the de-
mand of equal protection. Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 
403 (1945). 6 But the defendant does have the right to be 
tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to non-
discriminatory criteria. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 
(1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880). The 
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the 
State will not exclude members of his race from the jury ve-
nire on account of race, Strauder, supra, at 305, 7 or on the 
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not 
qualified to serve as jurors, see Norris v. Alabama, 294 
U. S. 587, 599 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 397 
(1881). 
5 See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 286-287 (1950) (plurality opinion); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 
(1945); Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 321 (1906); Neal v. Delaware , 
supra, at 394. 
• Similarly, though the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury 
will be selected from a pool of names representing a cross-section of the 
community, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), we have never held 
that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries actually chosen must 
mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population," id., at 538. Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept 
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heteroge-
neous nature of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the 
Court's holding that a jury of six persons is not unconstitutional. Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 102-103 (1970). 
' See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 482; Cassell v. Texas, supra, at 
287; Akins v. Texas, supra, at 403; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. , at 394. 
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Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire 
violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it de-
nies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to se-
cure. "The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the 
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or 
summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, as-
sociates, persons having the same legal status in society as 
that which he holds." Strauder, supra, at 308; see Carter v. 
Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U. S. 320, 330 
(1970). The petit jury has occupied a central position in our 
system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime 
against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or 
judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968). 8 
Those on the venire must be "indifferently chosen," 9 to se-
cure the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to "protection of life and liberty against race or color preju-
dice." Strauder, supra, at 309. 
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only 
the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try. 
8 See Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, at 530; Williams v. Florida, supra, 
at 100. See also Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1 
(1966). 
In Duncan v. Louisiana, decided after Swain, the Court concluded that 
the right to trial by jury in criminal cases was such a fundamental feature 
of the American system of justice that it was protected against state action 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 391 U. S., at 
147-158. The Court emphasized that a defendant's right to be tried by a 
jury of his peers is designed "to prevent oppression by the Government." 
!d., at 155, 156-157. For a jury to perform its intended function as a 
check on official power, it must be a body drawn from the community. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 156; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 
60, 86-88 (1942). By compromising the representative quality of the jury, 
discriminatory selection procedures make "juries ready weapons for offi-
cials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered 
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities." Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., 
at 408 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
• 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 349 (Cooley ed. 1899) (quoted in Dun-
can v. Lousiana, supra, at 152). 
84-6263-0PINION 
BATSON v. KENTUCKY 7 
Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an as-
sessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to 
consider evidence presented at a trial. See Thiel v. South-
ern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1946). A person's 
race simply "is unrelated to his fitness as a juror." Id., at 
227 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As long ago as Strauder, 
therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person 
participation in jury service on account of his race, the State 
unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror. 
100 U. S., at 308; see Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene 
County, supra, at 329-330; Neal v. Delaware, supra, at 386. 
The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends be-
yond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to 
touch the entire community. Selection procedures that pur-
posefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public 
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. See 
Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (1946); McCray 
v. New York, 461 U. S. 961, 968 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). Discrimination within the 
judicial system is most pernicious because it is "a stimulant to 
that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to 
[black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to se-
cure to all others." Strauder, supra, at 308. 
B 
In Strauder, the Court invalidated a state statute that pro-
vided that only white men could serve as jurors. 100 U. S., 
at 305. We can be confident that no state now has such a 
law. The Constitution requires, however, that we look be-
yond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and 
also consider challenged selection practices to afford "protec-
tion against action of the State through its administrative of-
ficers in effecting the prohibited discrimination." Norris v. 
Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; see Hernandez v. Texas, 347 
U. S. 475, 478-479 (1954); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., at 
346-347. Thus, the Court has found a denial of equal protec-
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tion where the procedures implementing a neutral statute op-
erated to exclude persons from the venire on racial grounds, 10 
and has made clear that the Constitution prohibits all forms 
of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of jurors. 11 
While decisions of this Court have been concerned largely 
with discrimination during selection of the venire, the prin-
ciples announced there also forbid discrimination on account 
of race in selection of the petit jury. Since the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects an accused throughout the proceedings 
bringing him to justice, Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 406 
(1942), the State may not draw up its jury lists pursuant to 
neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at "other 
stages in the selection process," Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 
559, 562 (1953); see McCray v. New York, supra, at 965, 968 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also 
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 632 (1972). 
Accordingly, the component of the jury selection process at 
issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors 
through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 12 Although a prosecutor or-
10 E . g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 407 (1967) (per curiam); Whitus 
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 548-549; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S., at 561. 
11 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 589; Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S., 
at 319; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S., at 394, 397. 
12 We express no views on whether the Constitution imposes any limit on 
the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel. 
Nor do we express any views on the techniques used by lawyers who 
seek to obtain information about the community in which a case is to be 
tried, and about members of the venire from which the jury is likely to be 
drawn. See generally J. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Un-
certain Commitment to Representative Panels, 183-189 (1977). Prior to 
voir dire examination, which serves as the basis for exercise of challenges, 
lawyers wish to know as much as possible about prospective jurors, includ-
ing their age, education, employment, and economic status, so that they 
can ensure selection of jurors who at least have an open mind about the 
case. In some jurisdictions, where a pool of jurors serves for a substantial 
period of time, see J. Van Dyke, supra, at 116-118, counsel also may seek 
to learn which members of the pool served on juries in other cases and the 
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dinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory chal-
lenges "for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related 
to his view concerning the outcome" of the case to be tried, 
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467, 473 (Conn. 
1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. New-
man, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977), the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on 
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as 
a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case 
against a black defendant. 
III 
The principles announced in Strauder never have been 
questioned in any subsequent decision of this Court. 
Rather, the Court has been called upon repeatedly to review 
the application of those principles to particular facts. 13 A re-
curring question in these cases, as in any case alleging a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether the 
defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful dis-
crimination on the part of the State. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U. S., at 550; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S., at 478-481; 
Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 403-404; Martin v. Texas, 200 
U. S. 316 (1906). That question also was at the heart of the 
portion of Swain v. Alabama we reexamine today. 14 
outcome of those cases. Counsel even may employ professional investiga-
tors to interview persons who have served on a particular petit jury. We 
have had no occasion to consider particularly this practice. Of course, 
counsel's efforts to obtain possibly relevant information about prospective 
jurors is to be distinguised from the practice at issue here. 
'
3 See, e. g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.-- (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 
443 U. S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977); Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 628-629 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U. S. 545, 549-550 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, supra, at 205; Coleman v. 
Alabama, 377 U. S. 129 (1964); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 589 
(1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. , at 394. 
14 The decision in Swain has been the subject of extensive commentary. 
Some authors have argued that the Court should reconsider the decision. 
E . g., J . Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commit-
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A 
Swain required the Court to decide, among other issues, 
whether a black defendant was denied equal protection by 
the State's exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude 
members of his race from the petit jury. 380 U. S., at 
209-210. The record in Swain showed that the prosecutor 
had used the State's peremptory challenges to strike the six 
black persons included on the petit jury venire. !d., at 210. 
While rejecting the defendant's claim for failure to prove pur-
poseful discrimination, the Court nonetheless indicated that 
the Equal Protection Clause placed some limits on the State's 
exercise of peremptory challenges. I d., at 222-224. 
The Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's histori-
cal privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control, 
id., at 214-220, and the constitutional prohibition on exclu-
sion of persons from jury service on account of race, id., at 
222-224. While the Constitution does not confer a right to 
peremptory challenges, id., at 219 (citing Stilson v. United 
States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919)), those challenges tradition-
ally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection 
of a qualified and unbiased jury, 380 U. S., at 219. 15 To pre-
ment to Representative Panels 166-167 (1977); Imlay, Federal Jury Ref-
ormation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 247, 
268-270 (1973); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 235, 283-303 (1968); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory 
Challenge, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1357 (1985); Note, Peremptory Challenge-
Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. 
L. J. 157 (1967); Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint 
for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1157 (1966). 
See also Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 
1611 (1985). 
On the other hand, some commentators have argued that we should ad-
here to Swain. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the 
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 Md. L. Rev. 
337 (1982). 
15 In Swain, the Court reviewed the "very old credentials" of the pe-
remptory challenge system and noted the "long and widely held belief that 
-
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serve the peremptory nature of the prosecutor's challenge, 
the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his actions in a par-
ticular case by relying on a presumption that he properly ex-
ercised the State's challenges. I d., at 221-222. 
The Court went on to observe, however, that a state may 
not exercise its challenges in contravention of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. It was impermissible for a prosecutor to use 
his challenges to exclude blacks from the jury "for reasons 
wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on 
trial" or to deny to blacks "the same right and opportunity to 
participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the 
white population." Id., at 224. Accordingly, a black de-
fendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system 
was "being perverted" in that manner. Ibid. For example, 
an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on 
evidence that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the 
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defend-
ant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of 
Negroes who "have been selected as qualified jurors by the 
jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for 
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit ju-
ries." Id., at 223. Evidence offered by the defendant in 
Swain did not meet that standard. While the defendant 
showed that prosecutors in the jurisdiction had exercised 
their strikes to exclude blacks from the jury, he offered no 
proof of the circumstances under which prosecutors were re-
sponsible for striking black jurors beyond the facts of his own 
case. I d. , at 224-228. 
A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain 
reasoned that proof of repeated striking of blacks over a num-
ber of cases was necessary to establish a violation of the 
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury." 380 U. S. , at 
219; see id., at 212-219. 
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Equal Protection Clause. 16 Since this interpretation of Swain 
has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 17 pros-
ecutors' peremptory challenges are now largely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. For reasons that follow, we reject 
this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards 
that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima 
facie case under the Equal Protection Clause. 
B 
Since the decision in Swain, we have explained that our 
cases concerning selection of the venire reflect the general 
equal protection principle that the "invidious quality" of gov-
ernmental action claimed to be racially discriminatory "must 
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 240 (1976). As in any 
equal protection case, the "burden is, of course," on the de-
fendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire "to 
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination." Whitus 
v. Georgia, 385 U. S., at 550 (citing Tarrance v. Florida, 188 
'
6 E. g., United States v. Jenkins, 701 F. 2d 850, 859-860 (CAlO 1983); 
United States v. Boykin, 679 F. 2d 1240, 1245 (CA8 1982); United States v. 
Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1218 (CA5 1971); Thigpen v. State, 49 Ala. 
App. 233, 270 So. 2d 666, 673 (1972); Jackson v. State , 245 Ark. 331, 432 
S. W. 2d 876, 878 (1968); Johnson v. Maryland, 9 Md. App. 143, 262 A. 2d 
792, 796-797 (1970); State v. Johnson, 125 N. J. Super. 438, 311 A. 2d 389 
(1973) (per curiam); State v. Shaw, 284 N. C. 366, 200 S. E. 2d 585 (1973). 
'
7 See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F. 2d 1113, 1120, and n. 2 (CA2 1984), 
cert. pending, No. 84-1426. The lower courts have noted the practical dif-
ficulties of proving that the State systematically has exercised peremptory 
challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of race. As the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed, the defendant would have 
to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the par-
ticular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and 
the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges. 
United States v. Pearson, 448 F. 2d 1207, 1217 (CA5 1971). The court be-
lieved this burden to be "most difficult" to meet. Ibid. In jurisdictions 
where court records do not reflect the jurors' race and where voir dire pro-
ceedings are not transcribed, the burden would be insurmountable. See 
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748, 767-768 (1978). 
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U. S. 519 (1903)). In deciding if the defendant has carried 
his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake "a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent 
as may be available." Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 
(1977). Circumstantial evidence of invidious intent may in-
clude proof of disproportionate impact. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S., at 242. We have observed that under 
some circumstances proof of discriminatory impact "may for 
all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality be-
cause in various circumstances the discrimination is very dif-
ficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Ibid. For example, 
"total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes 
from jury venires," ibid., "is itself such an 'unequal applica-
tion of the law ... as to show intentional discrimination,'" 
id., at 241 (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S., at 404). 
Moreover, since Swain, we have recognized that a black 
defendant alleging that members of his race have been imper-
missibly excluded from the venire may make out a prima 
facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the 
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, supra, at 
239-242. Once the defendant makes the requisite showing, 
the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial 
exclusion. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S., at 632. The 
State cannot meet this burden on mere general assertions 
that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly 
performed their official duties. See Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 632; Jones v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 24, 25 (1967). 
Rather, the State must demonstrate that "permissible ra-
cially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced 
the monochromatic result." Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 
at 632; see Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241. 18 
18 Our decisions in the context of Title VII "disparate treatment" have 
explained the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. See M cDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of 
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The showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in selection of the venire may be 
discerned in this Court's decisions. E. g., Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977); Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 631-632. The defendant initially must show 
that he is a member of a racial group capable of being singled 
out for differential treatment. Castaneda v. Partida, 
supra, at 494. In combination with that evidence, a defend-
ant may then make a prima facie case by proving that in the 
particular jurisdiction members of his race have not been 
summoned for jury service over an extended period of time. 
I d., at 494. Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire 
raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the 
"result bespeaks discrimination." Hernandez v. Texas, 
supra, at 482; see Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Corp., supra, at 266. 
Since the ultimate issue is whether the State has discrimi-
nated in selecting the defendant's venire, however, the de-
fendant may establish a prima facie case "in other ways than 
by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence" of mem-
bers of his race "from many panels." Cassell v. Texas, 339 
U. S. 282, 290 (1950) (plurality opinion). In cases involving 
the venire, this Court has found a prima facie case on proof 
that members of the defendant's race were substantially un-
derrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, 
and that the venire was selected under a practice providing 
"the opportunity for discrimination." Whitus v. Georgia, 
385 U. S., at 552; see Castaneda v. Partida, supra, at 494; 
Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241; Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, supra, at 629-631. This combination of factors raises 
the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination because 
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); United States Postal 
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983). The party 
alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination carries the 
ultimate burden of persuasion. Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine, supra, at 252-256. 
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the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of 
black citizens on a particular jury array where the selection 
mechanism is subject to abuse. When circumstances sug-
gest the need, the trial court must undertake a "factual in-
quiry" that "takes into account all possible explanatory fac-
tors" in the particular case. Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 
at 630. 
Thus, since the decision in Swain, this Court has recog-
nized that a defendant may make a prima facie showing of 
purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by 
relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case. 
These decisions are in accordance with the proposition, artic-
ulated in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 
that "a consistent pattern of official racial discrimination" is 
not "a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory govern-
mental act" is not "immunized by the absence of such dis-
crimination in the making of other comparable decisions." 
429 U. S., at 266, n. 14. For evidentiary requirements to 
dictate that "several must suffer discrimination" before one 
could object, McCray v. New York, 461 U. S., at 965 (MAR-
SHALL, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), would be in-
consistent with the promise of equal protection to all. 19 
c 
The standards for assessing a prima facie case in the con-
text of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully 
articulated since Swain. See Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 
at 494-495; Washington v. Davis, supra, at 241-242; Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, supra, at 629-631. These principles sup-
port our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima 
facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit 
'
9 Decisions under Title VII also recognize that a person claiming that he 
has been the victim of intentional discrimination may make out a prima 
facie case by relying solely on the facts concerning the alleged discrimina-
tion against him. See cases at supra, n. 19. 
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jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise 
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To estab-
lish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a 
member of a cognizable racial group, Castaneda v. Partida, 
supra, at 494, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremp-
tory challenges to remove from the venire members of the 
defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely 
on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremp-
tory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that per-
mits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate." Avery v. Georgia, supra, at 562. Finally, the 
defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on 
account of their race. This combination of factors in the 
em panelling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, 
raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. 
In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite 
showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circum-
stances. For example, a "pattern" of strikes against black 
jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an 
inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's 
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in 
exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference 
of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illus-
trative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced 
in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circum-
stances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against 
black jurors. 
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the bur-
den shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral 
explanation for challenging black jurors. Though this re-
quirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full pe-
remptory character of the historic challenge, we emphasize 
that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level 
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justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. See McCray v. 
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132; Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d 762, 
773 (CA6 1985), cert. pending 85-1028. But the prosecutor 
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the de-
fendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judg-
ment-that they would be partial to the defendant because of 
their shared race. Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S., at 
598-599; see Thompson v. United States, --U.S. --, 
-- (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
Just as the Equal Protection Clause forbids the States to ex-
clude black persons from the venire on the assumption that 
blacks as a group are unqualified to serve as jurors, supra, at 
5, so it forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the 
assumption that they will be biased in a particular case sim-
ply because the defendant is black. The core guarantee of 
equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not 
discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were 
we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such as-
sumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' race. Nor 
may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by de-
nying that he had a discriminatory motive or "affirming his 
good faith in individual selections." Alexander v. Louisi-
ana, 405 U. S., at 632. If these general assertions were ac-
cepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, the Equal 
Protection Clause "would be but a vain and illusory require-
ment." Norris v. Alabama, supra, at 598. The prosecutor 
therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the 
particular case to be tried. 20 The trial court then will have 
00 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v. 
Abrams, 750 F. 2d, at 1132, that "[t]here are any number of bases" on 
which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a 
juror who is not excusable for cause. As we explained in another context, 
however, the prosecutor must give a "clear and reasonably specific" ex-
planation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges. Texas 
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 258 (1981). 
84-6263-0PINION 
18 BATSON v. KENTUCKY 
the duty to determine if the defendant has established pur-
poseful discrimination. 21 
IV 
The State contends that our holding will eviscerate the fair 
trial values served by the peremptory challenge. Conceding 
that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to peremp-
tory challenges and that Swain did state that their use ulti-
mately is subject to the strictures of equal protection, the 
State argues that the privilege of unfettered exercise of the 
challenge is of vital importance to the criminal justice 
system. 
While we recognize, of course, that the peremptory chal-
lenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures, 
we do not agree that our decision today will undermine the 
contribution the challenge generally makes to the administra-
tion of justice. The reality of practice, amply reflected in 
many state and federal court opinions, shows that the chal-
lenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to 
discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts 
to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal 
protection and furthers the ends of justice. 22 In view of the 
21 In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that "a finding 
of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact" entitled to appropriate def-
erence by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. --
(1985). Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration 
here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordi-
narily should give those findings great deference. ld., at--. 
22 While we respect the views expressed in JUSTICE MARSHALL's concur-
ring opinion, concerning prosecutorial and judicial enforcement of our hold-
ing today, we do not share them. The standard we adopt under the fed-
eral Constitution is designed to ensure that a State does not use 
peremptory challenges to strike any black juror because of his race. We 
have no reason to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their duty to exer-
cise their challenges only for legitimate purposes. Certainly, this Court 
may assume that trial judges, in supervising voir dire in light of our deci-
sion today, will be alert to identify a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination. Nor do we think that this historic trial practice, which long 
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heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our 
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strength-
ened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury 
service because of his race. 
Nor are we persuaded by the State's suggestion that our 
holding will create serious administrative difficulties. In 
those states applying a version of the evidentiary standard 
we recognize today, courts have not experienced serious ad-
ministrative burdens, 23 and the peremptory challenge system 
has survived. We decline, however, to formulate particular 
procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection 
to a prosecutor's challenges. 24 
v 
In this case, petitioner made a timely objection to the pros-
ecutor's removal of all black persons on the venire. Because 
the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring 
the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we re-
mand this case for further proceedings. If the trial court de-
cides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful dis-
crimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a 
has served the selection of an impartial jury, should be abolished because of 
an apprehension that prosecutors and trial judges will not perform con-
scientiously their respective duties under the Constitution. 
23 For example, in People v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P. 2d 854 (1983), 
the California Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show 
that procedures implementing its version of this standard, imposed five 
years earlier, were burdensome for trial judges. 
24 In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state 
and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how 
best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no 
view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding 
of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the 
venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with 
the case, see Booker v. Jabe, 775 F. 2d, at 773, or to disallow the discrimi-
natory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged ju-
rors reinstated on the venire, see United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 
467, 474 (Conn. 1976), mandamus granted sub nom. United States v. N ew-
man, 549 F. 2d 240 (CA2 1977). 
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neutral explanation for his action, our precedents require 
that petitioner's conviction be reversed. E. g., Whitus v. 
Georgia, 385 U. S., at 549-550; Hernandez v. Texas, supra, 
at 482; Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U. S., at 469. 25 
It is so ordered. 
25 To the extent that anything in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 
(1965), is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is 
overruled. 
CHAMBERS 0,. 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
April 24, 1986 
84-6263 - Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to Conference 
• 
lfp/ss 04/29/86 84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
This case is here from the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky. Petitioner is black. At his trial on 
criminal charges, the prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges to strike all of the black veniremen. The 
result was an all-white jury. 
Petitioner objected to this use of peremptory 
challenges, and moved that the jury be discharged -
claiming a violation of rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The trial judge denied the 
motion. The issue was argued again before the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky, but petitioner's conviction was 
affirmed. 
The Kentucky court understandably relied on 
this Court's 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama. That 
case required an objecting defendant to prove 
"systematic exclusion" of black persons before any 
limit could be placed on the use of such challenges. 
Swain recognized, however, that the Equal Protection 
Clause does prohibit the state from using peremptory 
challenges to discriminate on account of race. 
• 2. 
Experience since Swain/ has made it clear that 
P!ovtog "systematic exclusion" of jurors / solely because 
of their race~ has been difficult) if not impossible. 
After a careful reconsideration of Swain, we 
conclude today/ that a defendant ~ make out a prima 
facie case of purposeful discriminatio;/by relying on 
the fact~urrounding the state's exercise of 
peremptory challenge~ the defendant's trial. If a 
prima facie case is established,/ the prosecutor then 
must articulate a neutral explanatio~for challenging 
black jurors. To this extent, the Court's decision in 
Swain is overruled. ---------------------------
that the use of peremptory 
challenges should be abolished. 
practice, when lawfully used, serves 
.t1: ial 
£~~r~ 
this cas:< rejected 
petitioner's objection without deciding whether the 
facts established a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination. ~be decision of the Kentucky 
" Supreme Cour~and remand the case for further 
roceedings consistent with our decision. 
• 3. 
Justices White and Marshall have filed 
concurring opinions. Justice Stevens has filed a 
concurring opinion in which Justice Brennan has joined. 
Justice O'Connor also has filed a concurring opinion. 
The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Justice Rehnquist has joined. Justice Rehnquist 
has filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief 
Justice has joined. 
lfp! s 04/29/86 • 84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
This case is here from the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky. Petitioner is black. At his trial on 
criminal charges, the prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges to strike all of the black veniremen. The 
result was an all-white jury. 
Petitioner objected to this use of peremptory 
challenges/~a~oved that the jury be discharged -
claiming a violation of rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The trial judge denied the 
motion. The issue was argued again before the Supreme 
1'4:f~~ 
Court of Kentucky,; but~petitioner's co~viction~  
aff i rRuilE11' 
The Kentucky court U-RQQ~etandabl¥ relied on 
this Court's 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama. That 
case required an object~n1 defendan~to prove 
"s~s~em~c exclusion" of black persons~before ~ 
limit could be placed on the use of such challenges. 
Swain recognized, however, that the Equal Protection 
Clause;'~~s pro~t the state/ from using peremptory 
challenges to discriminate on account of race. 
• 2. 
Experience since Swain~has made it clear that 
proving "systematic exclusion" of jurors solely because ..._., 
of their race,/ has been difficultJ if not impossible. 
After a careful reconsideration of Swain, we 
conclude today that a defendant can make out a prima 
facie case of purposeful discriminationj'by relying on 
the facts surrounding the state's exercise of 
~
peremptory challeng~t the defendant's trial. If a 
prima facie case is established, /the prosecutor then 
must articulate a neutral explanation for challenging 
~
black jurors. To this extent, the Court's decision in 
Swain is overruled. 
We do not suggest that the use of peremptory 
challenges should be abolished. This historic trial 
practice, when lawfully used, serves the selection of 
an impartial jury. / _ . 
~H.c.TC-
A& the- tr;i-.1. jaEI~-e :J.n this case~ rejected 
petitioner • s objection wi ;!:out __ ~~~ncy'whether the 
facts established a prima facie case of purposeful 
~~ tll-('-d..•""41i £., I 
discrimination, we reverse the decision of the Kentucky " ----
Supreme Court.afta remand the case ""'for fa!'thef" 
P""OCee64ng&....c.ensistent... With-e~ eeci:!J-i.Gn. 
3. 
Justices White and Marshall have filed 
Justice Stevens has filed a concurring opinions. 
concurring opinionj'in 
Justice O'Connor also 
which Justice Brennan has joined. 
has filed a concurring opinion. 
9./ The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion, in .. --.. 
which Justice Rehnquist has joined. Justice Rehnquist 
has filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief 
Justice has joined. 
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Rights of Minorities May Be Violated 
By Juror Exclusion, High Court Rules 
By STEI'HE:\ WER~IEL 
S!aff R1·por1er of TH>: WALL STRt:t:T JouR,.AI 
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court 
ruled that the constitutional rights of crim· 
ina! defendants may be violated when 
prosecutors exclude blacks and other mi· 
norities from juries. 
In a 7-2 ruling. the high court reversed 
its own 196S decision and made it signifi -
cantly easier for a defendant to prove that 
a prosecutor. while picking a jury. violated 
the 14th Amendment guarantee of "equal 
protection of the laws ." 
The ruling involved the stage in a crimi-
nal trial in which a panel of potential ju-
rors has been selected after those with con-
flicts of interest have been eliminated. In 
most states. prosecutors and defense law-
yers are then allowed peremptory chal-
lenges in which they may exclude jurors 
without giving their reasons. until a six -
person or 12-person JUry has been cho-
sen. 
In several states. civil-rights groups 
have complained that prosecutors regu -
larly use their challenges to exclude all 
blacks from juries when the defendant is 
black. on the theory that black jurors 
would be more sympathetic to black defen-
dant~ . 
In 196~. in an Alabama case. the Su-
preme Court ruled that the practice of 
challenging blacks or other minorities on 
juries only violated a person's rights if the 
defendant showed that prosecutors did it 
"in case after case ... 
Yesterday. in an opinion written bv Jus-
tice Lewis Powell. the high court said sub-
sequent state and federal court interpreta-
tions of the 196~ ruling have "placed on de-
fendants a crippling burden of proof. .. 
. making prosecutors· jury challenges 
"largely immune" from court review. 
As a result. the court took the unusual 
step of explicitly o\·erruling. rather than 
trying to differentiate. parts of the 196~ 
decision. Ironically. the decision yester-
day, by a court often described as conser-
\'ative, is considerably more liberal than 
the 196~ ruli ng. which was issued by a 
court that is viewed as the most liberal in 
history. 
Justice Powell said a defendant no 
longer needs to prove a pattern of exclud-
ing minority jurors in a string of cases. 
Rather . a defendant may show that a 
" combination of factors" in his own case 
prove that the prosecutor discriminated 
against minority jurors. Then the prosecu- . 
v tor must try to prove that there was some 
valid reason for the ex• ~usions that relates 
to the case. 
Thr court's ruling left an important 
questiOn unanswerea. Four justices. two in 
th r majority and two in dissent. said in 
separate statements that the ruling 
shouldn't be applied retroactively. But the 
other five, a majority of the court. didn't 
say whether they intended the decision to 
apply to concluded cases or only to future 
cases. If applied retroactively, "hundreds" 
of appeals may result, said Steve Ralston. 
a civfl-rights lawyer with the NAACP Le-
gal Defense Fund Inc . 
Chief Justice Warren Burger and .Jus-
tice William Rrhnquist dissented. 
The ruling came in an appeal by James 
Batson . a black man who was convicted of 
burglary by an all-white jury from which 
the prosecutor had exrlurled :1!! four h!:J ck 
potential jurors. Mr. Batson now will have , 
a chance to prove that his rights were vio- ' 
Ia ted. 
Illinois Abortion Law 
The justices unanimously dismissed an 
appeal by an Illinois doctor defending the 
1 state's Jaw that regulates abortions. A fed-
eral appeals court in Chicago struck down 
several sections of the law. Illinois decided 
to accept the ruling and didn 't appeal to 
the Supreme Court. but an Illinois pediatri-
cian did . 
In an opinion written hy Justice Harry 
Blarkmun. the court said the doctor 
doesn 't have a sufficient legal interest to 
file the appeal or to defend the state 
law . 
I 
The ruling is a victory for those favor-
ing the freedom of women to have abor-
tions. Women 's groups feared the court 
might curtail the right to an abortion. or as 
the Reagan administration has urged. 
overrulr the right altogether. 
However. the justices still have under 
consideration the Pennsylvania Jaw that, 
similar to the Illinois Jaw.· regulates abor-
tions hy requiring doctors , to inform pa-
tiPnts about the risks of abortion and to se-
lect methods most· likely to preserve a 
fetus outside the mother's womb. A federal 
appeals court in Philadelphia struck down 
parts of the Pennsylvania Jaw. 
May 9, 1986 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am now working on the "holds" for Batson, and the 
Clerk plans to place on next Thursday's discuss list about 
half of the approximately 20 cases being held. The question 
of the retroactivity of Batson is an important one, as sug-
gested by the views expre sed by several members of the 
Court. It is clear, I assume beyond dispute, that Batson 
enunci tes a ne\ constitutional rule. On the critical 
point, our decision overru es Swa'n. 
lf the case were accorded retroactivity courts 
would be reexamining on habeas corpus hundreds of final con-
victions. 1 think that t~e only serious question is whether 
Batson should b applied to cases pend ng on direct appeal 
or prospectively only. 
l circulate this emorandum at this time because 
until this issue is resolved, I cannot recommend disposi-
tions of the cases being held. 1 am inclined to grant a 
case that was pending here on direct appeal when Batson was 
announced, and resolve in that context the extent to which 
our decision should be applied retroact'vely. 
If we do grant one or more cases to enable us to 
resolve this question, one option would be to hold all of 
the presently pending ca es until next Term when this issue 
c n be decide • It also may be possible to resolve the 
issue summarily this Term, though we already are behind in 
th Court's work. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
May 0 , 986 
84- 626 3 Batson v . Kentucky 
MEMORA DUM TO THE CONFERNCE : 
In response to my inquiry of May 9 , as to "Holds", 
I h ve only heard from the Chief and John Stevens . Severa 
Justices have been away , and both Byron and 1 now will be 
away until next ~ednesday, 1 suggest that ~e delay acting on 
the "Holds" unti our ay 22 Conference . 
lt may be desir ble to have a preliminary discus-
sion at our Conference on Thur, ay , May 15 . I am requesting 
the Clerk, by a copy of th·s letter, to put this subject on 
the "Discus~ List" for that Conference. 
L. F. P. , Jr . 
ss 
cc: Mr. Joseph F. apaniol, Jr . 
' arne 05/10/86 
May 10, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
As I mentioned to you yesterday, one of the cases being 
held for Batson may be an appropriate vehicle in which to resolve 
the issue of retroactivity. The petition is No. 85-5609, 
Prejean v. Blackburn (cert. to CAS). The case is attractive be-
cause it is here on federal habeas and because petr, through the 
Debevoise & Plimpton firm, has filed a supplemental petition ar-
guing that Batson should be applied retroactively. 
Unfortunately, there is a problem with using the case. In 
addition to his Batson claim, petr argues that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits execution of a person who was a minor at the time 
that he committed the murder (petr was seventeen when he killed a 
state police officer). The Court might be inclined to consider 
that claim. 
Petr also claims that the lower courts erred in denying 
him an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the Louisiana death 
penalty system is being administered in a racially discriminatory 
page 2. 
manner; petr, who is black, offered statistics that he claimed 
showed that Louisiana capital juries discriminate against blacks 
who have killed white victims. CAS concluded that petr's statis-
tical offer was insufficient because it did not account for non-
racial variables. (CAS believed that petr should offer statis-
tics showing that death sentences in the judicial district where 
he was convicted were imposed on the basis of race; the court 
also decided that petr 's statewide statistics were insufficient 
because they showed only that a disproportionate number of capi-
tal defendants in the State were blacks who had killed white vic-
tims). F Pending before the Court is No. 84-6811, McCleskey v. 
Kemp, in which CAll rejected a similar challenge to the Georgia 
death penalty system. McCleskey was held for Lockhart, and the 
Court must now decide whether it is inclined to review CAll's 
holding with respect to discriminatory application of the capital 
punishment statute. If the Court does grant McCleskey, some mem-
bers of the Court may want to hold this case for McCleskey. If 
this petition is held, I assume that we could not use it for res-
elution of retroactive application of Batson. 
If McCleskey is denied, this case is the one we should 
propose as the vehicle for resolving retroactivity. If McCleskey 
is granted, I'm inclined to argue that this case should not be 
held because it appears that the statistics offered by petr here 
were far weaker than those offered in McCleskey. (In McCleskey, 
CAll held that statistics contained in the "Baldus Study" were 
insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.) Moreover, 
this case presents a challenge to Louisiana's death penalty sys-
page 3. 
tern, whereas McCleskey challenges the Georgia system. I will do 
further thinking about whether this case needs to be held in the 
event that the Court grants McCleskey. (My impression that this 
case need not be held is based in part on my view that CAll 
reached the correct result in McCleskey, a view that surely needs 
further thought on my part) • 
Since only the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens have re-
sponded to your memo on this issue, do you think that we should 
\ ask the Clerk to relist the Batson holds for the May 22 Confer-
ence? That option would give the Justices time to decide what 
they want to do on this question; perhaps, the issue could be 
placed on the May 15 Conference List for discussion. Then, in 
the following week, we could make recommendations concerning the 
being held. 
lfp/ss 05/10/86 BATC SALLY-POW 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERNCE: 
In response to my inquiry of /'Vt~ cor, , I have 
only heard from the Chief and John Stevens. Several 
Justices have been away, and both Byron and I now will be 
away until next Wednesday, I suggest that we delay acting 
on the "Holds" until our May 22. 
It may be desirable to have a preliminary 
discussion at our Conference on Thursday, May 15. I am 
requesting the Clerk, by a copy of this letter, to put 




JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
jnvumt (!J1t1td d tqt ~ittb jtatt.i\' 
Jl!U'ltingtlln.~. Of. 211~~~ 
May 12, 1986 
No. 84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
Dear Lewis, 
I will be attending the Sixth Circuit Conference 
this week on the 15th and, therefore, unable to participate 
in discussing the holds for Batson. I am inclined to think 
it would be possible to take one of the "holds" and decide 
the retroactivity issue by way of a per curiam. If enough 
others agree you may add my name to such a vote. In my 
view, Batson should not be retroactively applied. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE w ... . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~mtt <!fanrl uf tlrt~b .jhtlt.s 
)luJrittgtDn. ~. Of. 211,5'1-~ 
No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
MEMO TO THE CONFERENCE 
May 12, 1986 
I agree with Lewis that we should discuss how to dispose of 
the question whether Batson should be applied retroactively at 
Conference on May 15, 1986. 
, ~ 
, · ·. I \ lt/{ j)·~! . :_, \/ ,, ~,) 
i · ' I •) v U ,;-. I - . \ .. 1' ), ,/ 
Copies to the Conference 
arne 05/14/86 
May 14, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
In your absence, I spoke with Tim Flanigan, the Chief Jus-
tice's Super Clerk, and he informed me that a discussion of the 
retroactivity of Batson is being placed on the agenda for tomor-
row's Conference. As we discussed, you have endorsed Justice 
Harlan's position on retroactivity, that is, a new constitutional 
rule should apply to cases pending on direct appeal when the rule 
is announced but not to cases on habeas review. I am doing fur-
ther reading and research to be sure that there is no sound rea-
son for you to adopt a different position in this case, and I 




May 14, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
With respect to retroactivity of the rule in this case, 
the Court has, I believe, three options: 
(1) The rule could be given complete retroactive effect, ~D 
that is, the rule could be applied to cases pending on direct 
appeal when Batson was announced and to final convictions on ha-
beas corpus review. This position is inconsistent with your ap-
preach to retroactivity, and need not be given further consider-
ation. 
(2) The rule could be given retroactive effect to 
extent of applying it to cases pending on direct appeal at 
the ~ 
the lf"U,Mr 
time that Batson was announced, but the rule would not be applied 
in collateral attack on final convictions. This option repre-
sents y~iew of retroactivity. My research and thinking on 
the issue persuade me that you should adhere to this position in 
this case. As we have discussed, this position presents the only 
"principled" approach to retroactivity. You have repeatedly en-
page 2. 
dorsed this position. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 u.s. 
233, 246 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Harlin v. 
Missouri, 439 u.s. 459, 460 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in 
judgments); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 u.s. 323, 337 (1980) (Powell, 
J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Solem v. 
Stumes, 465 u.s. 638, 651 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in judg-
ment). As your opinions in these cases indicate, there are com-
pelling reasons for adopting this rule, reasons grounded on the 
even-handed administration of justice, fairness to litigants, the 
proper role of the Court, and the purposes of habeas corpus re-
view. Moreover, as the Court's opinions in this area sadly il-
lustrate, the Court has not come up with any satisfactory alter-
native approach to the issue of retroactivity. 
I# ,. 
(3) The rule could be applied prospectively only, _ t hat 
is, it could be applied only in trials that take place after the -decision in Batson was announced. (Of course, since the petr in 
Batson himself was given the benefit of the new rule, it is im-
possible at this point to hold that the case should be given com-
plete prospective effect.) There is a fairly substantial argu-
ment in favor of this position. If a black defendant objected at 
trial to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to 
exclude black jurors but the judge overruled the objection in 
reliance on Swain, the prosecutor would not have been required to 
come forward with his reasons, as now required under Batson, for 
the challenges. If Batson is applied retroactively to such a 
case pending on direct appeal, it probably will be impossible for 
page 3. 
prosecutors to reconstruct their reasons for striking the jurors. 
Thus, application of the rule to trials that occurred before 
Batson was handed down will cause some disruption of the adminis-
tration of criminal justice. As noted in point 2 above, I think 
that the reasons that support your approach to retroactivity are 
compelling; moreover, I do not think that this argument in favor 
of prospective application outweighs the reasons that have for-
merly persuaded you to adopt the intermediate approach. 
While I realize that this issue does need to be settled 
for the guidance of the lower courts, I am reluctant to recommend 
that you vote to dispose of the issue summarily this term. As we 
have discussed, the Court's retroactivity decisions are messy, 
with constantly changing coalitions for varying positions. (I 
have confidence that someday a majority will agree with your ap-
proach, but in this case I cannot predict what the Court is like-
ly to do.) Summary disposition here seems like a mistake because 
the issue is an important one, and in view of the Court's confus-
ing precedents, briefing would be helpful. Moreover, capital 
cases may present special issues that we have not yet identified. 
Therefore, I think that the Court should designate a case (or 
cases) for resolving the issue and direct the parties to submit --
briefs on the issue. (Justice Stevens' suggestion that the Court 
simply GVR in cases pending on direct appeal and deny those pend-
ing on habeas is another option to consider. That option has the 
merit of allowing the lower courts to consider the question and 
to write opinions illuminating this Court's review. Moreover, 
page 4. 
the Court may be satisfied with the lower courts' resolution and 
thus never have to take the question. However, the Court is 
likely to be divided on the question so that it would end up 
granting a case in any event, and the Court may wish to resolve 
the problem for the lower courts.) 
I am reviewing the Holds at this time to identify which 
case would provide the most appropriate vehicle to Grant, and 
will give that case number to you by the end of today or first 
thing tomorrow morning. (I'm sorry for the delay. I fear that it 
may take some time to decide which case is best for these pur-
poses, and I wanted to have this portion of the memo before you 
as soon as possible in case you would like further research on 
the basic issue.) 
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May 15, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
Last night, I spent a little time reading the pool memos 
for the cases held for Batson. My reading of the memos con-
vinces me that, at a minimum, the Court should direct parties in 
one or more of these cases to brief the issue of retroactivity. 
As I mentioned to you yesterday, it appears that virtually all of 
the petrs in these cases are making a Sixth Amendment argument 
Yk-
~ n t relied on Batson. My understanding is that when the 
ourt disposes of a case by summary disposition, ordinarily the 
_- ~~~ petition and response discuss the issue that the Court is resolv-
~ ing. Here, none of the petitions (with the exception of Prejean 
v. Blackburn, No. 85-5609, in which a supplemental petition dis-
cussing retroactivity has been filed) addresses retroactivity. 
Under those circumstances, summary disposition without further 
briefing does not seem desirable. (I make this point only be-
cause I suspect that the Chief Justice, from remarks made by his 




term.) In many respects, Prejean would be an ideal vehicle, 
since it is a capital case here on habeas and since the Debevoise 
firm is representing the petr who seeks retroactive application 
of Batson. But as I mentioned, Prejean raises an issue similar 
to that in McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-6811, which the Court may be 
inclined to Grant. (In my prior memo on this problem, I errone-
ously stated that McCleskey is being held for Lockhart v. McCree, 
No. 84-1865. Instead, 
/ 
it is being held for Rose v. Clark, No. 
84-1974). 
The Clerk provided us of a list of cases being Held for 
Batson; the list contains 18 cases, and there are 2 more cases 
that were Held for Lockhart that also raise Batson claims. In 
addition, I am sure that since the Clerk prepared the list, more 
petitions with Batson claims have been filed; I'm not certain how 
many. Of the 20 on the list, 4 are here on habeas. Of those 4, 
two are not appropriate vehicles for resolving the retroactivity 
issue because they were cases in which the CAs granted the habeas 
petitioner relief on Sixth Amendment grounds. One other is not 
appropriate because the petr is not raising a straight Batson 
claim, but rather is arguing ineffective assistance by reason of 
his lawyer's failure to object to exclusion of blacks through 
peremptory challenges. The fourth case here on habeas is Prejean 
v. Blackburn, discussed above. The remaining 16 cases on the 
list are here on direct appeal. 
s-/z. z, /?f:; 







May 22, 1986 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Anne 
Re: Cases held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
At the May 15, 1986, Conference, three cases for held for 
Batson. All three were here on direct appeal. (Nos. 85-6350, 
85-6552, 85-6678). I note that one of these, No. 85-6678, is 
NJOT. I went through the books for today' s Conference, and it 
appears that no cases will be held for Batson this week. 
;~5'-~~ 
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CHAMBE FIS OF" 
..JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, ..JR . 
.ittpt'tmt Qlltltrl of t!yt ~tb jtws 
._asfringhm. ~. <q. 21lbi)1~ 
May 27, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
No. 85-5823, Welch v. Rice - --
In 1979 petr was convicted for armed robbery. Following 
direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, petr sought fed-
eral habeas review in the DC for the ED Va., arguing, among 
other claims, that his lawyer was ineffective for failing to 
make certain objections at trial. Before considering petr's 
allegations, the DC observed that the pertinent standard was 
set out in Strickland v. Washington. First, petr, who is 
black, alleged that his lawyer was ineffective for failing 
to object to the seating of an all-white jury. Citing Swain 
v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965), the DC rejected this con-
tention on the ground that any objection by counsel would 
have been meritless. Second, petr argued that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to admission of evidence 
of petr's bad character. The DC noted that the evidence was 
elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination of the ar-
resting officer, and concluded that counsel's action fell 
"within the range of 'normal competency.'" Finally, the DC 
rejected petr's assertion that counsel was ineffective for 
f a i ling to object to the fact that a juror was acquainted 
wi th the complaining witness. The juror stated at trial 
that, although she knew the witness, she could remain impar-
tial. Under these circumstances, petr had failed to carry 
his "burden of proving partiality." Citing Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 u.s. 717 (1975). ~ --
CA4 denied a certificate of probable cause and dismissed 
the appeal. 
Appearing in this Court pro se, petr repeats the argu-
ments described above. I will vote to deny in view of the 
Conference's decision that Batson will not be applied to 
cases pending on habeas. Moreover, petr's ineffective as-
s i stance claim is weak in light of counsel's apparent and 
u nderstandable reliance on Swain. Petr's remaining conten-




JUSTICE LEWI S F. POWELL, JR. 
,iuprttttt <Jfo-nrl of tltt ~t~ jhdts 
._asftingtcn. ~. (!}. 2llc?Jl.~ 
May 28, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
No. 84-1426! Abrams v. McCray 
Resp, who is black, was convicted on robbery charges, 
after a trial at which the prosecutor used peremptory chal-
lenges to remove seven blacks and one Hispanic from the 
petit jury. Resp's conviction was affirmed on direct ap-
peal, and the state courts denied habeas relief. He then 
filed the habeas petition underlying this cert. petition in 
the DC for the ED of NY. The DC held that the prosecutor's 
use of peremptory challenges violated both the Sixth Amend-
ment and the Equal Protection Clause. 
On appeal, CA2 first considered the decision in Swain v. 
Alabama. Although urged to hold that Swain was no longer 
good law, CA2 observed that it was constrained to follow 
Swain, and accordingly declined to rest its decision on the 
Equal Protection Clause. CA2 concluded, however, that Swain 
did not set the standard for the Sixth Amendment. After 
adopting an evidentiary standard based on the Sixth Amend-
ment similar to that approved under the Equal Protection 
Clause in Batson, CA2 remanded to the DC for a hearing at 
which the State was entitled to come forward with evidence 
rebutting resp's prima facie case. 
The State filed a petition for cert. _jn which it argues 
that {1) racial challenges also violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, whether made by the prosecutor or defense counsel: 
(2) resp did not establish prima facie that the prosecutor's 
challenges were based on race: and {3) CA2 erred in placing 
the burden of proof on the State to prove the absence of 
discrimination. 
In view of the Conference decision that Batson is not to 
be applied retroactively on habeas review, my vote is to 
deny. The evidentiary standard adopted here comports with 
Batson, though CA2 relied on the Sixth Amendment. 
t.t-.(1~ 
L.F.P., Jr. 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.ittpTttttt (ijltltri of tltt 1hrittb Jtatts 
._aslfington. ~· <!}. 21lbi~~ 
May 28, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
No. 85-5609, Prejean v. Blackburn 
Petr was convicted for murder and sentenced to death. 
His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, 
and the state courts denied habeas relief. Petr filed a 
federal habeas petition, which the DC ultimately denied 
without holding an evidentiary hearing. CA5 affirmed. 
In his cert. petition, petr raises six claims, including 
a Batson claim and a Lockhart v. McCree claim. Petr also 
argues that the Louisiana death penalty is administered in a 
racially discriminatory fashion and that he was improperly 
denied an evidentiary hearing on this issue. Petr has filed 
a supplemental petition in which he argues that Batson 
should be applied retroactively on habeas review. In this 
connection, he urges that capital cases present special con-
cerns under the Court's discussion in Turner v. Murray, No. 
84-6646, concerning the danger of racial bias infecting a 
capital jury's sentencing discretion. 
Petr's Lockhart claim lacks merit in light of the 
Court's decision in that case. Similarly, the Conference 
has decided to reject petr's argument that Batson should 
apply retroactively on habeas. I will vote to continue to 
hold this case, however, pending disposition of the cert. 
petition in McCleskey v. Kemp, No. 84-68l~· Petr's chal-
lenge to the Louisiana capital punishment system is similar 
to the challenge raised in McCleskey to the Georgia scheme. 
While petr's statistical evidence appears substantially 
weaker than that presented in McCleskey, and the claim is 
state-specific, I believe that we should consider the peti-
tions together. If we decide to grant in McCleskey, we then 
will have the opportunity to decide how to handle this peti-
tion and similar challenges raised by capital defendants in 
other states pending resolution of McCleskey. 
My vote is to hold pending disposition of McCleskey v. 
Kemp, No. 84-6811. 
L .1-. (! 11r--
L.F.P., Jr. 
, 
May 28, 986 
84-6263 Batson v. KentuckY 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
It was decided at our Conference on May 2 , that we 
would grant one or two cases that are here on direct appeal, 
lim'ted to the question hether Batson should apply retroac-
tively in those cases, and set them for argument at the top 
of our October docket. At our last Conference w a so vot-
ed not to apply Batson to cases here on habeas corpus. 
1 suggest that we grant one or both of the 
following cases: 
85-5221, Griffith v. Kentucky (cert. to the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky). This case involves the same prosecutor 
a Batson~ he truck four of f've black veniremen. Defense 
counsel objected, and the record reflects the prosecutor's 
reasons for striking some of the blacks. 
85-5731, Brown v. united States (cert. to CAlO). 
In this case, the prosecutor struck the only two black ven -
remen, and made some remarks concerning his desire to have 
as few black jurors as possible because the defendant, who 
is black, was represented by a rominent black attorney. 
There was a time y ob'ection by defense counsel. 
If we select only one case, 1 suggest that it be 
the federal case as we will have the Solicitor General rep-
resenting the United States. The Batson issue is clearly 
presented in the cert. petitions in both cases. 
1 have requested the Clerk to put these two cases 
at the end of our discuss list in a special category. ln 
addition, 1 have circulate hold memos in four habeas corpus 
cases. In view of our vote with respect to habeas cases, 1 
recommend deny in three of the cases, and that we hold or 
relist 85-5609, Prejean v. Blackburn until we dispose of 84-
6811, McCleskey v. Kemp - a case that presents a challenge 
to capital punishment based on statistical evidence that it 
' 
2. 
impacts unfairly on blacks. Incidentally, in two of these 
AholdsA, the state- rather than the defendant- is the pe-
titioner. 
* * * 
1 raise the question whether we shou d take any 
action on the holds for Batson until we announce the grant-
ing, and setting for argument, of one or two cases that are 
pending on direct appeal. When that announcement is made, 
we can then dispose of the habeas cases being held. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
~ltJTttlttt Qtourl of tltt ~th jtatte-
.as~ton. ~. Qt. 21lc?~~ 
CHAM BER S Of' 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR. 
ss 
May 28, 1986 
84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In our grant of cert. on one or more of the pending 
cases, I suggest the grant be limited to the following 
question: 
In cases pending on direct appeal,~should the 
holding in Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263, 
be given retroactive effect? 
L.F.P., Jr. 
) 
May 28, 1986 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. entucky 
Dear Joe, 
Please place on the List for tomorrow's Con erence No. 
85-5221, Griffith v. Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Bro n v. 
United States. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
Mr. Joe Spaniol 
• 
#84-6263 Batson v. Kentucky (Bill) 
LFP for the Court 12/13/84 
1st draft 1/22/86 
2nd draft 1/24/86 
3rd draft 3/3/86 
4th draft 4/21/86 
Joined by JPS 1/23/86 
WJB 1/24/86 




BRW may join but may write separately 1/31/86 
TM concurring in part 
1st draft 2/18/86 
2nd draft 3/4/86 
3rd draft 3/18/86 
4th draft 4/7/86 
5th draft 4/17/86 
6th draft 4/28/86 
BRW concurring 
1st draft 3/7/86 
WHR dissenting 
1st draft 2/28/86 
2nd draft 3/7/86 
3rd draft 4/15/86 
4th draft 4/28/86 
Joined by CJ 4/24/86 
CJ dissenting 
1st draft 4/16/86 
2nd draft 4/25/86 
Joined by WHR 4/16/86 
JPS concurring 
1st draft 4/17/86 
2nd draft 4/18/86 
3rd draft 4/25/86 
Joined by WJB 4/17/86 
SOC concurring 
1st draft 4/17/86 
WHR will dissent 1/23/86 
CJ awaiting dissent 1/23/86 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F POWELL, .JR . 
.i~tntt Qlourt of tift ~tb Jta±ts 
._asltingtcn, ~. Of. 2D~~~ 
June 11, 1986 
Batson Retroactivity 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I enclose a draft of a proposed Per Curiam in Allen 
v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, a habeas case pending here on cert to 
CA7. Both the District Court and CA7 rejected Allen's con-
tention that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges violated Swain and the Sixth Amendment. In the pend-
ing petition for cert, Allen may fairly be viewed as arguing 
that Batson should be applied retroactively on habeas. 
On May 29, 1986, the Conference thought that the 
Court should use Abrams v. McCray, 84-1426, as the case for 
deciding whether Batson should be applied retroactively on 
collateral review of convictions that became final before 
Batson was announced. In McCray, CA2 - applying Sixth 
Amendment analysis - concluded that Swain was not a binding 
precedent because it was decided on equal protection 
grounds. On reflection, I concluded that the retroactivity 
issue should not be resolved in McCray, primarily because 
McCray adopted a Sixth Amendment standard that the Court has 
not yet considered. It would be difficult to write a deci-
sion holding that Batson did not apply retroactively in the 
context of a case that applied a different constitutional 
rule, without also saying something about the merits of that 
rule. 
If the Court approves a Per Curiam along the lines 
of my draft, we then could dispose of McCray - and also 
Michigan v. Booker, 84-1028 (a CA6 case similar to McCray) -
by a GVR in light of both Batson and Allen v. Hardy. That 
disposition would inform CA2 and CA6 that they should recon-
sider their Sixth Amendment analysis in light of Batson, and 
that they should not apply the new standard - whether under 
the Equal Protection Clause or the Sixth Amendment - to 
final convictions. 
I should note that we called for a response in Al-
len v. Hardy on May 16, 1986. As the time for a response 
does not expire until June 16, we should not act on these 
cases until the June 19 Conference. It is unlikely that 
anything in the response will require a change in the en-
closed draft. 





June 11, 1986 
Batson Retroactivity 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
1 enclose a draft of a proposed Per Curiam in Allen 
v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, a habeas case pending here on cert to 
CA7. Both the District Court and CA7 rejected Allen's con-
tention that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges violated Swain and the Sixth Amendment. In the pend-
ing petition for cert, Allen may fairly be viewed as arguing 
that Batson should be applied retroactively on habeas. 
On May 29, 1986, the Conference thouqht that the 
Court should use Abrams v. McCray, 84-1426, as the case for 
deciding whether Batson should be applied retroactively on 
collateral review of convictions th t became final before 
Batson was announced. ln McCray, CA2 - applying Sixth 
Amendment analysis - concluded that Swain was not a binding 
precedent because it was decided on equal protection 
grounds. On reflection, 1 concluded that the retroactivity 
issue should not be resolved in McCray, primarily because 
McCray adopted a Sixth Amendment standard that the Court has 
not yet considered. It would be difficult to write a deci-
sion holding that Batson did not apply retroactively in the 
context of a case that applied a different constitutional 
rule, without also saying something about the merits of that 
rule. 
If the Court approves a Per Curiam along the lines 
of my draft, we then could dispose of McCray - and also 
Michigan v. Booker, 84-1028 (a CA6 case similar to McCray) -
by a GVR in light of both Batson and Allen v. Hardy. That 
disposition would inform CA2 and CA6 that they should recon-
sider their Sixth Amendment analysis in light of Batson, and 
that they should not apply the new standard - whether under 
the Equal Protection Clause or the Sixth Amendment - to 
final convictions. 
1 should note that we called for a response in Al-
len v. Hardy on May 16, 1986. As the time for a response 
' 
does not expire until June 16, we should not act on these 
cases until the June 19 Conference. It is unlikely that 
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543 
Ann Marie Coughlin 
Joe Spaniol 
June 11,1986 
A list of the Batson "holds" is attached. 




JUSTICE LEWIS F POWELL , JR. 
/l c.~ 
June 18, 1986 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Thinking it might be helpful, I summarize the status 
of the cases held for Batson: 
V' 
(1) There are 21 cert. petitions held for Batson. ~ 
One of these, No. 85-5609, Prejean v. BlackDurn, a case here / . A 
on federal habeas, has been relisted with No. 84-6811, ~~
McCleskey v. Kemp (the case involving the Baldus study). ~Ju(~ 
The Batson claim raised by the petr in Prejean ultimately {~~ 
will be rejected on the ground that Batson does not apply ~~) 
retroactively on habeas review. 
(2) Of the remaining 20 petitions, I have circulated q ~ 
hold memos in 9 of the cases pending on dif e~ r .. ev_iew. ~~~ 
These 9 cases are on the discuss list for tomorrow's Confer- - c~ 
ence. In those cases in which the Batson claim was properly  
preserved, I recommend a hold for No. 85-5221, Griffith v. ~ ~t 
Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States, in which 
we will decide whether Batson should apply retroactively to ~ 
cases pending on direct appeal. Where the claim was not ~ 
preserved, I recommend we deny. ~; /~ 
~~-1-u,..v 
(3) Eleven cases held for Batson, plus No. 85-6593, c~ 
Allen v. Hardy (my per curiam rejecting retroactive applica-~ 
tion of Batson on habeas) , have been relisted for next ~~~ 
week's Conference. I will be circulating hold memos for 
those eleven cases. Three of the cases are here on federal 
habeas, and will be disposed of in light of my per cur1am 
opiTHon. There are six votes for the per curiam. Justice / J11 !A-
Marshall will circula~e a dis7ent. Se~en of the remaining ~L~.~ 
eleven cases are pend1ng on d1rect rev1ew. The hold memos ---, 
for these cases will be drafted along the lines described in 
point (2) above. The eleventh case appears to be here on 
state habeas. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 18, 1986 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
MEMORANDUM TO TRE CONFERENCE: 
Thinking it might be elpful, I summarize the status 
of the cases held for Batson: 
(1) There are 21 cert. petitions held fo~ Batson. 
One of these, No. 85-5609, Prejean v. Blackburn, a case here 
on federal habeas, has been relisted with No. 84-6811, 
McCleskey v. Kemp (the case involving the Baldus study). 
The Batson claim raised by the petr in Prejean ultimately 
will be rejected on the ground that Batson does not apply 
retroactively on habeas review. 
(2} Of the remaining 20 petitions, 1 have circulated 
hold memos in 9 of the cases pending on direct review. 
These 9 cases are on the discuss list for tomorrow's Confer-
ence. In those cases in which the Batson claim was properly 
preserved, 1 recommend a hold for o. 85-5221, Griffith v. 
Kentucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States, in which 
we will decide whether Batson should apply retroactively to 
cases pending on direct appeal. Where the claim was not 
preserved, 1 recommend we deny. 
(3) Eleven cases held for Batson, plus No. 85-6593, 
Allen v. Hardy (my per curiam rejecting retroactive applica-
tion of Batson on habeas), have been relisted for next 
week's Conference. 1 will be circulating hold memos for 
those eleven cases. Three of the cases are here on federal 
habeas, and will be disposed of in light of my per curiam 
opinion. There are six votes for the per curiam. Justice 
Marshall will circulate a dissent. Seven of the remaining 
eleven cases are pending on direct review. The hold memos 
for these cases will be drafted along the lines described in 
point (2) above. The eleventh case appears to be here on 
state habeas. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 8, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 85-6552, Jackson v. Ohio (cert. to Ohio Sup. Ct .) 
During jury se ection at petr ' s tria for rape , the 
prosecutor exercised two o is four peremptory cha enges 
against blac~s. Petr, who is black, timely objecte on the 
ground t~at the prosecutor's action violated petr's right to 
be tried by a jury o is peers , an move for a continuance 
so that ~d tic al b ack veniremen could be ca ed . T e TC 
denied the motion, and petr was convicted . 
On appea , Ohio App. Ct . affirmed . The court rejected 
numerous contentions raised by petr, including an argument 
concerning the 5t te ' s exercise of peremptory challenges. 
The court faun the rat ' onale of Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s . 
202 <1965), to be nispositive. Oh ' o Sup. t. denie eave 
to appea • 
In his cert. petition, among four ot er c aims , petr 
argues that the State's use of peremptory challenges violat-
ed his rights under the S xth Amendment and the EQual Pro-
tection Clause . In response to that argument , the State 
relies upon the analysis of S~ain an contends that the 
record oes not support petr ' s claim that the prosecutor 
used his cha lenges on racial groun s . 
Since Ohio App . Ct. reste its decision on the merits, 
not on any alleged inadequacy in the record, I will vote to 
hold th's pet tion for the cases in which we will decide 
whether Batson should be applied retroactively to cases 
pending on direct review . 
My vote is to hold for No . 85-5221, Griffith v. Kentucky 
and No . 85-5 731 , Brown v. United States. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 18, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Ca~es Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 85-6350, Po borny v. Ohio (cert. to Ohio Ct. App.) 
Petr, a white woman, was tried along with two co-
defendants, black men, on criminal charges. During jury 
selection, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the 
ground that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory chal-
lenges against three blacks. The prosecutor explained that 
he had "not only excused black people from serving on the 
jury, but had also excused white people." Ohio Ct. App. af-
firmed petr's conviction, rejecting her contention that the 
State's use of peremptory challenges violated her constitu-
tional rights. In the court's view, the facts did not give 
rise to a prima facie case of discrimination, and the prose-
cutor's response "was a very pertinent argument against any 
alleged practice of d scrimination. 
In her cert. petition, petr asserts the Batson claim. 
The State claims that petr did not properly present her ob-
jection to the TC and that the record does not disclose the 
race of the excluded jurors. 
Ohio Ct. App. did not rest its decision on a procedural 
default. The only precedent cited by the court was Akins v. 
Texas, 325 u.s. 398 (1945), which involved alleged discrimi-
nation in selection of the venire. While cases invo ving 
the venire are not irrelevant in this context, it is not 
clear that the court below rejected petr's claim under the 
appropriate legal standard. Therefore, my vote is to hold 
the petition for the cases in which we will decide whether 
Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pending on 
direct appeal. In the event that Batson is so applied, the 
state courts can consider whether petr has standing to raise 
the claim and whether the claim is procedurally barred. 
My vote is to hold for No. 85-5221, Griffith v. ~­
tucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 18 , 986 
ME ORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re : Cases Held for Batson v . Kentucky, No . 84 - 6263 
No . 85-6315, Williams v. l lJinois (cert . to 111 . App . Ct . ) 
Petr was conv ' cted for felony murder . 111 . App . Ct . 
affirmed, rejecting petr ' s contention that the State violat-
ed is right to a representative jury when it used peremp-
tory challenges to strike three black veniremen . The court 
rejecte the c a·m un er state case a\ precedent adhering 
to the evioentiary standard of Swain v . A ba~a, 380 u.s. 
202 (1965). 
In his cert . petition, petr reoeats his contention con-
cerning the Sta e·~ exerc:se of peremptory challenges and 
alec rai~es Confrontati0n Clause claim . Responning to the 
Batson c ai , the State notes t ,1t oetr • s nnalysis s incon-
sistent with S a'n . 
Since this ca e was pen ing on direct review when Batson 
a announce , 1 wi 1 vote to hol the petition for the 
cases in which we w'll decide whether Batson shoulo e ap-
plied retroactively on d rect appe~l . 
vote is to hold for No . 85-5221 , GriffitP v . Ken-
tucky, and No . 85-573] , Brown v . Uni t ed Stat es . 
L. F . P.,J r . 
June 18, 1986 
MEMORANDU TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v . Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 85-6253, Foro v . Georqia {cert . to Ga . Sup. Ct . ) 
Petr was convicte for mur er and sentenced to death . 
Ga . Sup. Ct. affirmed , rejecting, among numerous conten-
tions, petr's argument that the prosecutor ' s use of peremp-
tory chal enges to exclude black veniremen vio ated his 
right to a representative jury . The court rejected the 
claim because petr had shown only that a large percentage of 
black veniremen were struck in his case: he had offered no 
evidence of systematic exclusion of jurors in the jurisdic-
tion. 
ln his cert . petition , in addition to raising a claim 
premised on Lockhart v . HcCree , No . 84-1865 , and a prosecu-
torial misconduct claim , petr requests the Court to hold 
this case pending recision in No . 84-6263 , Batson v. Ken-
tucky . The State respond by arguing that Ga . Sup . Ct . 
properly rejected the Batson claim , and points out that the 
case is factually distinquishable from Batson because one 
black citizen served on the jury . 
I wi 1 vote to hold this petition for the cases in which 
we will decide whether Batson should be applied retroactive-
ly to cases pen ing on direct appeal. If we conclude that 
Batson is to be given retroactive effect , t e question 
whether the facts of this case give rise to an inference of 
discriminatory intent will be for the state courts to decide 
on remand . 
My vote is to hold for No . 85- 5221 , Griffith v . Ken-
tucky, and No . 85-5731 , Brown v . United States . 
L.F.P.,J r . 
June 18, 986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re : Cases Held for Batson v . Kentucky , No . 84-6263 
No . 85-5940 , Holme s v . I ll i nois (cert . to 111 . App . Ct .) 
In his cert . petition , petr raises the claim raised by 
t e petr in No . 84-6263 , Batson v . Kentuc~y . The State re-
sponds by arguing that the trial record is "un eveloped , " in 
that it does not reveal the number of black veniremen , the 
number of b acks exc u ed ~y the prosecutor ' s use of peremp-
tory chal enge~, or t e "raci · aent•ty" of those excluded . 
Citing to the record , petr contends that he objected to 
the prosecutor's exercise of. cha lenges against blacks . 
Moreover, Ill. App . Ct . di not re y on t e ina equacy of 
the recor in rPjectinq the c1aiw . Therefore, I will vote 
to hold this petition for the cases in which we will eci e 
whet ~r Batson should e applle retroactively to cases 
pending on 0irect a~pea1 . In the event that we conclude 
that our holding should be given retroactive effect, the 
state courts an cons · er on remand whether petr failed to 
make a record supporting his leqal claim . 
My vote is to hold for No . 85- 5221 , Griffith v. Ken-
tucky , and No . 85-5731 , Brown v . Uni t ed States . 
L. F. P. , Jr . 
June 18, 986 
MEMORANDUM TO TRE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Reld for Batson v . Kentucky , No . 84-6263 
No. 85-5190, Nurse v. Illinois (cert. to 111. App. Ct.) 
Petrs, who are black, claim that the State's use of pe-
remptory challenges exclude nine black veniremen violated 
petrs' rights to equal protection, and to an impartial jury 
drawn from a cross-section of the community. ln response, 
th St te suggests that petrs may not have properly pre-
s rve~ t e'r equal Protection argument because their motion 
for a new trial mere y alleged a enial of equal protection 
without supplying any facts to support the claim. 
Since 111. Apo. Ct. re'ecten the c aim on the merits, 
without any mention of a procedural bar, 1 ~'ill vote to hold 
this petition for the cases in whic. we will decide whether 
Batson shoul be applied retroactively to cases pending on 
direct review. 
y vote is to hold for No. 85-5221, Griff'th v. Ken-
tucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 18, 1986 
M£MORANDU TO THE CONFERE CE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 84-6732, Orji v. United States (cert. to CAS) 
Petr, a back an, as convicted on narcotics charges. 
The overn ent used its peremptory c1allenges to strike the 
s·x b ack ersons inc uae1 on the venire. After the jury 
was s orn, petr's lawyer state~ that he had a motion to make 
outside the :ury•s oresence. The judge excused the jury, 
ana, w thout exola ning the ~elief sought, counsel stated 
that he ~id not •understand the striking of every single 
black juror." 
On aopeal, petr claimed that the Government's exercise 
of peremptory cha lenges vtolat~d his rights 11n~er the Equal 
P otection Clause and the Sixth rnendment. CAS "put aside 
the sufficiency of the obiection beforP the trial court and 
~hether it was timely." T e court t en rejecte~ the claim 
on the mer ts because petr had not s tisfien the evtoentiary 
bur en imposed by Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (196S). 
In his cert. petition, petr rques that the Sixth Amend-
ment forbids prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges 
sole y on the basis of race, and that we should prohibit 
such ch lenges under our supervisory power. In response, 
the SG points out that there is a "question as to whether 
[petr} adequately and timely preserved an objection to the 
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges." 
Since CAS did not in fact rest its decision on a proce-
dural default, I will vote to hold this petition for the 
cases ·n which we will decide whether Batson should be ap-
plied retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal. In 
the event that we decide that Batson is to be g ven ret~oac­
tive effect, CAS can consider the issue of procedural de-
fault on remand. 
My vote is to hold for No. 85-S221, Griffith v. Ken-
tucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States, No. 85-5731. 
L.F.P.,Jr. 
June 18 , 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re : Cases Held for Batson v . Kent ucky , No . 84-6263 
No. 84- 6698, Carter v. Uni t ed States (cert . to CA3) 
Petr, who is black , was conv icted for bank robbery . 
During jury se ect'on, petr objected to the prosecutor ' s 
exercise o a peremptory challenge to remove the only black 
veniremen . The DC overruled the objection . 
On appeal, oetr primari y arque that the Government 
vio ated Fed. R. Crim. P. 12. by fa' ' ng to give him notice 
of ts alibi rebutta_ witnesses and that the DC erre . in 
refusing to suppress the testimony of those witnesses. 
Though agreeinq that the prosecutor should have qiven oetr 
not ' ce, CA3 conclu ed that the DC did not abuse its discre-
t'on in declining to suppress the evidence . After rejecting 
other cla'ms, CA3 affirmed. 
The third question pre~ented in the cert. petition is a 
Batson claim. CA3's dec'sion ists the claims raised by 
petr on appeal, but does not mention a Batson claim. The SG 
states that petr did not press a Batson claim in CA3, and 
petr does not a1lege that he in so. Since 1 conc _ude that 
petr failed to raise the cla'm below , 1 wil vote to deny on 
this claim . 
The first and second questions challenge CA3 ' s disposi-
tion of the Government's Rule 2 . 1 violation . These ques-
tions are not certworthy. F ' rst, contrary to petr ' s asser-
tion, th's case does not conflict with United States v . ~­
ers, 550 F.2d 1036 (CAS 977). Second , there is no merit to 
petr's contention that the DC ' s application of Rule 12 . 1 
violates Wardius v. Oregon, 412 u. s . 470 (1973 ). Unlike the 
statute in ~ardius , Rule 12 . 1 requires reciprocal d'scovery 
rights, and petr ' s allegation that he was denied due process 
is unconvincing in v iew of CA3 ' s conc lusion that he had ac-
tual knowledge of the identi t ies of the rebuttal witnesses . 
My vote is to deny . 
L. F.P., Jr. 
June 18, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 84-6633, Williams v. Texas (cert. to Tx. Ct. Crim. App.) 
Petr, a black man, was convicted for murdering a white 
po ice officer, and sentenced to death. Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 
rejected on the merits petr•s argument that the State vio-
lated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment by 
using peremptory challenges to strike al five blacks on the 
venire. In his cert. petition, petr repeats, among other 
claims, his argument concerning the State's exercise of its 
chal enges. 
Since this case was pending on direct appeal when our 
opinion in Batson was announced, 1 will vote to hold the 
petition for the cases in which we will decide whether 
Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pending on 
direct review. 
My vote is to hold for No. 85-522 , Griffith v. Ken-
tucky, and No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
Jun 26, 986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 85-6678, alker v. Oh'o (cert. to Oh. Sup. Ct.) 
After his first trial ended in a hung jury and his sec-
ond conviction was vacated on fe eral habeas, petr's third 
trial resulted 'n a conviction for murder. On appeal, petr 
argued that the prosecutor improperly exercised a peremptory 
challenge on racial grounds, striking the only black on the 
jury panel. Ohio Ct. App. rejected this claim because "a 
peremptory chal enge 1oes not require a reason." Petr also 
c aimed that the evidence of his guilt was insufficient to 
support the jury's verdict. Observing that the record pre-
sented a "mass of conf icting testimony," the court held 
that there waq "sufficient competent evidence" to support 
the verdict. Oh. Sup. Ct. denied leave to appeal. 
Petr filed a petition for cert., which is NJOT. Be con-
tends that the evidence was insuf icient under the standard 
of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 u.s. 307 (1979). He also claims 
that the prosecu or c allenged the only black venireman be-
cause he was black and that this action eprived him of his 
right to an impartial jury selected from a cross-section of 
the community. The State argues that there was ample evi-
dence to support petr's conviction and that petr di not 
estab ish systematic exc usion of black 'urors. The State 
also contends that the record does not support petr's asser-
tions that the prosecutor's chal enge was racially motivated 
or that there was only one black on the venire. 
1 will vote to hold this petition for the cases in which 
we wi 1 decide whether Batson will be applied retroactively 
on direct appeal. lf Batson is so applied, the state court 
should decide in the first instance whether this record 
gives rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination. 
My vote is to hold for No. 85-5221, Griffith v. Ken-
tucky, nd No. 85-5731, Brown v. United States. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 24, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
No. 85-1028, Michigan v. Booker 
Resp, a black man, was convicted for armed robbery, and 
his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then 
sought fe eral habeas corpus relief, arguing that the jury 
selection process at his trial was so infected with racism 
as to violate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
record shows that the prosecutor used h's peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude twenty-two black veniremen, while defense 
counsel excused thirty-seven white veniremen. The DC denied 
relief, and CA6 reversed. 
CA6 concluded that the Sixth Amendment prohibits parties 
in a criminal case from using peremptory challenges to ex-
clude black persons from the petit jury. CA6 observed that 
Swain v. Alabama foreclosed the Equal Protection claim 
raised by resp. But for the decision in Swain, CA6 stated 
that it would find that resp was denied equal protection by 
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges. CA6 then 
~ent on to adopt an evidentiary stan ard under the Sixth 
Amendment simi ar to that approved in Batson under the Equal 
Protection C ause, holding its new standard applicable to 
both prosecutors and defense counsel. CA6 remanded, order-
ing the DC to grant the writ unless the State promptly re-
tries resp. The State filed a petition for cert. 
My vote is to GVR in light of Batson v. Kentucky, No. 
84-6263, to afford CA6 the opportunity to reconsider its 
Sixth Amendment analysis, and in 'ght of A len v. Hardy, 
No. 85-6593, to inform CA6 not to apply its new rule retro-
actively on habeas. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 24, 986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
No. 84- 426, Abrams v. McCray 
Resp, who is black, was convicted for robbery, after a 
trial at w ich the prosecutor used peremptory cha en es 
against seven b acks nd one Htspanic. Resp•~ conviction 
tas affirmed on d'rect appea , and the state courts den ed 
habeas relief. He then f' ed th habeas petition underlying 
this c rt. etition in the DC for t e ED of NY. Th~ DC held 
that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenqes v'olated 
both the Sixth Amendment nd the Equal Protect'on Clause. 
On appeal, CA2 observed that it was onstrained to fol-
low the decjsion in w~in v. Alabam , and accordinqlv de-
c ined to rest its decision on the Bqual Protect on Clause. 
CA2 conclu e , however, that s~ain d'd not set the standar 
for the Sixth Amendm nt. After adopting an ev dentiary 
standar based on the Sixth Amendment sim lar to that ap-
proved un er the Equal Protection Clause in Batson, CA2 re-
man ed to the DC for hearing at w ich the State w s enti-
tle to com orwar with evidence re utting resp's p rna 
facie case. 
The State has filed a petition for cert. in which it 
argues that (1) racial challenges a so violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, whether made by the prosecutor or defense 
counsel: (2) resp did not establish prima acie that the 
prosecutor's chal enges were based on race: and (3) CA2 
erred in p acing the burden of proof on the State to prove 
the absence of discrim'nation. 
y vot is to GVR in ight of Batson v. ~entucky, o. 
84-6263, to afford CA2 the opoortunity to reconsider ts 
Sixth Amendment nalys·s, and in light of Allen v. Hardy, 
o. 85-6593, to inform CA2 not to apply its new rule retro-
actively on habeas. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 24, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for No. 84-6263, Batson v. Kentucky 
No. 85-5823, Welch v. Rice 
In 1979 petr as convicted for armed robbery. Following 
direct revie an state habeas proceedings, petr. sought ha-
beas relief in federal DC, asserting, among other c .aims, 
that his lawyer wa ineffective for f iling to make certain 
objections at tri Before consider'ng Petr's allegations, 
the DC observed that the pertin ~t standard was et out ·n 
Str'cklan~ v. shington. First, petr, who is b ck, al-
lege that his awyer as ineffective for f il'ng to obiect 
to the seating of an l-\h'te jury. C ttng Swa·n v. A a-
bama, the DC rejected thi contention on the ground that any 
o jection by counsel would have been meritles~. Second, 
petr argued that counse wa ineffective for f ling to ob-
ject to admission of evi ence of petr's bad character. The 
DC noted th t the ev'd nee was e ic'ted by defense counsel 
on cross-examination o the arresting officer, and concluded 
that counsel's action fell "within the range of 'normal com-
petency.•ft Fin lly, the DC re'ect petr's assertion that 
counsel was ineffective for fu ing to object to the fact 
that a juror wa acquainted with the complaining witness. 
The juror stated at trial that, although she knew the it-
ness, she coul remain impartial. Under these circum-
stances, petr had failed to carry his "burden of proving 
partiality." Citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 u.s. 717 (1975). CA4 
denied a certificate of probable cause and dismissed the 
appeal. 
Appearing here pro se, petr repeats the arguments de-
scribed above. 1 will vote to deny in view of. our decision 
in Allen v. Hardy, No. 85-6593, that Batson wil not be ap-
plied retroactively to cases pending on habeas. Petr's in-
effective assistance claim is weak since counsel apparently 
and understan ably relied on Swain, and his remaining con-
tentions are not certworthy. 
My vote is to deny. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 24, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, o. 84-6263 
No. 84-6504, ~ack v. Illinois (cert. to Ill. Sup. Ct.) 
Following a bench tr'al, oetr, a b ack man, was con-
victed for murder. During selection of the 'ury for the 
penalty hearing, the prosecutor exercise1 2 Peremptory 
challenges against blacks, with the result that only one 
black juror was seated. The jury fixed punishment at death. 
Ill. Sup. Ct. affirmed, rejecting, among other claims, 
petr's contention that he ~as den e due Process b the 
State's use of eremptory chal enges. The court reaqoned 
that a defendant does not make out a constitutional viola-
tion by proving that th~ State exercised Peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude b acks from his jurv. R~th , the defend-
ant had the burden of proving system c exclusion, burden 
that etr ha not carried in th's case. 
In his cert. petition, petr raises two clai s, one of 
which argues that s S'xth menom nt riqhts wer violated 
by the State's use o~ per mptory ch 1 enges. Respon ing to 
that c aim, the State urges t e rotrt tore ffir Swain v. 
Alabama and contends that th record i t is cas reflects 
neutral reasons supporti g t e prosecu or's challenges. 
111. Sup. Ct. rejected m un er the Swain 
standard, not n the groun r sons suooorte . 
the prosecutor's challenges. Therefore, 1 will vote to hold 
this petition for the cases in ~hich we will 1 cide whether 
Batson should be applied retroactively to cases pending on 
direct apoea • If Batso is so ?pplied, the state courts 
should decide whether petr has est lis ed a prima f cie 
case of discrimination and, if so, whether the prosecutor's 
explanations rebut that case. 
My vote is to hold for Griffith v. Kentucky, No. 85-
5221, and Brown v. United States, o. 85-5731. 
L.F.P., Jr • 
• 
June 24, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO TBE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 84-6536, White v. Alabama (cert. to Ala. Crim. App.) 
Petr was convicted for robbery. During jury selection, 
petr objected to the prosecutor's exercise of six peremptory 
challenges against blacks. The TC overruled the objection. 
On direct appeal, Ala. Crim. App. rejected petr•s claim 
that he was denied a "fair trial" because t e State use 
peremptory chal enges to exclude black veniremen. The 
court held that petr ha not satisfied his burden of proving 
"systematic exclusion." The court cited Carpenter v. State, 
404 So.2d 89 (Ala. cr·m. App. 1980), which in turn cited 
Thigpen v. State, 270 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1972), which relied on 
the standard of Swain v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 202 (1965). 
Appearing in t is Court pro se, petr raises eight 
claims, one of which concerns the State's use of peremptory 
challenges. Petr primarily argues that he was enied his 
right to a fair tria under the state constitution, but he 
also claims that he ~uffered a deprivation of his rights 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal 
Constitution. In response, the State cites S1ain, asserting 
that the Constitution does not require an examination of the 
reasons un erlying 'ts exercise of peremptory challenges. 
While petr's inartful papers raise some question as to 
whether he pressed a federal claim below, the State does not 
suggest that petr did not preserve a federal question. 
Moreover, it seems clear that Ala. Crim. App. re'ected the 
claim under a line of state decisions that rested on Swain. 
Therefore, 1 will vote to hold this petition for the cases 
in which we will decide whether Batson should be applied 
retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal. 
My vote is to hold for Griffith v. Kentucky, No. 85-
5221, and Brown v. United States, No. 85-5731. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 25, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CO FERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 85-5949, White v. Missouri (cert. to Mo. Ct. App.) 
Petr, who is b ack, was tried for murder. An all-white 
jury was selected after the prosecutor exercised peremptory 
challenges against four black veniremen. Petr moved to 
quash the jury "because of the discriminatory use by the 
state of its peremptory challenges." The TC enied the mo-
tion. Petr was convicted and sentenced to a prison term. 
On direct appeal, petr raise an argument concerning 
the State's exerci e of peremptory challenges. Mo. ct. App. 
rejected that claim on the grounds that petr had failed to 
show a violation of the cross-section requirement imposed by 
Duren v. Missouri, that the actu 1 petit jury need not con-
stitute a cross-section, that petr failed to prove that the 
"representation of blacks was unfair in relat"on to the num-
ber of blacks in the community," an that he failed to es-
tablish systematic exclusion of "blacks as veniremen." The 
court re ected petr's r maining content"ons, nd affirmed. 
Mo. Sup. Ct. denied review. 
Among the c a·ms raise in his cert. petition, petr 
includes his argument concerning the State's use of peremp-
tory challenges, contending that the prosecutor'~ action 
vio ated petr's right to an impartial jury selected from a 
fair cross-section of t e commun ty. Respondinq to that 
claim, the State asserts only that 't need not iscuss the 
issue because we wi reso v the ·ssue in Bat on. 
Since this case was pending on direct appeal when Batson 
was announced, I will vote to hold it for the cases ·n which 
we will decide whether Batson should apply retroactively on 
direct appeal. 
My vote is to hold for Griffith v. Kentucky, No. 85-
5221, and Brown v. United States, No. 85-5731. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 26, 1986 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 85-1317, Tucker v. Un'ted States (cert. to CA7) 
Petr is a b ack man who was tried for fraud along with 
the petr in No. 85-976, a white woman. After the prosecu-
tor used four of his seven peremotory cha lenges against 
blacks, an all-white jury was selected. Defense counsel 
objected to exc usion of the black veniremen. When the DJ 
asked for an explanation, the prosecutor stated that, be-
cause the case invo ved comp ex commerc'a transactions, he 
sought educated jurors with business experience, and that 
the blacks on the venire were uneducated. Accepting that 
explanation, the DC overruled defense counsel's objection. 
Petr was convict d. 
On appeal, petr raised three relevant claims. He 
claimed that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's in camera 
submissions to the OJ, that the DC erroneously excluded a 
letter written by a prosecution witness, and that the prose-
cutor impermissibly exe cised his peremptory challenges on 
racial grounds. CA7 rejected these arguments. First, CA7 
concluded that the prosecutor acted prudently in submitting 
certain documents to the DJ for a decision as to whether 
they constituted Brady material. CA7 found petr's sugges-
tion that the documents poisoned the DJ's mind to be "ridic-
ulous" since DJs must be trusted impartially to preside over 
trials at which they possess information adverse to the de-
fendants that the jurors do not know. Second, CA7 agreed 
that the DJ erre in excluding the letter. But A7 observed 
that the letter had been used extensively to impeach the 
witness' testimony and that it did not establish that his 
testimony was false. Under these circumstances, the error 
was "harmless." Finally, CA7 rejected petr's argument con-
cerning the Government's use of peremptory challenges. CA7 
noted that Batson was pending before us, but believed that 
Batson would not help petr, whatever its holding, since the 
DJ already ha satisfied himself that the prosecutor's chal-
lenges were not motivated by racial bias. CA7 held that the 
DC's finding in this connection were "not clearly errone-
ous." 
ln his cert. petition, petr raises the Batson claim, 
emphasizing that the prosecutor's explanation was given ex 
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parte and claiming that the explanation was a pretext. He 
also claims that he was denied due process because the in 
camera submissions biased the DJ against him and that the 
improper evidentiary ruling was such a fundamental error as 
to require reversal w thout nalysis for harmless error. 
For the reasons stated in my hold memo in No. 85-976, 
Be 1 v. United States, 1 will vote to deny th's oetition. 
Consistent with Batson, the DJ asked the prosPcutor to ex-
plain why he challenged blacks. The OJ found that the chal-
lenges were not racia y motiv ted, an CA7 he d that this 
finding was not clear y erroneous. hile there rna be merit 
to petr's argument that an ex parte hearing w s inappropri-
ate, Batson refrained from saying anythinq about the Proce-
dures that the ower courts shou fo low. Thus, a GVR 
would not be helpful. Petr's remaining arguments are not 
certworthy. 
~y vote is to deny. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
June 27, 1986 
MEMORANDUM 'I'O THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases Held for Batson v. Kentucky, No. 84-6263 
No. 85-5451, Riley v. Delaware (cert. to Del. Sup. Ct.) 
During ;urv selection at petr's murder trial, the prose-
cutor use0 3 of is 12 peremptory c allenges against the 
three blacks rem in ng on the venire after challenges for 
cause. Petr ' 0 not make a contemporaneou ohjPction to the 
prosecutor' c allenges, but after the 'ury wa~ selected he 
renewed an earlier motion to " ischarge the venire for ra-
cial imbalance." The TC denied the motion. Pe r was con-
victed for both 'ntentional murder and felony murder, and 
sentenced to eat for the f.e1on murder. 
On appeal, Del. Sup. ct. considerPd petr's argument that 
the proqecutor ex rcised his peremptory challenges for "ra-
cial reasons" in violation of the ;:,'x h Arne dment. The 
court rejected the argument on t~o grounds . F'rst, tt con-
cluded that DPtr ~id not present his bixth Amendment claim 
to the TC ecause he never suggested there that the State 
had used 'ts challenges on raci l grounds. Second, the 
court decided th t, even if petr h d presented the claim, he 
failed to establ'sh a "pr'ma fac·e claim that the State ex-
ercised its peremptory challenges on racial grounds." The 
court was persuaded by precedent from other jurisdictions 
that had rejecten the standard of S1ain v. Alabama, and ac-
cord'ngly held that a defendant could make out a violation 
of the Delaware Constitution by relying solely on the orose-
cutor's exercise of challenges at h'c; trial. Apo ying that 
new standard, the court found no vio ation on this record. 
Petr raised two additional arguments that are re . evant 
to this petition . First, he claimed that his rights under 
the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause were 
violated when the venire became "rac'ally d'sproportionate~ 
through the TC's excusal of black ;urors for personal rea-
sons. Del. Sup. Ct. rejected that argument on the ground 
that s'mply proving a reduction ' n the number of black veni-
remen through su~h exc sa1s did not violate the Constitu-
tion. Second, pPtr challenged the State's use of the under-
ly'ng felony (first-degree robbery) (1) to elevate the of-
fense from a reckless ki ling to a first degree felony mur-
der offense an~ (2) as an aggravating circumstance to permit 
imposition of capital punishment . Petr argued that such 
t 
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wdual use" placed him in double jeopardy and sub ected him 
to wcruel and inhuman punishment." Del. Sup. Ct. reiected 
that claim under its decision in Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 
552 (1985). Finally, Del. Sup. Ct. considered an argument 
raised by the ACLO as am'cus concerning remarks made by the 
prosecutor during the sentencing hearing. The prosecutor 
explained that the sentence was subject to automat'c reviP-w 
by Del. Sup. Ct. and that the jurors therefore were required 
to complete interrogatories explaining their findings. 
Since petr had not raised this i~sue either at tr'a or on 
appeal, Del. Sup. Ct. stated that any error would be revers-
ible only if it constituted "manifest injustice." The court 
then discussed our holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi, OS 
s.ct. 2633 (1985), and concluded that, unlike the remarks 
there, these remarks were not c lcu1ated to dimin'sh the 
jurors' sense of respons'bility, but rather accur tely de-
scribed the governing statute. 
In his cert. pe tion, petr repe ts the c a'ms described 
above. 1 will vote to deny. Del. Sup. Ct. gave a ternative 
holdinqs with respect to petr•s Batson cl 'm, one of which 
rested on a procedural default. Th court's decision there-
fore is suPported by adequate and independent state law 
grounds. Moreover, the court re'ecte~ petr•s claim on the 
merits under a stand rd that is not 'neon i~tent w'th 
Batson. 
Petr's remaininq claims are not cer.tworthy. His chal-
lenge to the composition of the venire i rneritless since 
the claim rests solelv on the fact that a larqe number of 
black veniremen were excu ed for personal reasonsJ he con-
cedes that he has made no showing of racial discrimination 
in selection of the venire. Whether or not there is any 
merit to petr's argument concern'ng "dual use" of the under-
lying felony, the issue is not squarely presentP.d here since 
petr was convicted both for 'ntentional murder and for felo-
ny murder. Finally, Del. Sup. Ct. proper y app ied the 
standard of Caldwell and reasonab y cone uded that the ros-
ecutor•s comment about the ava'lab'l ty of utomatic review 
was simply an accurate description of state law. 
My vote is to deny. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
